Coastside Fishing Club v. California Fish & Game Commission

Opinion

Plaintiff Coastside Fishing Club (Coastside) appeals an order denying its petition for a writ of mandate directing the California Fish and Game Commission (the Commission) to vacate its regulations that create marine protected areas (MPAs) and marine managed areas (MMAs) in state waters of an area of the Pacific Ocean known as the North Central Coast Study Region. Coastside contends the trial court erred in denying its petition on the ground it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and in ruling, on the merits, that the Commission acted within its statutory authority in adopting the regulations for the North Central Coast Study Region (NCC regulations). We conclude the court erred in applying the doctrine of exhahstion of administrative remedies, but correctly ruled that the Commission acted within its statutory authority in adopting the NCC regulations. Accordingly, we affirm.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Marine Life Protection Act

In 1999 the Legislature enacted the Marine Life Protection Act (MLPA; Fish & G. Code, § 2850 et seq.). The Legislature declared that “California’s marine protected areas (MPAs) were established on a piecemeal basis rather than according to a coherent plan and sound scientific guidelines.[^[1] ] Many of these MPAs lack clearly defined purposes, effective management measures and enforcement. As a result, the array of MPAs creates the illusion of protection while falling far short of its potential to protect and conserve living marine life and habitat.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2851, subd. (a).) Thus, the main objective of the MLPA was to “modify the existing collection of MPAs to

ensure that they are designed and managed according to clear, conservation-based goals and guidelines that take full advantage of the multiple benefits that can be derived from the establishment of marine life reserves.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2851, subd. (h).)

The MLPA requires the Commission to adopt a “Marine Life Protection Program” with specified goals designed to protect marine life (Fish & G. Code, § 2853), and to “adopt a master plan that guides the adoption and implementation of the Marine Life Protection Program . . . and decisions regarding the siting of new MPAs and major modifications of existing MPAs.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (a).) The MLPA directs the Department of Fish and Game^[2] to prepare, or contract for the preparation of, the master plan and to convene “a master plan team to advise and assist in the preparation of the master plan, or hire a contractor with relevant expertise to assist in convening such a team.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (b)(1).) The master plan team members must “have expertise in marine life protection and ... be knowledgeable about the use of protected areas as a marine ecosystem management tool.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (b)(2).) The team is to include staff from the DFG, the Department of Parks and Recreation, and the State Water Resources Control Board. (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (b)(3)(A).) Five to seven team members must be scientists (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (b)(3)(B)), and the DFG is authorized to “engage other experts to contribute to the master plan, including scientists, geographic information system (GIS) experts, and commercial and recreational fishermen, divers, and other individuals knowledgeable about the state’s underwater ecosystems, the history of fishing effort or MPA management, or other relevant subjects.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2855, subd. (b)(5).)

One of the main components of the master plan is “[r]ecommended alternative networks of MPAs, including marine life reserves in each biogeographical region that are capable of achieving the goals [of the MLPA].” (Fish & G. Code, § 2856, subd. (a)(2)(D).) The DFG is required to “convene, in each biogeographical region and to the extent practicable near major working harbors, siting workshops, composed of interested parties, to review the alternatives for MPA networks and to provide advice on a preferred siting alternative.” (Fish & G. Code, § 2857, subd. (a).) Following public review, at least three public meetings, and appropriate modifications to the draft master plan, the DFG was required to submit, on or before April 1, 2005, a proposed final master plan to the Commission. (Fish. & G. Code, § 2859, subd. (b).) However, the DFG was unable to meet that statutory time limit. (See Coastside Fishing Club v. California Resources Agency (2008) 158

Cal.App.4th 1183 , 1196-1197 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 87 ] (Coastside).) Fish and Game Code section 2861, subdivision (b), provides that nothing in the MLPA “restricts any existing authority of the [DFG] or the [C]ommission to make changes to improve the management or design of existing MPAs or designate new MPAs prior to the completion of the master plan.”^[3]

Marine Managed Areas Improvement Act

In 2000, one year after it enacted the MLPA, the Legislature passed the Marine Managed Areas Improvement Act (Pub. Resources Code,^[4] §§ 36600-36900) (Improvement Act). An MMA is statutorily defined as “a named, discrete geographic marine or estuarine area along the California coast designated by law or administrative action, and intended to protect, conserve, or otherwise manage a variety of resources and their uses. The resources and uses may include, but are not limited to, living marine resources and their habitats, scenic views, water quality, recreational values, and cultural or geological resources.” (§ 36602, subd. (d).)^[5] The Legislature noted that the array of state MMAs existing at the time it passed the Improvement Act was the “result of over 50 years of designations through legislative, administrative, and statewide ballot initiative actions, which [had] led to 18 classifications and subclassifications of these areas.” (§ 36601, subd. (a)(4).)

