Sullivan v. Paterson

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (O’Connor, J.), entered July 23, 2010 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendants’ cross motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring chapter 45 of the Laws of 2010 to be constitutional.

In this action, plaintiffs challenge legislation enacted in April

Turning to the merits, and applying the “exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality” that this statute enjoys, we must reject plaintiffs equal protection challenge (Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d 7 , 11 [1976]). Where, as here, a legislative distinction is not based on a suspect classification and does not impair a fundamental right, the challenger has the tremendous burden of demonstrating that no facts can reasonably be conceived to show the existence of a rational basis in support of some legitimate state interest in drawing the distinction (see Miriam Osborn Mem. Home Assn. v Chassin, 100 NY2d 544 , 547 [2003]; Riley v County of Monroe, 43 NY2d 144 , 149 [1977]). “The rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d 713 , 719 [2001], cert denied 534 US 826 [2001] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d 284 , 290 [1999], cert denied 530 US 1276 [2000]; FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US 307 , 314 [1993]) and requires the challenger to negate “ ‘every conceivable basis which might support [the state’s interest] whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record’ ” (Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d at 719 , quoting Heller v Doe, 509 US 312 , 320-321 [1993]). The state, on the other hand, need not produce any evidence to demonstrate the existence of any rational reason for the statu

Here, defendants have proffered, as a rational basis for drawing a distinction between NYSUT members and nonmembers, that the eligibility exclusion provides a legitimate means to target a group of individuals who, if encouraged to retire, will provide the most cost savings — namely, the classroom teachers and teachers assistants that make up the majority of individuals represented by NYSUT, as opposed to the supervisory and administrative personnel represented by ESSAA. The premise asserted — which plaintiff does not effectively rebut — is that replacing administrators and supervisors is not as advantageous from a cost-savings perspective as replacing older classroom teachers, because supervisors and administrators are usually replaced by someone closer in seniority than a classroom teacher’s replacement. The Court of Appeals previously has held that a similarly drawn distinction between teachers and administrators on a financial basis is rational, even where some of the administrators also taught. In Schneider v Sobol ( 76 NY2d 309 [1990]), the Court upheld a regulation that targeted teachers and excluded individuals who were compensated under an administrative or supervisory salary schedule from receiving legislatively created salary supplements where it was uncontroverted that “the average salaries of school administrators as a group are consistently higher than comparable salaries of teachers as a group” (id. at 314-315). Likewise, we agree with Supreme Court’s well-reasoned conclusion that the proffered financial basis for the distinction utilized here also is rational.

Plaintiff’s assertion that the legislation was not explicitly targeted at teachers alone is insufficient to change the fact that such a distinction, as applied, provides a rational basis for the legislation. Indeed, “ ‘it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the [Legislature’ ” (Port Jefferson Health Care Facility v Wing, 94 NY2d at 290 , quoting FCC v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 US at 315 ; see Affronti v Crosson, 95 NY2d at 719 ). Further, plaintiffs assertion that the Legislature’s decision to include ERS members in the definition of eligible employees necessitates a finding that the state did not intend to target teachers because “[n]o teachers belong to . . . ERS” is incorrect inasmuch as the Legislature had to include ERS members to reach those teachers employed by state-operated institutions of the State University of New York and community colleges (see L 2010, ch 45, § 3 [a], [c]).

Nor are we persuaded that the eligibility requirement is ir-

Finally, we turn to plaintiffs assertion that Supreme Court erred in determining that “NYSUT affiliated locals are a reasonable proxy for teachers” because there are some classroom teachers that are not members of NYSUT. Inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of any individual classroom teacher who would have retired under the incentive but for the requirement that they be a member of NYSUT, plaintiff lacks standing to assert this particular argument on behalf of those excluded teachers (see e.g. Matter of Benedictine Hosp. v Glessing, 47 AD3d 1184 , 1187 [2008]). Indeed, those individuals who submitted affidavits asserting that they had been personally and negatively impacted by the eligibility exclusion were all administrators or supervisors. Plaintiff also lacks standing to assert that the statute violates any individual’s right to free association because he has not offered proof of any individual who would have retired pursuant to chapter 45 of the Laws of 2010, but for their choice not to join a union affiliated with NYSUT (see e.g. id.; see also Wild v Hayes, 68 AD3d 1412 , 1414 [2009]).

Cardona, P.J., Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.