Monarco v. Lo Greco

Natale and Carmela Castiglia were married in 1919 in Colorado. Carmela had three children, John, Rosie and Christie, by a previous marriage. Rosie was married to Nick Norcia. Natale had one grandchild, plaintiff Carmen Monarco, the son of a deceased daughter by a previous marriage. Natale and Carmela moved to California where they invested their assets, amounting to approximately $4,000, in a half interest in agricultural property. Rosie and Nick Norcia acquired the other half interest. Christie, then in his early teens, moved with the family to California. Plaintiff remained in Colorado. In 1926, Christie, then 18 years old, decided to leave the home of his mother and stepfather and seek an independent living. Natale and Carmela, however, wanted him to stay with them and participate in the family venture. They made an oral proposal to Christie that if he stayed home and worked they would keep their property in joint tenancy so that it would pass to the survivor who would leave it to Christie by will except for small devises to John and Rosie. In performance of this agreement Christie remained home and worked diligently in the family venture. He gave up any opportunity for further education or any chance to accumulate property of his own. He received only his room and board and spending money. When he married and suggested the possibility of securing some present interest to support his wife, Natale told him that his wife should move in with the family and that Christie need not worry, for he would receive all the property when Natale and Carmela died. Natale and Carmela placed all of their property in joint tenancy and in 1941 both executed wills leaving all their property to Christie with the exception of small devises to Rosie and John and $500 to plaintiff. Although these wills did not refer to the agreement, their terms were agreed upon by Christie, Natale and Carmela. The venture was successful, so that at the time of Natale’s death his and Carmela’s interest was worth approximately $100,000. Shortly before his death

In this case both elements are present. In reliance on Natale’s repeated assurances that he would receive the property when Natale and Carmela died, Christie gave up any opportunity to accumulate property of his own and devoted his life to making the family venture a success. That he would be seriously prejudiced by a refusal to enforce the contract is made clear by a comparison of his position with that of Rosie and Nick Norcia. Because the Norcias were able to make a small investment when the family venture was started, their interest, now worth approximately $100,000, has been protected. Christie, on the other hand, forbore from demanding any present interest in the venture in exchange for his labors on the assurance that Natale’s and Carmela’s interest would pass to him on their death. Had he invested money instead of labor in the venture on the same oral understanding, a resulting trust would have arisen in his favor. (Byers v. Doheny, 105 Cal.App. 484 , 493-495 [ 287 P. 988 ]; see, Restatement, Trusts, § 454, comment J., illus. 12.) His 20 years of labor should have equal effect. On the other hand, Natale reaped the benefits of the contract. He and his devisees would be unjustly enriched if the statute of frauds could be

It is contended, however, that an estoppel to plead the statute of frauds can only arise when there have been representations with respect to the requirements of the statute indicating that a writing is not necessary or will be executed or" that the statute will not be relied upon as a defense. This element was present in the leading case of Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782 [ 106 P. 88 , 134 Am.St.Rep. 154 ], and it is not surprising therefore that it has been listed as a requirement of an estoppel in later cases that have held on their facts that there was or was not an estoppel.. (See, e.g., Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80 , 87 [ 193 P. 84 ]; Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal.App.2d 171 , 175 [ 112 P.2d 30 ] ; Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal.App. 244 , 246 [ 184 P. 954 ].) Those cases, however, that have refused to find an estoppel have been cases where the court found either that no unconscionable injury would result from refusing to enforce the oral contract (Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80 , 87 [ 193 P. 84 ]; Smith v. Bliss, 44 Cal.App.2d 171 , 178 [ 112 P.2d 30 ]; Little v. Union Oil Co., 73 Cal.App. 612 , 621-622 [ 238 P. 1066 ]; Standing v. Morosco, 43 Cal.App. 244 , 247, 248 [ 184 P. 954 ]), or that the remedy of quantum meruit for services rendered was adequate. (Murdock v. Swanson, 85 Cal.App.2d 380 , 385 [ 193 P.2d 81 ]; De Mattos v. McGovern, 25 Cal.App.2d 429 , 432 [ 77 P.2d 522 ]; cf., Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580 , 586 [ 147 P. 259 ].) In those cases, however, where either an unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment would result from refusal to enforce the contract, the doctrine of estoppel has been applied whether or not plaintiff relied upon representations going to the requirements of the statute itself. (Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal.2d 416 [ 65 P.2d 770 ]; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal.2d 469 [ 45 P.2d 198 ]; Sandfoss v. Jones, 35 Cal. 481 ; Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897 [ 198 P.2d 357 ]; Frey v. Corbin, 84 Cal.App.2d 536 [ 191 P.2d 21 ]; Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal.App.2d 282 [ 188 P.2d 278 ]; Tobola v. Wholey, 75 Cal.App.2d 351 [ 170 P.2d 952 ]; Van Fossen v. Yager, 65 Cal.App.2d 591 [ 151 P.2d 14 ]; Honsberger v. Durfee, 55 Cal.App.2d 68 [ 130 P.2d 189 ]; Sessions v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 47 Cal.App.2d 611 [ 118 P.2d 935 ]; Rutland, Edwards & Co. v. Cooke, 44 Cal.App.2d 258 [ 112 P.2d 287 ]; Pellerito v. Dragna, 41 Cal.App.2d 85 [ 105 P.2d 1011 ]; Tuck v. Gudnason, 11 Cal.App.2d 626 [ 54 P.2d 88 ]; Feeney v. Clapp, 126 Cal.App. 729 [ 15 P.2d 178 ]; Holstrom v. Mullen, 84 Cal.App. 1

It is settled that neither the remedy of an action at law for damages for breach of contract nor the quasi-contractual remedy for the value of services rendered is adequate for the breach of a contract to leave property by will in exchange for services of a peculiar nature involving the assumption or continuation of a close family relationship. (Jones v. Clark, 19 Cal. 2d 156 , 160 [ 119 P.2d 731 ]; Wolfsen v. Smyer, 178 Cal. 775 , 782-783 [ 175 P. 10 ]; Baumann v. Kusian, 164 Cal. 582 , 587-588 [ 129 P. 986 , 44 L.R.A.N.S. 756 ]; McCabe v. Healy, 138 Cal. 81 , 88-89 [ 70 P. 1008 ]; Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444 , 450, 452 [ 45 P. 710 , 33 L.R.A. 369 ].) The facts of this ease clearly bring it within the foregoing rule.

It is contended, however, that since Christie is not a party to this action, his change of position in reliance on Natale’s promises will not support Carmela’s efforts to secure the benefits of the contract due to her. In this respect, plaintiff contends that defendants did not plead a contract for Christie’s benefit but only one whereby Carmela was entitled to ownership as the surviving joint tenant. When the action was commenced, however, Carmela was the person entitled

The judgments are affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J., concurred.