A report prepared by the State Interagency Marine Managed Areas Work-group indicated that the MMAs had “evolved on a case-by-case basis, without conforming to any plan for establishing MMAs in the most effective way or in a manner which ensures that the most representative or unique areas of the ocean and coastal environment are included.” (§ 36601, subd. (a)(5).) The report also stated that California’s MMAs did not comprise an organized system because “the individual sites [were] not designated, classified, or managed in a systematic manner,” and many of the MMAs lacked “clearly defined purposes, effective management measures, and enforcement.” (§ 36601, subd. (a)(6).) The Legislature found that this array of MMAs created the illusion of a comprehensive system of management while it actually “[fell] short of its potential to protect, conserve, and manage natural, cultural, and recreational resources along the California coast.” (§ 36601, subd. (a)(7).) Designation of MMAs and subsequent adoption of regulations without adequate consideration given to overall classification

objectives had “contributed to fragmented management, poor compliance with regulations, and a lack of effective enforcement.” (§ 36601, subd. (a)(9).)

Thus, the Legislature’s express intent was that “[wjith the single exception of state estuaries, . . . the classifications currently available for use in the marine and estuarine environments of the state shall cease to be used and that a new classification system shall be established, with a mission, statement of objectives, clearly defined designation guidelines, specific classification goals, and a more scientifically-based process for designating sites and determining their effectiveness.” (§ 36601, subd. (b).) The Legislature declared that “[t]he mission of the state MMA system is to ensure the long-term ecological viability and biological productivity of marine and estuarine ecosystems and to preserve cultural resources in the coastal sea . . . .” (§ 36620.) The Legislature found and declared a need to redesign California’s MMAs to establish and manage a system using science and clear public policy directives to achieve the objectives of conservation, education and research, sustainable use of marine resources, and providing opportunities for public enjoyment of natural and cultural marine and estuarine resources. (Ibid.) Under the new classification system, there are six MMA classifications: (1) state marine reserves, (2) state marine parks, (3) state marine conservation areas, (4) state marine cultural preservation areas, (5) state marine recreational management areas, and (6) state water quality protection areas. (§§ 36602, subd. (d), 36700 [defining the six classifications].) State marine reserves, state marine parks, and state marine conservation areas are also statutorily designated as MPAs. (§ 36602, subd. (e).)

The Improvement Act directed the Secretary of the California Resources Agency (Resources Agency)^[6] to establish a “State Interagency Coordinating Committee” (Coordinating Committee), consisting of representatives from various state agencies with jurisdiction or management interests over MMAs, including the DFG, Department of Parks and Recreation, California Coastal Commission, State Water Resources Control Board, and State Lands Commission. (§ 36800.) Section 36800 provides that the Coordinating Committee “shall review proposals for new or amended MMAs to ensure that the minimum required information is included in the proposal, to determine those state agencies that should review the proposal, and to ensure consistency with other such designations in the state. The committee shall also serve to ensure the proper and timely routing of site proposals, review any proposed site-specific regulations for consistency with the state system as a whole, and conduct periodic reviews of the statewide system to evaluate whether it is meeting the mission and statement of objectives.” (Ibid.) The Coordinating

Committee is also responsible for reclassifying any MMA in existence on January 1, 2002, that has not been reclassified in accordance with the MLPA, with the directive that the reclassification process “shall occur to the extent feasible in conjunction and consistent with the MMA master planning process created pursuant to the [MLPA].” (§ 36750.) The existing MMAs must be reclassified under the classification system described in section 36700, which defines the Improvement Act’s six MMA classifications noted above.

