Bourne v. Bourne

The plaintiff, Marie Bourne, brought this action against Harry S. Bourne and Hope Bourne, the parents of her husband, Ralph Bourne, to recover damages for the alleged alienation of her husband’s affections. The ease was tried before a jury, and there was a verdict and judgment for twelve thousand five hundred dollars in plaintiff’s favor. The defendants appeal, basing their claim for reversal on insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict, and error of the court in giving and refusing instructions and in the admission of evidence.

The weak point in plaintiff’s case is insufficiency of the evidence that the desertion of plaintiff by her husband was caused or influenced by the fault of the defendants or that

This hearsay testimony, as has been indicated, consisted of the testimony of the plaintiff, supplemented by that of some of her witnesses, as to declarations which they claimed the husband, Ralph Bourne, made in their presence, of criticism and unkind remarks, and attempts to influence him against his wife, made by his parents, chiefly his mother. The following excerpts from the transcript of the evidence will serve to illustrate the character of this testimony as to alleged declarations of Ralph Bourne: “He told me that they spoke to him about coming back, and that he could not possibly get along over in Glendale because he couldn’t earn his living; . . . and they said they would do anything he wanted if he would come back to Eagle Rock, and Ralph was very indignant about it, and he told me about it, and said for me not to mind what they said because they could never get him away from me. . . . Well, Ralph was very angry with his folks because he always told me never to mind what Ms folks said about me, because he didn’t believe them; that he would never leave me for any reason in the world; . . . that he would never leave me to go back to his folks. . . . Sometimes he wouldn’t tell me all that was said until later. He used to say that he didn’t like to tell me everything that they said, because he said it would make me feel bad if I knew that

[1] There was a good deal more hearsay testimony of this character. It all went in over the objections of defendants’ counsel that it was incompetent and hearsay, and under a ruling of the court that it was admitted only for the purpose of showing the state of the husband’s feelings during this period; and the court expressly instructed the jury that they were to receive it for no other purpose, and that it was not competent evidence to prove any of the conduct or statements therein attributed to the defendants.

It is probable that the court was correct in its ruling, although there were some of these hearsay narratives attributed to the husband, which gave purported damaging statements of his parents, that were not accompanied by any evidence of his own feelings in the matter. A fair consideration of the rulings on the extent to which such declarations may be used in evidence, in Cripe v. Cripe, 170 Cal. 91 , [ 148 Pac. 520 ], Humphrey v. Pope, 1 Cal. App. 375 , [ 82 Pac. 223 ]; Barlow v. Barnes, 172 Cal. 98 , [ 155 Pac. 457 ], and Jameson v. Tully,

It is apparent, from the undisputed evidence, that the marriage of this young couple took place with the full consent and approval of the defendants. The plaintiff, before the marriage, was a frequent guest at defendants’ home, and sometimes spent the night with them. They were present at the marriage ceremony, and provided a home for the young couple with the declared purpose of ultimately deeding it to them. The mother-in-law spoke in high terms of approval of the new daughter-in-law, stating to one of plaintiff’s witnesses that Ralph had married her “because he knew she was a good, pure girl.” Both the parents wanted the young couple in their company, and the mother was particularly solicitous to have the companionship and affection of her son’s wife. If any criticism can be made of the attitude of the defendants toward their daughter-in-law during the first few months of the marriage, it was for over-zealousness and officiousness for her welfare. They probably were not always wise or discreet, and, according to plaintiff’s testimony, were inclined to impose upon the young couple too dictatorial a supervision of their conduct and affairs; but that anything was said or done by these defendants which was not meant in kindness and for the good of both their son and his wife during the first months of their marriage, is not seriously contended.

The plaintiff was eighteen years of age and her husband was twenty-one when they were married in May, 1913. He was .the only child of the defendants. There was nothing worthy of serious consideration that occurred in the family to disturb the harmony of any of their relations, particularly as relates to the conduct of defendants, for several months. There had been some criticism, which was neither unkindly

Then came the second, and final, serious episode in the relations of these two families—the result of an evident misunderstanding, for which the plaintiff was apparently as much to blame as anyone else. Mrs. Bourne, the elder, had a woman friend—a Mrs. Visel—who frequently visited at her home, and with whom she was talking one day about her daughter-in-law’s skill in sewing. She made a remark about her sewing which all parties agree was perfectly harmless, and more in the nature of praise than of criticism. Mrs. Visel repeated this to plaintiff in a way to leave the impression that the mother-in-law was finding fault. Plaintiff then gave her version of the matter to her husband. He, in turn, repeated it to his father; and the father took his wife to task for having made an unkindly criticism of the daughter-in-law. By the time the story got back to the mother, she received the impression that Mrs. Visel had misrepresented the incident and

