Lindstrom v. Haglund

These are appeals from orders of the superior court sitting in probate confirming a sale of real property by a special administrator with general powers, allowing a creditor’s claim, and admitting a will to probate and disallowing a prior will.

Etta Kennedy departed this life on October 25, 1946, leaving two writings purporting to be wills. The first, dated January 24, 1945, devised certain real property to appellant Haglund, the residue to appellant Friday who was named executor. The document dated May 23, 1945, devised the same realty to others and by a codicil thereto dated October 3, 1946, designated Clarence Weisbrod executor. Both instruments having been duly offered for probate, by reason of the anticipated delays to be caused by will contests, respondent Lindstrom was appointed special administrator with general powers on December 16, 1946.

On February 13, 1947, Lindstrom, as special administrator, filed a return of sale of the real property and household furnishings which by the first will had been devised to appellants and petitioned the court for confirmation of the sale. He alleged that it was “for the advantage, benefit and best interests” of the estate and the beneficiaries thereof that such property should be sold. Over appellants’ objections the court found in accordance with such allegation and confirmed the sale.

Appellants attack the sale on three grounds:

(1) They assert that the advertisement asking for bids contained a statement that “such real and personal property will be offered separately,” but were not. This was not true. The notice of sale, after 'specifying the time and place

(2) The order of confirmation is attacked also upon the ground that it was an “attempted equitable conversion.” Such a conversion is effected only by a testator and derives solely from his intention as expressed in his will. (Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482 , 488 [ 253 P. 921 ].) Courts do not as a rule change the quality of devised property unless so directed by the decedent. (Ibid., p. 489.) But this doctrine does not prohibit the probate court from selling devised property if the circumstances dictate the sale to be most advantageous to the estate. The court below was confronted with a will contest. The first purported will bequeathed the real property to a “friend.” The subsequent writing made no special bequest of the realty but all her estate was devised to her son and he was named executor. To protect the estate against potential loss the special administrator was appointed. Having sold the house and furnishings in the exercise of his general power, confirmation of the sale could not be denied. (Prob. Code, § 465; Levy v. Cytron, 84 Cal.App.2d 827 [ 191 P.2d 816 ].) Crouse v. Peterson, 130 Cal. 169 [ 62 P. 475 , 615], contains nothing to the contrary. In the absence of proof of fraud in procuring confirmation of such a sale the order will not be disturbed. (Baldwin v. Stewart, 218 Cal. 364 [ 23 P.2d 283 ]; Estate of George, 123 Cal.App. 733 , 736 [ 12 P.2d 86 ].)

(3) The contention is made that the real property vested in Mrs. Haglund at the death of Mrs. Kennedy by virtue of the terms of the first will. Such vesting of the title of a decedent’s property is subject to administration. (Reed v. Hayward, 23 Cal.2d 336 , 340 [ 144 P.2d 561 ]; Prob. Code, §§ 300, 28.) The court having authorized a conveyance of the devised property in the course of administration, Mrs. Haglund’s consent to the conveyance was unnecessary. Indeed the court’s rejection of appellants’ proposed will completely disposes of her claims.

It is contended that the court lost jurisdiction to determine the will contest after the appeals from the order of confirmation had been lodged in this court. Appellants lose sight of the fact that the estate of a decedent passes into the custody of the state, to be by its agencies and instrumentalities managed until creditors are paid and the rights of

Appellants’ next contention is that testator’s codicil dated October 3, 1946, should not have been admitted to probate since the signature thereon is erratic, is poorly written and does not correspond with the signatures on the two wills. As evidence, appellants append to their brief photostatie copies of the three signatures for comparative values. The difference in signatures is readily apparent. But it is the difference between feebleness and strength, sickness and health, a broken body and one that is strong. If there are dissimilarities, the similarities are more striking. The probate court having determined that the same hand signed the three instruments its finding will not be upset on the ipse dixit of appellants that testator did not sign the instrument which merely substituted Mr. Weisbrod for her deceased son as executor. Thus, even if the codicil were excluded the will itself would stand and the court would appoint a new executor to replace him who had been removed from the terrestrial scene. Appellants’ contention even if meritorious would avail them nothing.

Other contentions refer to nonessentials. Inasmuch as all three appeals are based upon the same arguments answered above, the orders are all affirmed.

McComb, J., and Wilson, J., concurred.