The Coordinating Committee and appropriate “managing agencies”^[7] were directed to cooperate to develop, on or before January 1, 2002, “[designation guidelines based on the classification goals adopted for the state system of MMAs . . . .” (§ 36850.) The designation guidelines “shall be used to provide a general sense of requirements for designating a site in any particular classification, and may include characteristics such as uniqueness of the area or resource, biological productivity, special habitats, cultural or recreational values, and human impacts to the area. These designation guidelines shall be provided on a standard set of instructions for each classification.” (Ibid.) The Coordinating Committee was also directed to establish, on or before January 1, 2002, the “standard set of instructions for each classification to guide organizations and individuals in submitting proposals for designating specific sites or networks of sites.” (§ 36870.) Section 36900 provides that “[individuals or organizations may submit a proposal to designate an MMA directly through the [Coordinating Committee] or an appropriate designating entity. Proposals submitted to a designating entity shall be forwarded to the [Coordination Committee] to initiate the review process.”

Concurrently with the Improvement Act, the Legislature amended Fish and Game Code section 1580, and enacted Fish and Game Code sections 1590 and 1591. Fish and Game Code section 1580 had previously authorized the DFG and the Commission to establish terrestrial, fresh water, and marine ecological reserves. The Legislature amended Fish and Game Code section 1580 to exclude marine reserves from the scope of that statute,^[8] and passed Fish and Game Code section 1590, which authorized the Commission to “designate, delete, or modify state marine recreational management areas

established by the commission for hunting purposes, state marine reserves, and state marine conservation areas, as delineated in subdivision (a) of Section 36725 of the Public Resources Code.” (Fish & G. Code, § 1590.)^[9] Fish and Game Code section 1591 provides that any proposals for MPAs made after January 1, 2002, must follow the guidelines set forth in the Improvement Act, and that pursuant to section 36750 of the Improvement Act, all MPAs in existence on that date and not reclassified in accordance with the MLPA must be reclassified as a state marine reserve, state marine park, or state marine conservation area. (Fish & G. Code, § 1591, subd. (a).)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The NCC regulations at issue in this appeal were the result of a “public-private partnership,” the genesis of which is discussed in Coastside, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 1183 . The DFG was unable to meet the statutory time limit for submitting a proposed final master plan to the Commission under the MLPA due to inadequate funding. (Coastside, supra, at pp. 1196-1198.) Recognizing the DFG’s long history of having insufficient funding to meet its statutory mandates, the Legislature declared that “[w]hile revenues have been declining, the [DFG’s] responsibilities have increased in order to protect public trust resources in the face of increasing population and resource management demands. The [DFG’s] revenues have been limited due to a failure to maximize user fees and inadequate non-fee-related funding. The limited department revenues have resulted in the inability of the department to effectively provide all of the programs and activities required under this code and to manage the wildlife resources held in trust by the department for the people of the state.” (Fish & G. Code, § 710.5, subd. (a).) Thus, the Legislature declared that “[t]o fulfill its mandates, the [DFG] must secure a significant increase in reliable funding, in addition to user fees.” (Fish & G. Code, § 710.5, subd. (c).) Toward that end, the Legislature declared its intent that the DFG “shall cooperate with the Legislature, recreational users,

phases by region, beginning with the development of alternative networks of MPAs for one specific region, namely, an area along the central coast, as part of the first phase.” The MOU provided that the Secretary of the Resources Agency would appoint seven to 10 unpaid advisors to a “California MLPA Blue Ribbon Task Force” to, among other duties, “oversee the preparation of the draft Master Plan Framework and the proposal for alternative networks of MPAs in an area along the central coast for the [DFG] pursuant to the MLPA and this MOU.”

The process implemented by the first MOU resulted in the Commission’s approval of a set of MPAs for the central coast region in April 2007. The regulations establishing those MPAs became effective in September 2007. The first MOU process also resulted in the Commission’s adoption of a “Revised Draft Master Plan for Marine Protected Areas” (revised draft master plan) in February 2008.

On January 1, 2007, the Resources Agency, the DFG, and the Foundation entered into a second MOU for the North Central Coast Study Region (NCC MOU). The main objective of the NCC MOU was “to achieve the objectives of the [MLPA] for the second phase of developing a statewide network of [MPAs].” Another stated objective of the NCC MOU was “[t]o refine the MLPA Initiative process to benefit from and be responsive to the lessons learned in the first phase of the MLPA process for the Central Coast . . . .” Like the first MOU, the NCC MOU provided that the Secretary of the Resources Agency would appoint members of a blue ribbon task force (the Task Force). The Task Force’s duties under the NCC MOU were, among other things, to “guide the development of alternative MPA proposals, modify proposals presented to the Task Force by the Regional Stakeholders Group[^[10] ] as the Task Force deems appropriate and craft alternative MPA proposals for presentation to the . . . Commission” and to “recommend to the . . . Commission a range of alternative proposals and a preferred MPA alternative proposal for the next phase of the MLPA Initiative process . . . .” The NCC MOU called for extensive involvement by the DFG in the development of the MPA proposals.