This second separation of the families occurred about two years after the marriage of the young people and about four months before the plaintiff was deserted. During all this time the young husband sided with his wife in whatever differences occurred, and was admittedly deeply in love with her, and, according to the wife’s testimony, expressed great indignation at anything like a hostile attitude toward her on the part of his parents. If there had been any attempt on the part of the parents to alienate him from his wife, it had, up to this time, been a signal failure.

After this second episode, the young people again moved into apartments of their own, but the son continued in the employment of his father. Friendly relations were not resumed with the plaintiff, although the parents made overtures in that direction by taking the young people products of their home garden, and inviting them to join in auto trips. The plaintiff repulsed these advances, and displayed a spirit of unrelenting hostility to the husband’s parents. She evidently, as her husband testifies, resented any approaches to social intimacy with them on the part of their son, and virtually admitted that she insisted upon Ms giving up all family relations with them. Reading between the lines of plaintiff’s own testimony, it is evident that this matter became one of some tension and bitterness between

Mrs. McDonald, the plaintiff's mother, testified that on one occasion the elder Mrs. Bourne spent the evening with her and talked about Marie all the time. This was in the winter of 1914, evidently while the young people were living at Glendale. She testifies that Mrs. Bourne said that Marie was not a good housekeeper; that it would have been better for Balph if he had never married her, and that he would never get along. Mrs. McDonald also testified that she saw the defendant Harry Bourne the day after the trouble over the automobile accident, and that he said: “Balph was going with another girl at the same time as with Marie, and that he wished Balph had married the other girl. He said she was not a good housekeeper, and was extravagant, and that Balph would have been better off if he had not married her.”

There may have been some other statements of like nature, but the foregoing is substantially the sum total of any expression, by act or word, prior to the date of the separation of plaintiff and her husband, tending to show malice or ill will on the part of the defendants toward the plaintiff. This and the two quarrels they had, and the fact that the plaintiff herself had given them little cause to feel kindly toward her, is the sole basis for the inference that the defendants had willfully and maliciously alienated their son’s affections from his wife or influenced him to desert her. There is no direct evidence whatever that they ever, by any word or conduct directed to or in the presence of their son, attempted to influence his relations with his wife.

There is only one other circumstance in this unfortunate family tragedy tending to connect the defendants with the separation of their son from his wife. On the 10th of July, 1915, the desertion took place. Balph Bourne, in the absence of his wife from home on that day, went to their apartment, packed up Ms belongings and some of the wedding presents he and his wife had received at their marriage, and departed. He took an east-bound train for New York, and did not return to Los Angeles until about the time of this trial. It is admitted that on the 7th or 8th of July he disclosed to his parents his intention to leave, and asked for money for his trip. He and both the defendants testify that the parents objected to Ms separation from his wife, and urged upon Mm

The plaintiff’s cause of action is for alienation of her husband’s affections and inducing the desertion. If the state of mind which induced this desertion was caused by the willful and malicious influence of the parents, they would be liable, irrespective of whether or not they assisted him in his plans to go away. If his loss of affection for and determination to leave his wife arose from their own domestic troubles, whether over the wife’s implacable purpose to break up his relations with his father and mother or otherwise, and without malicious interference of the defendants, they are not legally responsible, no matter what assistance they gave him in carrying out his purpose; and no presumption of a bad motive arises from the mere fact that they gave bim such assistance. (Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317 , [ 51 Am. St. Rep. 310 , 33 N. E. 638 ]; Trumbull v. Trumbull,

