Rice v. California Lutheran Hospital

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant, Lutheran Hospital Society ■ of Southern California, a corporation, notwithstanding a verdict in her favor, in an action for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of said defendant.

Plaintiff, on the recommendation of her physician, entered the defendant’s hospital as a patient at 7 :30 p. m. on Thursday, October 8, 1942, for an operation consisting of the removal of her uterus which was affected with cancer. She was assigned to a room and put to bed, where she remained until the following Saturday morning when the operation was performed. The operation required an abdominal incision four or five inches long, and extended over a period of an hour and forty-five minutes. A spinal anesthetic was administered, prior to the operation, and occasionally during the progress of it, nitrous oxide (laughing gas) was given to the patient.

At the time of the injury plaintiff’s room was equipped with a table standing about a foot from the left side of the bed, the top of which was about six inches below the level of the bed. On the Monday following the operation at 12:30 p. m., while plaintiff was alone in her room, an employee of the hospital brought a tray with a teapot of hot water, a cup and saucer, a spoon and a tea bag which she placed on the bedside table. She left immediately. Later a nurse noticed that the call light at plaintiff !s door was on and entered her room. She found the teapot and cup and saucer on the bed. The tray was on the bedside table. Plaintiff had suffered burns

To support the judgment notwithstanding the verdict defendant urges that there was no substantial evidence of negligence ; that plaintiff was, as a matter of law, eontributively negligent and assumed the risk; that even if serving the tea constituted.negligence, plaintiff’s physician alone was liable, as defendant hospital was merely following his instructions.

This court has recently stated the standard of conduct required of a hospital in the care of its patients:

“ ‘The extent and character of the care that a hospital owes its patients depends on the circumstances of each particular case. A private hospital owes its patients the duty of protection, and must exercise such reasonable care toward a patient as his known condition may require. The measure of duty of a hospital is to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence used by hospitals generally in that community, and required by the express or implied contract of the undertaking. A hospital is liable for want of ordinary care, whether from incompeteney of a nurse or failure in duty by a fully qualified nurse. . . . The duty of care imposed on a hospital extends to safeguarding the patient from dangers due to mental incapacity. ... On the other hand, a private hospital is not an insurer of a patient’s safety, and the rules as to care required are limited by the rule that no one is required to guard against or take measures to avert that which a reasonable person under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to happen.’ ” (Wood v. Samaritan Institution, 26 Cal.2d 847 , 851 [ 161 P.2d 556 ].)

In the light of that standard there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find negligence on the part of defendant in this case. Plaintiff was about 60 years of age. The operation was a serious one requiring nearly two hours to perform and severely taxing the strength of the patient. Only about 48 hours transpired between the operation and the injury. A drainage tube was maintained in the wound until Monday morning. A tube through the nose of the patient to her stomach was maintained to alleviate nausea. The patient was nauseated and frequently vomited. She had had no oral nourishment. She was suffering pain, and drugs were administered to her, the last before the occurrence of the injury being at about 10 a. m. Monday and consisting of 1/3 grain of pantopon, a derivative of opium. About 2:50 Monday

Prom all of these circumstances the trier of fact was justified in finding that the standard of care required by defendant

Defendant vigorously asserts that the only credible evidence in the case shows no liability on its part. It points to testimony of doctors, nurses and the hospital charts to the effect that plaintiff’s condition was good a short time prior to the accident on the day thereof; that she was exceptionally alert mentally; that the narcotics administered to her were for pain alone and would not cause drowsiness or mental sluggishness; and that several witnesses testified that plaintiff had told them that the accident was her fault in that she tired to help herself to the tea to avoid bothering the nurses. It suggests that the evidence produced by plaintiff’s own witnesses shows her condition to have been good, that the narcotics did not affect her mental clarity, and in that connection she is bound by the testimony of those witnesses. Contrary to that latter contention, however, it is within the province of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in evidence whether the conflict is between witnesses on one side or on opposite sides. Hence, this court will not disturb the finding where there is any substantial evidence supporting it, even though there is a conflict in the evidence produced by the prevailing party. (See Dietlin v. General American Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal.2d 336 [ 49 P.2d 590 ]; Frazee v. Fox Film Corp., 45 Cal.App. 661 [ 188 P. 286 ]; Parker v. Herndon, 19 Cal.App. 451 [ 126 P. 183 ]; Pedrow v. Federoff, 77 Cal.App. 164 [ 247 P. 212 ]; Brock v. Pearson, 87 Cal. 581 [ 25 P. 963 ]; Weintraub v. Soronow, 115 Cal.App. 145 [ 1 P.2d 28 ]; Isham v. Trimble, 5 Cal.App.2d 648 [ 43 P.2d 581 ]; Gackstetter v. Market Street Ry. Co., 10 Cal.App.2d 713 [ 52 P.2d 998 ]; Bushey v. Union Oil Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 350 [ 56 P.2d 1272 ]; People v. Crownover, 34 Cal.App.2d 7 [ 92 P.2d 929 ]; Rosella v. Paxinos, 110 Cal.App. 299 [ 294 P. 39 ].) It may be conceded that the conflict in the evidence in this case is violent. Nevertheless, the credibility of the witnesses and the resolution of those conflicts was for the jury. We cannot say that plaintiff’s testimony was inherently incredible, especially when we consider the background of her age, the seriousness of the operation, the time elapsing between the operation

The foregoing discussion not only-shows a basis for finding defendant negligent because it should have anticipated the hazard inherent in its omissions, but also establishes that

Defendant argues that if anyone is liable it is Dr. Chaffin, plaintiff’s physician, who gave the order that plaintiff be served tea knowing the customary manner of serving it which was followed in the case at bar. If the duty of care resting upon the hospital embraced the serving of the tea, defendant cannot escape the responsibility for performance of that duty by attempting to shift it to the doctor. The doctor merely fixed the time when tea could be served to the patient, he did not purport to supervise the care and supervision to be exercised in the process of serving it. Even if he ordered the tea to be served in the customary manner, but that manner was negligent, the defendant would be liable in following such instruction where a duty of care toward the patient rested upon it. The obligation and duty assumed by the hospital is stated generally in Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospital, 18 Cal.2d 97 , 103 [ 114 P.2d 1 ]:

‘‘ The complaint charges only what is common practice, that the hospital agreed to care for the patient in the usual manner, that is, to furnish him with accommodations and to maintain such attendants, including nurses and internes, as would assure him proper care and attention before, during and after the operation. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that the hospital is practicing medicine in violation of law. ’ ’ The nurses attending plaintiff were employed by the defendant hospital and were not special nurses in the employ of either plaintiff or her physician. Likewise, the person who served the tea was defendant’s employee. The defendant was bound to supply proper, attendance and care to plaintiff and that duty extended to furnishing and supervising the furnishing of nourishment. It cannot be said that because the doctor ordered tea to be served plain

The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter judgment for plaintiff 'on the verdict.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Eespondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 20, 1945.