In June 2008, the Task Force presented to the Commission five proposals for designating MPAs in the North Central Coast Study Region. One proposal was to take no action and leave the 13 existing MPAs for the North Central Coast Study Region as they were. Three other proposals were from work-groups within the regional stakeholders group. The fifth proposal, developed in a meeting between members of the regional stakeholders group and the Task Force, integrated elements of the three proposals from the regional stakeholders group and was presented to the Commission as the “Integrated Preferred Alternative.”

After conducting seven public hearings over a 14-month period, on August 5, 2009, the Commission adopted the Integrated Preferred Alternative proposal with minor modifications.^[11] The Commission prepared a final statement of reasons regarding its adoption of the NCC regulations, including responses to comments (i.e., objections and recommendations) received at public hearings on the proposed regulations, as required by Government Code section 11346.9, part of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA; Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.). The Office of Administrative Law approved the NCC regulations and they became effective on May 1, 2010.

In February 2011, Coastside, United Anglers of Southern California, and Robert C. Fletcher filed an “Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief’ (the complaint) challenging the NCC regulations and regulations designating MPAs in the South Coast Study Region. At issue in this appeal are the complaint’s third cause of action for writ of mandate and fourth cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Those causes of action challenged the NCC regulations and were asserted by Coastside only. The trial court bifurcated the claims concerning the NCC regulations from those concerning the south coast regulations and adjudicated only the former claims.^[12]

Regarding the third and fourth causes of action, the court first ruled that Coastside failed to exhaust its administrative remedies provided by Government Code section 11346.9, part of the APA. Although the trial court correctly noted that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking judicial relief, it proceeded to rule on the substantive issues raised by Coastside.^[13]

The court ruled that the Commission had not exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the NCC regulations. The court noted Fish and Game Code section 2861, former subdivision (c) (now subd. (b)), “expressly permits [the Commission] to designate new MPAs prior to a final Master Plan.” The court additionally ruled that the Coordinating Committee review process under sections 36800 and 36900 was not required for the NCC regulations for two reasons. First, the court concluded that “the designation authority contained in [Fish and Game Code] section 1590 is not subject to the Coordinating Committee review process contained in the [Improvement Act] because it exists as a stand-alone statute that is outside the [Improvement Act].” Second, the court concluded that Coordinating Committee review was not required because under sections 36800 and 36900, the Commission’s “rulemaking process involving MPA designations only applies to external MMA proposals from individuals and organizations, not managing and designating entities.” Accordingly, the court denied Coastside’s petition for writ of mandate and, in doing so, impliedly and necessarily denied Coastside’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief under its fourth cause of action. Coastside filed this appeal after voluntarily dismissing its remaining claims in the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action of the complaint.

DISCUSSION

Coastside contends the trial court erred in denying Coastside’s petition on the ground it failed to exhaust its administrative remedies provided by the APA. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that “ ‘administrative remedies be pursued as a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking judicial relief from an administrative action.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. [Citations.] Under this rule, an administrative remedy is exhausted only upon

“termination of all available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘This rule is not a matter of judicial discretion, but rather is a jurisdictional prerequisite.’ [Citations.] Moreover, it applies whether relief is sought by a petition for traditional or administrative mandate. [Citation.] ‘ “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies furthers a number of important societal and governmental interests, including: (1) bolstering administrative autonomy; (2) permitting the agency to resolve factual issues, apply its expertise and exercise statutorily delegated remedies; (3) mitigating damages; and (4) promoting judicial economy.” ’ ” (SJCBC LLC v. Horwedel (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 339 , 345-346 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 ].) Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a given case is a legal question that we review de novo. (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 865 , 873 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 636 ].)

