Majority
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Long Beach dated September 28, 2005, granting the application of the respondents Alexandra Yaniv and Morris Yaniv for a variance, and an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), entered March 14, 2006, which denied the petition and dismissed the hybrid proceeding and action.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof dismissing the eighth and ninth causes of action; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and the eighth and ninth causes of action are reinstated and severed.
Contrary to the contentions of the petitioners, the determination of the respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Long Beach (hereinafter the board) was amply supported by the hearing record and was not arbitrary and capricious (see gener
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the board took a hard look at the relevant areas of environmental concern associated with the variance application and set forth an adequate reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination. Accordingly, the requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) were satisfied, and the Supreme Court properly rejected the petitioners’ contention to the contrary (see generally Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306 [2006]; Matter of Spitzer v Farrell, 100 NY2d 186 [2003]).
The board’s issuance of findings of fact subsequent to the commencement of this matter does not constitute a basis for reversal {see Matter of North Shore F.C.P., Inc. v Mammina, supra; Matter of Efraim v Trotta, 17 AD3d 463 [2005]; Matter of Warren v Harris, 179 AD2d 660 [1992]; Matter of Berka v Seltzer, 170 AD2d 450 [1991]).
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the petitioners’ first seven causes of action, which challenged the administrative determination of the board. However, given the factual disputes among the parties with regard to the plenary claims set forth in the eighth and ninth causes of action, and the absence of a dispositive motion directed
Cases cited
- Halperin v. City of New Rochelle 24 AD3d 768 p. 1069
- Sasso v. Osgood 86 NY2d 374 p. 1069
- Mangan v. Cianciulli 19 AD3d 598 p. 1069
- CFS Realty Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals 7 AD3d 705 p. 1069
- Suddell v. Zoning Board of Appeals 36 NY2d 312 p. 1069
- North Shore F.C.P., Inc. v. Mammina 22 AD3d 759 p. 1069
- In re Il Classico Restaurant, Inc. 254 AD2d 418 p. 1069
- Michelson v. Warshavsky 236 AD2d 406 p. 1069
- Community Synagogue v. Bates 1 NY2d 445 at 454 p. 1069
- Eadie v. Town Board 7 NY3d 306 p. 1069
- Spitzer v. Farrell 100 NY2d 186 p. 1069
- Efraim v. Trotta 17 AD3d 463 p. 1069
- Warren v. Harris 179 AD2d 660 p. 1069
- Berka v. Seltzer 170 AD2d 450 p. 1069