[5] The relations of a parent, particularly of a mother to her son, are scarcely less sacred that the relationship between husband and wife, and are usually more unselfish. The home of the parents is the natural sanctuary of the children in eases of marital infelicity. It is not the policy of the law to leave this door open only at the risk of involving the parents in litigation for alienation of affection. No presumption arises of malicious interference because the parents take sides with their child, unless it affirmatively appears that it is done in bad faith and from ill will toward the other party. A mother has a right to fight to retain the affection and society of her boy so long as she does not try to interfere with his duty to his own domestic relations; and any wife who, without serious cause, interposes a barrier to her husband’s affectionate regard for his mother, deserves to lose his love. We find no evidence in this ease of anything but a spirit of friendliness and a desire to conciliate the regard and affection of this plaintiff on the part of defendants, for the first two years of her marriage with their son, a spirit which, if interrupted, was not broken by the one or two unfortunate quarrels, incidents for which the plaintiff’s suspicion and unfriendly attitude toward her parents-in-law were largely responsible. And after the quarrel in March, 1915, some three or four months before the desertion of plaintiff by her husband, there is no reason to believe there was a day when the defendants would not gladly have welcomed a reconciliation with their daughter-in-law. They made every attempt in that direction that self-respect would permit, and their advances were coldly repulsed. [6] It is not unlikely in moments of resentment they said harsh and unkind things about her; but that fact

It must be remembered that there is no direct evidence that they did try to influence their son in this regard, but, on the other hand, the son and both defendants explicitly deny that any such influence was ever attempted; and each of them testified that the defendants, when told of his intentions, advised him to remain with his wife. The husband’s explanation of the estrangement from his wife is that it resulted from constant quarrels over the wife’s insistence that he give up all social relations with his father and mother. There is at least no evidence to rebut the statement of the defendants that they were so informed, and so believed, when they finally consented to aid their son in the separation. [7] It is a cruel and reprehensible circumstance that they permitted this thing to happen without offering any aid or comfort to the deserted wife. But, however unjustifiable this may seem, even in view of the plaintiff’s hostility toward them, it was the violation of no legal duty, and in itself raises no inference that they instigated his desertion. It is sought to connect the mother with the preparation of the note left by the husband to inform the plaintiff of his desertion. Balph Bourne and both defendants deny that she had anything to do with it. The only evidence tending to show that the mother had any part in this note is a single word written on its margin, which the plaintiff testified was in the handwriting of her husband’s mother. A comparison of this with other exhibits showing the same word in the admitted handwriting of the mother alone seems to be a sufficient disproof of this testimony. But, in any event, it is an immaterial circumstance. The note was written after the determination of Balph Bourne to leave his wife had been formed and declared, and at the most would indicate an acquiescence and co-operation in his avowed purpose, without being of the slightest value in showing that the defendants had influenced his determination in the matter, or in discrediting their testimony that they relied on the representations of their son as to the cause of his separation from his wife. The jury may have been justified in disbelieving the testimony of Balph Bourne as to the cause of his leaving his wife, but there is no legal ground for rejecting the testimony

Respondent’s counsel argue that the acts of the parents disclose a hostile feeling toward their daughter-in-law, that this feeling evidences a motive prompting them to alienate the son’s affections, and that, therefore, the existence of such motive is a circumstance that may justify the inference that the parents did use persuasion and inducement to alienate their son’s affection from his young wife. Seeking to draw an analogy between a case such as this and a prosecution for crime, counsel say: “Men are hung for less evidence than this. . . . Jones has a grudge against Smith, and Smith is found murdered; Jones is shown to have had the opportunity to commit the crime; his gun is found in the vicinity of the murder bearing evidence that one shot had been fired; at the trial he attempts to establish an alibi; the jury convicts him and the court upholds the conviction, and no reasonable man questions the fact that the evidence

[11] Conceding its full probative force to all the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff, and disregarding, as we must, the denials and contrary testimony of the defendants, the evidence is insufficient for this purpose. The evidence here would not justify a verdict against strangers, much less as against parents. [12] The law places the parents of a married child on a much more favorable basis than that of a stranger to the family relations, in actions for alienation of affection. All presumptions in such eases must be that the parents will act only for the best interests of the child. (Trumbull v. Trumbull, supra; Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280 , [ 80 Am. St. Rep. 396 , 47 Atl. 553 ]; Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556 , [9 Ann. Cas. 958, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 322 , 79 N. E. 762 ]; Reed v. Reed, supra; Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93 , [ 32 L. R. A. 623 , 19 South. 955 ]; Hall v. Hall, 174 Cal. 718 , [ 164 Pac. 390 ].) In Hall v. Hall, supra, our supreme court states the rule as follows: “Having in contemplation the natural solicitude of the parent for the child, and the well-nigh universal experience of mankind that parents in their conduct toward their children are actuated by high and disinterested motives involving the sacrifice of their own interests for the welfare of their child,

