In re Jackson

By this application for the writ of habeas corpus, Mrs. Margaret Jackson seeks the release of her brother, John A. Zanetti, hereinafter sometimes called the patient, who

On February 14, 1947, the patient was committed to the Napa State Hospital by order of the Superior Court of Sonoma County. Such commitment was upon proceedings had .pursuant to provisions of division 6, part 1, chapter 1, of the Welfare and Institutions Code which provide for the commitment of “mentally ill persons who have been adjudicated by a court to be so psychotic as to be dangerous to themselves or to the person or property' of others and are found to be in need of supervision, treatment, care and restraint” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5041). A hearing was had (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5050.9) in which lay witnesses and medical examiners testified as to the patient’s mental condition. On request of counsel the question of Mr. Zanetti’s mental illness or insanity was submitted to a jury; on the issues there involved he was found “mentally ill.” Judgment was rendered and an order of commitment filed. No action or proceeding has been had to challenge directly the initial validity of this judgment, to terminate its effectiveness, or to relieve the patient from its operation. It is true that as a general rule “All persons are presumed to be sane until the contrary is proved” (14 Cal.Jur. § 19, p. 362), but it is also the rule that when insanity, other than “temporary or spasmodic,” has once been finally adjudicated it “is presumed to continue unless the contrary is shown” (see 14 Cal.Jur. §19, p. 363; 28 Ám.Jur. § 121, p. 751; Estate of Baker (1917), 176 Cal. 430 , 436 [ 168 P. 881 ]). The Sonoma County judgment, therefore, remains, and will continue to remain, a valid and effective warrant for detaining the patient in the state hospital, or subject to parole therefrom, until and unless he is discharged by the ■medical superintendent of such hospital (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6729 et seq.) or until his right to release from such detention or supervision has been adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding directed to that end (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6620; Pen. Code, §1473; Cal. Const., art VI, §4; In re Buchanan (1900), 129 Cal. 330 , 332 [ 61 P. 1120 , 50 L.R.A. 378 ]; Kellogg v. Cochran (1890), 87 Cal. 192 , 197 [ 25 P. 677 , 12 L.R.A. 104 ]).

On December 2, 1948, Zanetti’s parole was revoked; he was apprehended and returned to the Napa State Hospital. Demand for his release from the hospital was made to the medical superintendent on December 6,1948, and was refused. Thereafter, on December 21,1948, Mrs. Jackson filed a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Napa County. In the return to the writ the hospital superintendent relied on the February 14, 1947, judgment of commitment. A hearing was had and the writ was denied. A similar petition was filed in the District Court of Appeal on January 20, 1949, and was denied without opinion.

The application for the writ to this court states: “. . . John A. Zanetti was . . . summarily reconfined in the said Napa State Hospital as a mentally ill person without benefit of any legal process whatsoever. That the said Theo K. Miller [superintendent of the Napa State Hospital] . . . held and does now hold said John A. Zanetti in confinement and restraint, notwithstanding the fact that the said John A. Zanetti was at said time and place and is now sane and competent under and by virtue of an adjudication of his ‘legal condition’ as a sane and competent person by a Superior Court of this State, in and for the City and County of San Francisco ...” The “adjudication” referred to is the revocation of letters of guardianship and restoration to capacity in the proceeding under the Probate Code. Petitioner does not allege that Zanetti is not “so psychotic as to be dangerous” to himself “or to the person or property of others” or that he is no longer mentally ill, or that he has recovered to the degree that he is no longer in need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint. At the oral argument petitioner specifically disclaimed any desire to amend her petition and asserted that she chose to rely exclusively upon the adjudication by the San Francisco court restoring the ward to competency and discharging the guardian. It is clear, therefore, that the

The law governing insane and incompetent persons in the State of California is primarily statutory. An examination of the statutes involved and the cases relevant thereto will serve to indicate the definitive variants of the term “insanity” and the possibility of its use in different situations. Among others can be noted: (1) insanity or ineom7 petency with relation to capacity to contract (Civ. Code, §§ 38-40); (2) insanity or incompeteney with relation to capacity to make testamentary disposition (Prob. Code, § 20; Estate of Worrall (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 243 [ 127 P.2d 593 ]; Estate of Baker (1917), 176 Cal. 430 , 436 [ 168 P. 881 ]); (3) insanity with relation to capacity to commit crime (Pen. Code, § 26); (4) insanity as “mental illness” which warrants confinement under provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code, division 6; and, (5) insanity or incompetency pursuant to which, under Probate Code, section 1460, letters of guardianship are issued. “Insanity” may and does mean a variety of different things. Depending on the pertinent statute, a variety of issues of fact can be the subject of litigation. And, depending on which statute is invoked, the parties to the litigation are different and the results obtained are to different ends.

