Mooney v. Pickett

Opinion

Plaintiff and appellant, on behalf of himself and others, appeals from order of the San Mateo County Superior Court denying petition for writ of mandate.

Question Presented

Is appellant entitled to General Assistance welfare payments as of the date of his original application?

Record

Appellant, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel respondents to grant him and the class of persons similarly situated General Assistance (welfare payments). On or about July 17, 1970, appellant’s application for relief had been denied solely because he was employable and therefore ineligible under San Mateo County Ordinance Code, chapter XIV, sections 2337 and 2339.

Respondents answered the petition, admitting that appellant and his class had been denied General Assistance because of the ordinance forbidding relief to employable applicants.

On September 22, 1970, the superior court rendered its decision denying the peremptory writ of mandate, and discharging the alternative writ previously issued. An order was entered pursuant thereto, from which appellant appeals.

In response to such contention, the Supreme Court held that the provisions for appeal in section 2182, and for payments, if awarded, to commence from the date the applicant was first entitled thereto, “subserve a clear public purpose by securing to those entitled to aid the full payment thereof ‘from the date . . . [they were] first entitled thereto’ regardless of errors or delays by local authorities.” (Id. at p. 85.) Since it was the mandatory duty of the county to furnish aid according to the plan set forth in the Welfare and Institutions Code, the court held that “[t]he obligation to pay became a debt due from the county to the applicant as of the date the latter was first entitled to receive the aid.” (Id. at pp. 85-86.)

Although, as stated in the cited case, there was then a provision in section 2182 providing that, if awarded, the payments for aid were to commence from the date when the applicant first became entitled thereto, the reasoning behind and public policy subserved by granting aid retroactively are applicable to the instant case.

In Mooney v. Pickett, supra, the Supreme Court stressed that section 17000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, pursuant to which appellant sought General Assistance, “imposes a mandatory duty upon the counties to support ‘all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident.’ ” (Id. at p. 676.) Consequently, the obligation to provide appellant with General Assistance became a debt due from the county as of the date he was first entitled thereto. By requiring such retroactive payments to be made by the county, the public policy of securing to those entitled to aid the full payment thereof, from the date they were first entitled thereto, regardless of errors and delays by local authorities, is promoted.

In Alvarado v. Schmidt (W.D.Wis. 1970) 317 F.Supp. 1027 , plaintiffs sought retroactive payments of AFDC grants wrongfully withheld from them. The court stated that “[i]n several recent cases where state welfare laws or regulations were challenged by recipients, courts have granted awards

Just as the state may not operate an AFDC plan violative of federal statutory requirements, a county may not adopt welfare regulations inconsistent with state statute. “In administering General Assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.]” (Mooney v. Pickett, supra, at p. 679.) “When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the regulations adopted pursuant thereto must be consistent and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose.” (Macomber v. State Social Welfare Bd. (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 614 , 616 [ 346 P.2d 808 ].) To deny appellant General Assistance to which he was legally entitled, the municipal ordinance being violative of legislative acts and thus void (Daley v. State Dept. of Social Welfare (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 801 , 805 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 318 ]), would allow the county to operate a plan of General Assistance inconsistent with the dictates of state statutory requirements. The Supreme Court having declared the “employable single man rule” illegal, appellant is entitled to retroactive payments as of the date of his original application if, at that time, he was legally entitled thereto.

Respondents contend that whether appellant was entitled to General Assistance, as of the date of his original application, involves questions of fact which have not yet been determined. Such contention is without merit in light of the factual stipulations entered into by the parties in the lower court. Respondents stipulated to the fact, as alleged in appellant’s petition, that appellant would be eligible for General Assistance but for the fact he is employable.

In Mooney v. Pickett, supra, the respondent contended that appellant, apart from the issue of unemployability, was ineligible for General Assistance. The court held that, while such assertions directly contradicted the stipulations entered into by the parties in the superior court, since the matter before it was not on appeal from the superior court judgment but rather was an original proceeding in mandamus, the stipulations were not technically binding. (4 Cal.3d at p. 682.) The court made the observa

In the instant case, we find that respondents are bound by the stipulations entered into before the lower court. “A stipulation is conclusive with respect to the matters covered by it, unless the court, for good cause shown, later permits its abandonment or withdrawal.” (Harris v. Spinali Auto Sales, Inc. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 447 , 452 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 610 ].) The truth of the facts contained therein cannot be contradicted, and while such stipulation is not itself evidence, it is the equivalent of, and may be relied on as, proof. (Id. at pp. 452-453.) No relief from the stipulation has been requested or granted. Hence the stipulated facts are binding on this appeal. (See Cocking v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 965 , 971 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 193 ].)

Appellant was legally entitled to assistance as of July 14, 1970.

Since the stipulation does not apply to other members of the class, factual determinations of their eligibility as of the date of their original applications will have to be made.

As to appellant, the order denying writ of mandate is reversed with directions to the lower court to enter order in appellant’s favor entitling him to retroactive payments of General Assistance as of the 'date of his original application.

As to other members of the class, the order is reversed with directions to the lower court to issue an order to compel respondents to make a determination as to the eligibility of said members for General Assistance as of the date of their original applications and make payment thereof, if the applicants are eligible.

Devine, P. J., and Rattigan, J., concurred.

On July 14, 1972, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.