Appellants further urged as ground for reversal that there is no evidence in this case to justify holding the defendant Harry S. Bourne as a joint tort-feasor with his wife, even if the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict against the latter. We think this point is well taken. As has been pointed out, not one hostile word or act tending to show malice or ill will on the part of the father against his son’s wife, or any effort on his part to bring about a separation, appears in the record, excepting the circumstances as testified to by plaintiff’s mother; that after the quarrel and removal of the young folks to Glendale, incident to the automobile accident, the father-in-law said that he was sorry his son had not married another girl with whom he had kept company, and that Marie, the plaintiff, was not a good housekeeper. It is true the father-in-law was a party to the quarrel

[13] We are of the opinion, too, that there was error in the admission by the court, over defendants’ objection, of plaintiff’s testimony of declarations of her husband as to his father being worth seventy-five thousand dollars. This was clearly hearsay, had no legitimate value in proving the state of the husband’s feelings, was contrary to the testimony of the defendant parent—who swore that he was not worth over fifteen or twenty thousand dollars—and quite probably influenced the comparatively large amount of damages found by the jury.

Judgment reversed.

Finlayson, P. J., concurred.

I regret most sincerely my inability to

secure the approval of my own conscience, which is absolutely necessary, in order to agree with my sincere, able, and distinguished associates in their conclusion as expressed in the foregoing opinion. I therefore dissent.

In view of what appears to me the importance of this case, coupled with the fact that this presents our first disagreement, I submit the case as I see it, rather than, as is customary, to discuss only the points upon which we disagree:

The record here discloses, among other matters, the following facts: That plaintiff married Ralph Bourne on May 20, 1913, when she was eighteen and Ralph twenty-one years of age; that Ralph loved her when he married her, and continued to so love her at all times up to a date approximately that of the desertion, to wit, July 10, 1915; and that she was a devoted and loving wife. That on the date last mentioned Ralph told his wife he was going to work, and directed her to go to Los Angeles, borrow enough money from her sister to purchase a pair of shoes and some theater tickets, and meet him at 6:30 P. M. at the Hayward Hotel, in Los Angeles; that plaintiff did as directed; that shortly after plaintiff left home to carry out the plan as above stated Ralph and his father, Harry S. Bourne, drove up in the defendants’ automobile to within one block of the apartment house in which Ralph Bourne and his wife were living, stopping in the rear of the apartment house, and Ralph, alighting from the automobile, went into his apartment, carrying a valise which had been furnished for that occasion by his parents; that he there en. countered his mother-in-law, to whom he misstated his errand, and then proceeded to change his clothes; that he at that time left for his wife a certain “note,” which, in words and figures, is as follows:

“July 10th, 1915.

“I simple am sick and tired of this life, so am leaving for good. I am taking the silver, and consider this a fair division, as you have your ring, and a couple of hundred dollars’ worth of furniture.

“Ralph.

“P. S.—Don’t blame my folks, as they are ignorant of my whereabouts.”

On the back of this note appeared the following memorandum: “Silver, blue suit, shoes, collars, razor and strop, tooth brush, brushes, underclothes, jack bowl.” The articles last

One hundred and eighty pages of a two hundred and sixty page opening brief is directed by appellants to the discussion of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Many points are urged for a reversal. I shall discuss only those which I deem essential for my present purpose.

The verdict is attacked as unsupported by the evidence. I am satisfied from an examination of the record that there was sufficient evidence—although not as weighty as might be desired—to justify the verdict, and hence to support the judgment; and this even though we disregard the declarations of the husband to his wife, without the presence of the parents. In discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, appellants urge that the court erred in permitting plaintiff to state, over defendants’ objection, declarations claimed by Ralph to have [been made by his parents to him concerning his wife, etc., in

