Lloyd Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission

Isaac F. Wilson was fatally injured by an explosion in an oil rig. The Industrial Accident Commission awarded his widow a death benefit against Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Ltd., compensation insurance carrier of Lloyd Corporation, found to be the special employer; and State Compensation Insurance Fund, insurer of Drilling & Exploration Company, Inc., found to be the general employer of Mr. Wilson. Lloyd Cor

D. & E. Company was under contract to do repair work on two oil wells of Lloyd, the owner, as ordered by the latter, was to receive its payroll expense and a flat per diem charge for use of its regular drilling equipment tools, and Lloyd was to furnish drilling mud and any other needed tools. The contractor was to do all work, including that required for the completion and bringing in of the well. Drilling for deepening of the well had been finished and work was in progress for bringing in the well at the time of the accident.

The first point brings in question the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that Lloyd had actual control of the workmen while the well was being brought in and at the time of the accident. The evidence was held sufficient to prove that fact in Lloyd Corporation v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1943), 60 Cal.App.2d 5 [ 140 P.2d 77 ], where an award was affirmed in favor of the widow and children of Arthur A. Burleson, who came to his death in the same accident, and it was held further that the measure of control by Lloyd there proved was sufficient to show a special employment of Burleson. Prom the record in the instant case, which is before us in response to the writ, we have reached a like conclusion as to the status of the decedent Wilson. He was a rotary helper on the D. & E. Company drilling crew, while Burleson was a welder. The evidence was not as specific as to the duties of Wilson as it was as to those of Burleson in the other ease but, as we shall see, it was sufficient to support a finding that Wilson was under special employment to Lloyd.

The record shows that the fatal explosion occurred while Burleson was welding in the cellar of the well and while Wilson was under the derrick floor but above ground. Wilson emerged fatally injured and died two days later. No one was able to' state just what he was doing but it is admitted that he was on duty with the rest of the crew and there was testimony that about an hour before the accident he and another employee had been helping Lloyd’s foreman putting clamps on top of the “Christmas tree’’ under orders that were being given the foreman by Lloyd’s production manager. Apparently ' he had "no specific duties at the time but assisted, as other members of the crew did, as he was needed in the prog

There was direct evidence that Lloyd had furnished and assembled a “Christmas tree” and lines to handle the flow of gas and oil, including a line for the pumping of oil into the hole to remove drilling mud. Installation of the equipment was within the duties of D. & E. Company and employees of both companies were engaged in that work. Lloyd’s production manager and foreman were on the job and giving orders. None were being given by D. & E„ Company or its employees. This was by common consent and understanding, although not under express agreement. While D. & E. Company paid the wages of its crew and had to complete the work in which the crew was engaged, there was direct evidence that control of the workmen, who were installing Lloyd’s equipment and had started the mud pump, was actually with Lloyd. The D. & E. crew was not engaged in any work other than that pertaining to the bringing in of the well, and the natural inference would be that Wilson was on duty and prepared to assist in the only work that was under way, which would place him under Lloyd’s control. The evidence of the existence of a special employment was substantial. (Lloyd Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 60 Cal.App.2d 5 .)

Petitioners’ attack upon the finding that Mrs. Wilson was wholly dependent for support upon her husband also is untenable. The presumption that she was so dependent is conclusive if she was living with him at the time of his injury or if he was then legally liable for her support (Lab. Code, sec. 3501(a)). The finding should be construed as implying that both grounds of dependency existed.

The evidence was sufficient to prove that the parties were living together as husband and wife. It is true that Mrs. Wilson sued for divorce in Ventura County March 11, 1942, and was given an interlocutory decree on the following day. The parties had entered into a property settlement agreement on March 10, 1942, under which their property was divided, Mr. Wilson paid his wife $550 and was to pay her in addition $1,320 at the rate of $55 per month, and Mrs. Wilson released her husband from.the obligation of support. It is also true that they “separated” on March 10, that is to say, they slept in separate rooms in the same apartment for two nights. But

The conclusive presumption of dependency arising from the existence of a legal liability of a husband to support his wife is, of course, independent of the one we have discussed. A husband’s obligation of support is suspended while

Certain additional facts, namely, that the interlocutory decree did not provide for Mrs. Wilson’s support, that Mr. Wilson made one payment of $55 under the agreement, and that Mrs. Wilson claimed and received from Mr. Wilson’s estate the unpaid balance to which she was entitled under the agreement, do not militate against our conclusions.

The fact that Mr. Wilson made one payment on the agreement after the reconciliation would indicate that he regarded his obligation to pay the full amount as one which pertained to the division of property, which had been fully executed by Mrs. Wilson. He did not seek to obtain credit on the debt for sums which he voluntarily paid for Mrs. Wilson’s support. The conditions which governed in the determination of the question of dependency were those which existed during Mr. Wilson’s lifetime. By his will he left nothing to his wife. She was willing to accept the balance of the sum specified in the agreement, and the estate was willing to pay the amount, in lieu of any interest she might have had if the agreement had been rescinded. We cannot see that the manner in which Mrs. Wilson settled with the estate bears in any way upon the facts which controlled in the matter of dependency or that it was relevant to that issue.

The award is affirmed.

Wood (Parker), J., and Bishop, J. pro tem., concurred.