Majority
This action was brought under the provisions of the Public Liability Act of 1923. Plaintiff McAtee was injured when one of the wheels of the automobile in which he was riding ran into a hole in a street in the city of Marysville. The action was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of defendant city and judgment was entered in conformity therewith. The trial court thereafter granted a new trial upon all issues, specifying as the basis of the order the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict and that it was against law. From that order the defendant city has appealed. Contending that there were
The accident occurred at a point within the southeast portion of the northwest quadrant of the intersection of 10th and Yuba Streets in Marysville. In 1905, and when the easterly portion of Marysville, in which the intersection is located, contained but few residents, the city laid a 10-inch sewer line composed of terra cotta pipe intended to carry sewage by gravity from the easterly portion of Marysville in a westerly direction and to a point of disposal. The line at the intersection of 10th and Yuba Streets lay 2 or 3 feet beneath the surface. In 1929, and when the population of eastern Marysville had substantially increased and the high school was being built north of the intersection involved, the city laid a second sewer line consisting of 12-inch concrete pipe running southerly on Yuba Street and emptying into a sump on the southeast corner of the intersection. Two pumps were installed at the sump for the purpose of pumping the collected sewage up into the 10-inch line whence, along with the sewage collected in that line, it all flowed westerly to the point of disposal. Where the 12-inch line passed beneath the intersection it was approximately 12 feet below the surface. The intersection at 10th and Yuba Streets is subjected to heavy traffic, including the passage over it of loaded logging trucks coming from the easterly mountains. In March, 1949, in the year preceding the accident to respondent, a city employee noted a damp area in the intersection and reported the matter to the city engineer. The area was excavated and a break was found in the 10-inch line. One section of terra cotta pipe had collapsed and three others were cracked. The break was repaired by substituting sections of concrete pipe. During the following summer the city tore out the paved portion of the intersection and replaced the paving with 10 inches of gravel covered by 2 or 3 inches of black top. The city also, at the point where the logging trucks generally turned from Yuba onto 10th, added gravel and black top over the area they would thus traverse. The burden of duty of the sewer pipes steadily increased with the increase of population in the area served and the 10-inch terra cotta line was itself considerably extended to serve a greater area east of the intersection. The result was that the carrying capacity of the
“ The rule is well established that an appellate court will not reverse an order of a trial court granting or refusing a new trial unless it can be said as matter of law that there was no substantial evidence to support a judgment for the moving party, or that there was a clear or manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting the new trial. . . . The rule as stated in Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165 ,168 [ 153 P.2d 338 ], is that if the evidence as a whole would be insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in favor of the moving party, the order appealed from should be reversed. ... In Seth v. Lew Hing, 125 Cal. App. 729 , 732 [ 14 P.2d 537 , 15 P.2d 190 ], in which an order granting a new trial was reveled and a hearing in the Supreme Court denied, the rule was thus stated: ‘Preliminarily we should consider the function of this court on an appeal from an order granting a new trial. On this point the authorities are in accord with the statement found in Moss v. Stubbs, 111 Cal.App. 359 , 363 [ 295 P. 572 , 296 P. 86 ], that “It is equally well settled that where there is no substantial conflict" in the testimony on material issues, and the evidence as a whole would be insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in favor of the moving party, an order granting a new trial cannot be sustained.” ’ ” (Martin v. Smith, 103 Cal.App.2d 894 , 897 [ 230 P.2d 679 ].)
It is well settled that when a public improvement, such as was involved in the instant case, has been planned by city officials and constructed in accordance with such plans, and when it is shown that by carrying out the plan a dangerous or defective condition has been created, no further proof is needed to charge the city with notice of that condition and the statutory requirement under the Public Liability Act that a city sought to be held responsible thereunder had notice has been met. (Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196 , 203 [ 157 P.2d 625 , 158 A.L.E. 625], and cases cited.) In the Fackrell case it was contended that, conceding the foregoing rule, there was nothing in that ease about the street or sidewalk involved as originally completed that was inherently dangerous, but that on the contrary they were then safe and
"... Actual notice of a defective or dangerous condition is not required. Constructive notice satisfies the statutes. . . . Constructive notice is defined by section 19 of the Civil Code as that knowledge of circumstances ‘sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact’ where ‘by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.’ The rules governing constructive notice require reasonable diligence in making inspections for the discovery of unsafe or defective conditions. . . . Where the authorities who have planned and constructed an improvement have knowledge of circumstances which reasonably might be expected to result in a dangerous condition as a natural and probable consequence of the work, such authorities are put upon inquiry, and it follows that it is incumbent upon them to make inspections commensurate in scope with the nature and character of their knowledge and the peril which should be avoided.
"As to what constitutes a dangerous or defective condition no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down, but each ease must depend upon its own facts. . . . Whether a given set of circumstances creates a dangerous or defective condition is primarily a question of fact. . . . All legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged toward upholding the findings. [Here we must indulge the same inferences in determining whether or not a verdict in favor of respondent would have been supported by the record.] Appellate courts, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court should be realistic and practical.”
We think this case is governed by the rules declared
The order appealed from is affirmed. The cross-appeal is dismissed.
Adams, P. J., and Schottky, J. pro tern., concurred.
Cases cited
- Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Railway Corp. 25 Cal.2d 165 at 168 p. 511
- Seth v. Lew Hing 125 Cal. App. 729 at 732 p. 511
- Moss v. Stubbs 111 Cal.App. 359 at 363 p. 511
- Martin v. Smith 103 Cal.App.2d 894 at 897 p. 511
- Fackrell v. City of San Diego 26 Cal.2d 196 at 203 p. 511