I believe the case of Cripe v. Cripe, supra, decisive of this phase of the case, notwithstanding that at first blush it would appear that the case of Barlow v. Barnes, 172 Cal. 98 , [ 155 Pac. 457 ]—a later case—would seem to be in conflict therewith. This, I think, is more apparent than real. Respondent’s argument here appeals to me. When considered in all its aspects, I think it not in conflict with the Cripe case, for a different point is decided. In the Cripe case it was held that, “in an action for alienating the affections of a husband or wife, the state of the feelings of such husband or wife is material.” In the Barnes case the court held that the guilt of the defendant cannot be proved by declarations of the alienated spouse as to the acts or statements of defendant. From the language of the court, I cannot conclude that it intended to go any further than that or to announce a rule contrary to that applied in the Cripe case. In the Barnes case there were two alleged causes of action—one for alienation of the wife’s affections and the other for damages for alleged criminal intercourse with the wife. When the letters in that case, objections to the introduction of which were sustained by the court, were sought to be introduced, there was no statement or explanation made to the court that they were offered for any limited purpose; and, so far as that case was concerned, such limited purpose would appear to have been to show a state of mind or feelings on the part of the alleged alienated spouse at the time the said letters were written, and thus to support the first cause of action, and in the absence of such explanation their reception might reasonably have led the jury to consider them in connection with the second alleged cause of action. In my opinion, the ruling of the trial court, under the facts as there presented, was absolutely correct. In the Cripe case, as in the case at bar, the offer of the letters and the declarations was accompanied by such explanation, the court, in overruling the objections in this case, so stating, and at the same time admonishing the jury as already indicated. Indeed, in the Barnes case, as one of the several propositions advanced, it was argued to the trial court by counsel for appellant “that they [the letters] were material to the issues under both causes alleged is apparent from the language of the letters, showing that her affections were alien

One other point in the Barnes case needs consideration. The supreme court in that ease used the following language: “They [the letters] were not admissible under section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” and cites, among others, the case of Humphrey v. Pope, 1 Cal. App. 374 , [ 82 Pac. 223 ], decided July 25, 1905, and at a time when that section did not contain its present exception permitting a husband or wife to testify in such a case as the one at bar. The Barnes case was decided by the supreme court on February 10, 1916. The section referred to was amended, as indicated, in 1911. It is apparent, therefore, that the Gripe decision, as well as the fact that section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been so amended, was not called to that court’s attention, as the court uses the specific language last above quoted, and follows the Humphrey case. In view, therefore, of the exact question which was presented to the court in the Barnes case for its decision, and confronted, as we are, with the array of facts just referred to, there is, I think, no warrant for construing that decision as in conflict with the Gripe case on the point involved and now under discussion in the ease at bar. This construction is in line, in my opinion, not only with the doctrine laid down by our own supreme court, but with what seems to me the overwhelming weight of authority of this question.

Certain instructions given by the court to the jury are objected to by appellants here. “If all the instructions taken together, and not being inconsistent with each other or confusing, give to the jury a fair and just notion of the law upon the point to which they are addressed, it is sufficient.” (Weaver v. Carter, 28 Cal. App. 241 , [ 152 Pac. 323 ]; Hamlin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 776 , [ 89 Pac. 1109 ]; Taylor v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 172 Cal 638 , [ 158 Pac. 119 ]; Parkin v. Grayson-Owen Co., 25 Cal. App. 269 , [ 143 Pac. 257 ].) Speaking generally, I think the instructions given by the court, and particularly including those to which appellants ob

In the case at bar the conditions, I think, are just as much the other way. The love and affection of the husband for his wife, as disclosed by the record, continued almost, if not quite, to the date of the desertion, and the record, disregarding the statements of the young husband entirely as hearsay, contains evidence of defendants’ duplicity—as I read it—the details of which need not be recited here. There is no doubt but that the rule is that the decisions require a much stronger case to be made where the defendants are, as here, the parents of the alleged alienated spouse—as is held in Gripe v. Gripe, supra, and cases there cited; but in the case at bar, in my opinion, this requirement has been fully met.

The point is made that the verdict is excessive. With this view, also, I do not agree. If the defendants wanted the verdict to sever the punitive damages, if any were awarded—as

Appellants argue that if this judgment is upheld and they are called upon to pay the same, that it means the annihilation of their meager fortune at a time in life when a new start is fraught with unpromising prospects. It is to be regretted that due consideration was not given to this phase of the question by defendants before the perpetration by them of the acts disclosed by the evidence here. It is, indeed, too true that “the way of the transgressor is hard.” Helen Bosanquet, in referring to “the family,” said: “It is greater than love itself, for it includes, ennobles, makes permanent, all that is best in love. The pain of life is hallowed by it, the drudgery sweetened, its pleasures consecrated. It is the great trysting place of the generations, where past and future flash into the reality of the present. It is the great storehouse in which the hardly earned treasures of the past, the inheritance of spirit and character of our ancestors, are guarded and preserved for our descendants. And it is the great discipline through which each generation learns anew the lessons of citizenship, that no man can live for himself alone.” The record here discloses beyond question, I think, that by the saying and doing of those things said and done, these defendants transgressed even that great solicitude which the law entertains in behalf of parents when it requires a stronger case to be made against them than is necessary to be made against a stranger, and rendered highly improbable, if at all possible, the erection, not to say the maintenance, of such a home by the husband and wife here involved.