“The APA establishes the procedures by which state agencies may adopt regulations. The agency must give the public notice of its proposed regulatory action (Gov. Code, §§ 11346.4, 11346.5); issue a complete text of the proposed regulation with a statement of the reasons for it (Gov. Code, § 11346.2, subds. (a), (b)); give interested parties an opportunity to comment on the proposed regulation (Gov. Code, § 11346.8); respond in writing to public comments (Gov. Code, §§ 11346.8, subd. (a), 11346.9); and forward a file of all materials on which the agency relied in the regulatory process to the Office of Administrative Law (Gov. Code, § 11347.3, subd. (b)), which reviews the regulation for consistency with the law, clarity, and necessity (Gov. Code, §§ 11349.1, 11349.3).” (Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 , 568 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 , 927 P.2d 296 ].)

Citing City of Coachella v. Riverside County Airport Land Use Com. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1277 , 1288 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 795 ] for the proposition that “ ‘[a]n administrative remedy exists where the administrative body is required to actually accept, evaluate and resolve disputes or complaints,’ ” the Commission argues that the instant action is barred under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies because Government Code section 11346.9 required it to hear, evaluate and respond to any challenges brought during the administrative hearings on the proposed NCC regulations, and Coastside actively participated in the rulemaking process without raising any objection to the Commission’s procedure or authority to adopt MPAs.^[14]

remedy exception where the administrative remedy and alternative judicial remedy are provided by different statutes within the same statutory scheme. (See, e.g., San Elijo Ranch, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 608 , 613-614 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 601 ] [exhaustion doctrine did not preclude city from pursuing judicial remedy to enforce its conditional use permit issued to county for expansion of county’s landfill because California Integrated Waste Management Act gives local governmental entities both an administrative and a judicial remedy to enforce their reasonable land use conditions or restrictions on solid waste management facilities]; Muir v. Steinberg (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 264 , 269-270 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 431 ] [exception applied where administrative remedy and judicial remedy were in different sections of the Wat. Code].)

The APA provides a judicial remedy as an alternative to challenging the validity of a regulation through the preadoption public comment process. Government Code section 11350, subdivision (a), states: “Any interested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the validity of any regulation or order of repeal by bringing an action for declaratory relief in the superior court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The right to judicial determination shall not be affected by the failure either to petition or to seek reconsideration of a petition filed pursuant to Section 11340.7[^[15] ] before the agency promulgating the regulation or order of repeal. The regulation or order of repeal may be declared to be invalid for a substantial failure to comply with this chapter, or, in the case of an emergency regulation or order of repeal, upon the ground that the facts recited in the finding of emergency prepared pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 11346.1 do not constitute an emergency within the provisions of Section 11346.1.”

Although Government Code section 11350, subdivision (a), specifies that a regulation may be declared invalid for failure to comply with the chapter that comprises the APA or because it was improperly adopted as an emergency regulation, it does not limit a declaratory relief action challenging the validity of a regulation to those grounds. (See Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (1999) 21 Cal.4th 310 , 320 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 , 981 P.2d 52 ] [validity of a board policy is properly raised through a declaratory relief action under Gov. Code, § 11350].) Because the APA expressly provides the judicial remedy of declaratory relief to challenge the validity of a regulation and does not expressly require that such challenges be first raised during the preadoption public comment period, we conclude that bringing a challenge to the validity of a proposed regulation during the public comment period is not

a prerequisite to a judicial action.^[16] An interested person seeking to challenge the validity of an administrative regulation may pursue either the APA’s preadoption administrative remedy or the postadoption judicial remedy provided by Government Code section 11350 or both.^[17] Accordingly, Coastside is entitled to a judicial resolution of this matter despite its failure to raise its challenge to the validity of the NCC regulations through the public comment procedure provided by the APA.

Turning to the merits, we note that although Coastside complains about various aspects of the process that led to the adoption of the NCC regulations, including the role played by the Task Force that was formed under the NCC MOU, its opening brief presents two discrete issues for our determination: (1) whether the Commission had statutory authority to designate MPAs (i.e., adopt the NCC regulations) before the conclusion of the MLPA’s master plan process and (2) whether the Commission lacked statutory authority to adopt NCC regulations without prior review by the Coordinating Committee.

The NCC regulations challenged in this appeal are quasi-legislative regulations because the Commission adopted them in accordance with the Legislature’s delegation of the power to make law. (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 ,7, 10 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ] (Yamaha Corp.).) Quasi-legislative regulations “have the dignity of statutes.” (Id. at p. 10.) When a court assesses the validity of a quasi-legislative regulation, the scope of its review is limited to determining whether the regulation is within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature and whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the delegating statute. (Id. at pp. 10-11.)