This difference in issues has been recognized and considered in a number of eases. The early ease of Kellogg v. Cochran (1890), supra, 87 Cal. 192 , determined that under Probate Code, section 1470 (at that time Code Civ. Proc., § 1766 et. seq.), the probate court, in revoking letters of guardianship,

“. . .[I]t seems clear that the proceeding against insane and other mentally incompetent persons, authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure, is entirely distinct from the proceedings authorized by the Political Code [now Welf. & Inst. Code] for the commitment of insane persons to the state insane asylum. . . . The application of . . . [Prob. Code, § 1470] to persons committed to the asylum would be utterly inconsistent with the government of those institutions according to the requirements and regulations of the [Welf. & Inst. Code]. . . . After a person has been committed to either of the asylums on a charge of insanity, and received into the asylum, no court in this state is authorized to discharge him therefrom, or to restore him to the capacity of a sane person, under any circumstances, except upon a writ of habeas corpus. The power to discharge him otherwise than upon habeas corpus is vested exclusively in the officers of the asylum.”

In the same manner Aldrich v. Superior Court (1898), 120 Cal. 140 [ 52 P. 148 ], and Aldrich v. Barton (1908), 153 Cal. 488 [ 95 P. 900 ], recognized these two statutes as mutually exclusive. (See, also, Knorp v. Board of Police Commissioners (1916), 31 Cal.App. 539 [ 161 P. 12 ].) Discharge from a mental institution does not in itself warrant discharge of a guardian (In re Des Granges (1929), 102 Cal.App. 592 [ 283 P. 103 ]; Guardianship of Gordon (1943), 56 Cal.App.2d 523 , 527 [ 132 P.2d 824 ]) and, conversely, appointment of a guardian does not in and of itself warrant confinement in an institution (Sullivan v. Dunne (1926), 198 Cal. 183 , 193-194 [ 244 P. 343 ]). Similarly, appointment of a guardian puts an incompetent under a disability to contract (Civ. Code, §40; Hellman etc. Bank v. Alden (1929), 206 Cal. 592 , 604-605 [ 275 P. 794 ]) but, despite commitment to an institution, the patient’s power to contract is left unimpaired (Fetterley v. Randall (1928), 92 Cal.App. 411 , 416 [ 268 P. 434 ]). With reference to release from an institution or the discharge of a guardian it is pointed out in 28 American Jurisprudence, pages 679-680, that “The courts have largely relied upon the opinions of qualified physicians and alienists in testing the advisability of discharging those confined to insane asylums, but have, at the same time, recognized that the determinant factors in such situations are not necessarily the same as those

Limiting our discussion to the two codes involved in this decision, then, it is clear that the proceedings for commitment under the Welfare and Institutions Code and the guardianship proceedings under the Probate Code are two dissimilar and separate proceedings and an order restoring to capacity one who has had a guardian does not entitle him to release from the state hospital when he is held by commitment under the first mentioned code. Proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Probate Code (see § 1460, quoted above) are designed to protect an incompetent who is for any reason mentally incapable of taking care of himself and of his property. The incompetency determined here need not be the result of insanity, e.g., “mental illness,” and no confinement is contemplated. Protection of the incompetent from others is the main purpose of the statute. (Sullivan v. Dunne (1926), supra, 198 Cal. 183 , 190; In re Des Granges (1929), supra, 102 Cal.App. 592 , 598.) The proceedings pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code (see § 5041, quoted above), on the other hand, contemplate determination of the question whether the person is so mentally ill or deranged as to be dangerous to himself or others and, in order to protect society, a proper subject for commitment to the state hospital.

Petitioner contends that “the restoration to the ‘legal condition’ or status of a sane and competent person may be accomplished under the Welfare and Institutions Code by a ‘certificate of discharge as recovered’ issued by the Medical Director of a State Hospital for the Insane, if, but only if, no guardian has been appointed for such person” and from this premise argues that, hence, the court adjudication in the guardianship proceeding must be regarded as paramount. It is true that if the administrative officer issues a “certificate of discharge” and letters of guardianship are outstanding, the action of the administrative officer does not supersede or vacate or terminate the order of the court granting the letters; it would not necessarily and under the specified circumstances be the equivalent of a judicial determination that the ward was capable of managing his person and affairs. (In re Des Granges (1929), supra, 102 Cal.App. 592 .) Cases which support this proposition of law, however, are not authority for

Since the issues before the probate court in the guardianship proceeding did not encompass the issues which were determinative in the proceeding before the Superior Court in Sonoma County, and since it is under the commitment of the latter court that the respondent has acted, we are satisfied that petitioner has failed to make out a ease.

For the reasons stated the writ is discharged and the patient is remanded to the custody of the superintendent of the state hospital at Napa.

Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred in the judgment.