My associates refer to the ‘ ‘ note ’ ’ left by Ralph. There was conflict in the evidence on that point. The jury resolved that conflict in favor of the plaintiff. Confronted by this fact, I fail to understand the authority of this court to interfere with the conclusion of the jury.

If it be a fact that the elder Mr. and Mrs. Bourne did in fact endeavor to get their son away from his wife, then those of us who have had experience in the trial of such cases know how stealthily the disintegrating work is done and what subterfuges are resorted to. It is not the usual thing to have the strongest kind of evidence. It is well known that the sulky mood, the insolent look, the gloomy manner, etc., of the person guilty of such conduct often means as much, and sometimes more, than the overt acts or statements. That such a condition existed in the case at bar is, I think, not an unfair inference from this record. I am not unmindful of the fact that the law is very solicitous for the parents in such a case as this, and that it encourages keeping “the light in the window” for the return of the erring son or daughter. Yet this solicitude does not go so far as to countenance the willful breaking of a lamp burning in another’s window that the erring child may see the light in his or her parent’s window more clearly. Nor am I unmindful of the fact that sometimes in such cases as the one at bar the plaintiff is an adventuress, pure and simple, seeking, as it were, whomsoever she might devour. In this case I see nothing that even points to such a conclusion. There is, in my opinion, no evidence in this record to impugn plaintiff’s motives or good faith.

That the family, as such, is the basis and the unit of society, is, perhaps, no longer questioned; that it is the foundation upon which our civilization rests is no longer debatable. That whatever undermines the integrity of the home will eventually produce the downfall of that social and political institution which we call government, is now quite generally conceded. That there is becoming more apparent each year evidences which point unerringly, it would seem, to the growing instability of the family, I think, cannot be denied. That it is challenging the attention and the serious

Marriage, by its nature, establishes social relations; hence, society is regarded as a third party thereto. This is the basis upon which the state erects its authority to define the qualifications of the persons who marry, the terms, rights, and obligations of the marriage contract, and for what causes and in what manner it may be terminated. The interest of corporate society in the institution of marriage increases in proportion as it is realized how deeply the welfare of the social organism is affected by the uniting of individuals in family relations. Whenever the fundamental importance of marriage to society as a whole is adequately recognized, there is no disposition to rail against the increasing tendency of the state to exercise the most careful surveillance over its procedure, and it becomes that our modem social development demands that in the absence of that paternal authority which characterized the colonial period of our history, the state itself should exercise a control as nearly approximating it as possible.

While this is not an action for divorce, still, while discussing the present instability of the family, and in this way supporting my argument here for the faith that I have in my conclusion in the case at bar, will it be out of place to

Is not this condition destructive of the family and does it not strike at the very foundation upon which our government stands? Is it not true that the nation whose family life decays, rots at the core and dries up the springs of all social and civic virtues? Is it not un-American and erroneous to suggest that courts should ignore such facts when considering such cases as the one at bar? Is it not a matter of common knowledge among mature men and women .that there is no time in the world when young people should not be interfered with in their domestic affairs like the first two or three years while they are adjusting themselves to

As I see it, anything that in any way—even though that be an overzealous father or mother, or both—injures, or even tends to injure or undermine the family, is inimical to the institutions of our country and the best traditions of our people. It requires no “wise men from the East,” nor those with prophetic vision, to see that, if persisted in, it is no long road that must be traveled until governments themselves fall and our vaunted civilization passes into history.

When, therefore, we are confronted with a condition of such vital public importance as disclosed by the statistics referred to, coupled with evidence such' as disclosed by the record here, and the fact that awards larger than the one here involved have been sustained in this state for negligent death alone, as evidenced by the following cases: Hale v. San Bernardino etc. Co., supra, where the award was twelve thousand dollars, and McGrory v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 22 Cal. App. 671 , [ 136 Pac. 303 ], where the award was twenty thousand dollars, I do not feel, in the face of the record here, that we should disturb the verdict of the jury or the order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, which was the conclusion of the learned trial judge, who appears to have been extremely careful and who has conducted himself on the trial of this ease in such a way as to be worthy of emulation by every trial judge in the land.

I think the appeal from the order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial should be dismissed and the judgment appealed from affirmed.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 9, 1919.

All the Justices concurred, except Melvin, J., who was absent.