People v. Richards

This is an appeal by the People from a judgment of dismissal given upon an order sustaining defendant’s demurrer to an amended indictment. The amended indictment undertook to charge defendant with a violation of section 72 of the Penal Code, which, at the time of the offense alleged, read as follows: “Every person who, with intent to defraud, presents for allowance or payment to any state board or officer, or to any county, town, city, ward or village board or officer, authorized to allow or pay the same if genuine, any false or fraudulent claim, bill, account, voucher, or writing, is guilty of a felony.”

The indictment contained nine counts, each charging in language identical with the others, except as to the details of the claim, the presentation of a false and fraudulent claim to the board of supervisors of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. The only argument made by respondent in support of the order sustaining the demurrer is that said board of supervisors is not one of the boards described in section 72, and hence the presentation of a false claim to that board is not made a public offense by this section. Manifestly that board is not within the section unless it can be regarded as a “state board or officer.” The term “state officer” has been frequently considered by the courts, and various meanings have been given to it according to the context and the nature and purpose of the constitutional or statutory provision in which it is found.

■ In some cases it has been limited to officers exercising a state-wide jurisdiction, and in others it is further limited to such officers as belong immediately to the three constituent branches of the state government, or to the officers provided for in the constitution. In other decisions, the criterion has been whether the duties of the office directly concern the affairs of the state, and it has been said that an officer with such duties may be a state officer, although his duties are to be performed in a limited territory or district.

It has been held that a mine inspector is a state officer, although elected by a district, because the office directly concerns the affairs of the state. (In re Lamb, 251 Pa. 102 [ 96 Atl. 255 ].) Another case held that because the functions of a county game-warden concerned the state at large or the general public, he was not a county officer, although his duties were to be performed within the territorial limits

Bearing in mind the evident purpose of section 72 to penalize the making of false and fraudulent claims against public funds, we see no reason for giving to the words “state board or officer,” as used therein, any narrow or limited meaning. The common-law rule as to the strict construction of penal statutes does not apply to the ■ code, but all its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. (Pen. Code, sec. 4; People v. Soto, 49 Cal. 67 ; People v. Fowler, 88 Cal. 136 [ 25 Pac. 1110 ].)

Respondent’s argument is that, under the rule embodied in the maxim, “expressw unins est exclusio alterins,” the mention in section 72 of county, town, and other boards and officers, all of whom, as he claims, might be regarded as state boards or officers, in the broadest sense, shows that the expression “state board or officer” must have been used in a more limited sense as referring only to boards, and officers whose powers and duties are state-wide. It is scarcely correct to say that all of the various boards and officers named in the section are state boards and officers, even in the broadest sense given to those terms by the authorities cited, for many of them do not perform services for or on behalf of the state. But aside from this, the rule of expressio unius is not of universal application. (Blevins v. Mullally, 22 Cal. App. 519 , 529 [ 135 Pac. 307 ].)

Our conclusion is fortified by a consideration of the section heading prefixed to section 72. That section had never been amended up to the time when this case arose, and as originally enacted had the following section heading: “Fraudulently Presenting Bills or Claims to Public Officers for Allowance or Payment.” These original section headings are not merely editor’s notes, but are integral parts of the code itself and must be consulted in ascertaining and interpreting the legislative will as expressed in the various sections. (Bettencourt v. Sheehy, 157 Cal. 698 [ 109 Pac. 89 ]; Matter of Application of Wilson, 30 Cal. App. 567 [ 158 Pac. 1050 ]; 23 Cal. Jur. 772.) At the time this section was adopted there were in existence, school districts, reclamation districts, swamp land districts, and levee districts, none of which are expressly mentioned in section 72, and upon the argument of respondent all of them would be excluded from its operation. No logical reason can be imagined for excluding them or any other public board or officer from the operation of the section, and the section heading just quoted indicates that the legislature had no such intention. As we shall see, all of these existing public corporations have been classed as state agencies; and their boards and officers, as well as those of the numerous other state agencies of similar character for which statutory provision has since been made, should be regarded as state boards and officers within the meaning of section 72. We adopt the following language of the court in Milliken v. Meyers, 25 Cal. App. 510 , 514 [ 144 Pac. 321 , 323], as indicating the meaning of those terms as used in this section:

Accepting that meaning, we next inquire as to the duties and functions of the officers of the Los Angeles County Flood Control District. That district was created in 1915 by a special act of the legislature. (Stats. 1915, p. 1502.) The purposes for which it was formed as declared in this statute were: “The objects and purposes of this act are to provide for the control of the flood and storm waters of said district, and to conserve such waters for beneficial purposes by spreading, storing, retaining or causing to percolate into the soil within said district, or to save or conserve in any manner, all or any of such waters, and to protect from damage from such flood or storm waters, the harbors, water ways, public highways and property in said district.” To carry out these purposes, it was made a body politic and corporate, and given power to acquire and own property, to incur indebtedness, to issue bonds, to levy taxes, which are in reality special assessments, and to construct all necessary or proper works and improvements. The statute also provides: “The Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County shall be, and they are hereby designated as, and empowered to act as, ex officio the Board of Supervisors of said Los Angeles County Flood Control District, and said Board of Supervisors is hereby vested with the same powers' and shall perform the same duties for and on behalf of said district, and the government thereof, to carry out the purposes of this act that the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County now have or may hereafter have by law for said Los Angeles County, and shall also have such other or additional powers for said district as may be necessary to carry out any of the objects or purposes of this act above mentioned, or to exercise any of the said powers of said district; ...”

This district is substantially similar in character, at least so far as the present matter is concerned, to irrigation districts and reclamation districts. (Los Angeles Co. F. C. Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 119 [ 169 Pac. 1028 ].) In the

In Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. County of Sacramento, 134 Cal. 477 , 479 [ 66 Pac. 668 , 669], the court held that the property of a reclamation district is exempt from taxation under section 1 of article XIII of the constitution, which exempts from taxation property that “may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county or municipal corporation within this state.” Referring to the property

In Turlock Irr. Dist. v. White, 186 Cal. 183 , 189 [ 17 A. L. R. 72 , 198 Pac. 1060 , 1063], where it was contended that the property of irrigation districts had been exempted from taxation merely because of the inclusion in the exempting provisions of section 1, article XIII, already quoted, of the words “municipal corporation,” the court said: “To the contrary, such exemption existed because of the express exemption of the property of ‘the state/ contained in that section and because of the implications in favor of the exemption of public property.”

The plain conclusion from these authorities is that the quasi corporations under consideration, including irrigation districts, reclamation districts, and school districts, are all merely state agencies for carrying out state purposes and their property is state property. It follows that their boards and officers are state boards and officers within the purview of section 72 of the Penal Code. We see no reason for making any distinction in this respect between the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and the other quasi corporations above mentioned.

Respondent contends quite urgently that the case of Rose v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 739 [252, Pac. 765], is decisive of the point here involved, but we do not so regard it. In that case it was held that an irrigation district officer is subject to removal under section 772 of the Penal Code, which provides for the removal by a superior court of “any officer within the jurisdiction of the court.” In Kilburn v. Law, 111 Cal. 237 [ 43 Pac. 615 ], it was held that section 889 must be considered with section 772 and limits it to proceedings against district, county, municipal, or township officers, and hence bank commissioners, being

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the court is directed to overrule the demurrer to the amended indictment.

Conrey, P. J., and Houser, J., concurred.

A petition by respondent to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 12, 1927.