Coastside contends that the trial court erred in ruling that Fish and Game Code sections 2859, subdivision (c), and 2861, former subdivision (c) (now

subd. (b)), authorized the Commission to designate MPAs before completion of the master plan process. Preliminarily, we presume the trial court’s reference to Fish and Game Code section 2859, subdivision (c), in that context was a clerical error and that the court intended to refer to section 2861, subdivision (c). As noted, former section 2861, subdivision (c), provided: “Nothing in this chapter restricts any existing authority of the department or the commission to make changes to improve the management or design of existing MPAs or designate new MPAs prior to the completion of the master plan.” The trial court in its ruling stated: “Fish and Game [Code] section 2861, [subdivision] (c) expressly permits [the Commission] to designate new MPAs prior to a final Master Plan.” Later in the same paragraph the court reiterated that Fish and Game Code “section 2859, [subdivision] (c) expressly confers authority to designate MPAs before the conclusion of the master plan process.” As Coastside points out, Fish and Game Code section 2859, subdivision (c), does not address the Commission’s authority to designate MPAs before completion of the master plan process; it provides: “The [C]ommission shall hold at least two public hearings on the master plan and the Marine Life Protection Program prior to adopting the plan and program. The [Commission may adopt the plan and the program immediately following the second public hearing or at any duly noticed subsequent meeting.” Thus, it appears the court intended to reiterate that former subdivision (c) of section 2861 “expressly confers authority to designate MPAs before the conclusion of the master plan process,” but mistakenly referred to section 2859 instead of section 2861.

We conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Fish and Game Code section 2861, former subdivision (c), expressly authorized the Commission to designate MPAs before completion of the master plan process. Coastside’s argument to the contrary focuses on the qualifying language in section 2861, former subdivision (c), that “[n]othing in [the MLPA] restricts any existing authority of the [DFG] or the [C]ommission to . . . designate new MPAs prior to the completion of the master plan.” (Italics added.) Coastside argues that the trial court erred in relying on Fish and Game Code section 1590 as authority to designate new MPAs prior to the completion of the master plan because that statute was not “existing authority” when the Legislature enacted section 2861.^[18] We do not construe the phrase “existing authority” in Fish and Game Code section 2861 to mean authority existing at the time the Legislature enacted the MLPA, including section 2861; we construe it to mean

authority existing at the time the Commission designates a new MPA. At the time the Commission adopted the NCC regulations, it had “existing authority” to do so under section 36725 and Fish and Game Code section 1590.

However, even if we were to construe the phrase “existing authority” in Fish and Game Code section 2861, former subdivision (c), to mean authority existing when the MLPA was enacted, we would still conclude that section 2861, former subdivision (c), authorized the Commission to designate new MPAs before completion of the master plan. When the MLPA (including § 2861) was enacted in 1999, Fish and Game Code section 1580 authorized the DFG, with approval of the Commission, to establish marine ecological reserves to protect threatened or endangered marine aquatic organisms or “large heterogeneous natural marine gene pools for the future uses of mankind . . . ,” and authorized the Commission to “adopt regulations for the occupation, utilization, operation, protection, enhancement, maintenance, and administration of ecological reserves.” (Stats. 1993, ch. 667, § 1, p. 3845.) Fish and Game Code section 1584 defines “ecological reserve” as “land or land and water areas that are designated as an ecological reserve by the commission pursuant to Section 1580 and that are to be preserved in a natural condition, or which are to be provided some level of protection as determined by the commission, for the benefit of the general public to observe native flora and fauna and for scientific study or research.”^[19]

Fish and Game Code section 2852, subdivision (c), provides, in relevant part, that an MPA is a marine area “and associated flora and fauna that has been designated by law, administrative action, or voter initiative to protect or conserve marine life and habitat. . . . MPAs are primarily intended to protect or conserve marine life and habitat, and are therefore a subset of marine managed areas (MMAs), which are broader groups of named, discrete geographic areas along the coast that protect, conserve, or otherwise manage a variety of resources and uses, including living marine resources, cultural and historical resources, and recreational opportunities.” Thus, the marine ecological reserves that Fish and Game Code former section 1580 authorized the DFG and the Commission to establish qualify as MPAs within the meaning of the MLPA because their purpose was to protect and conserve marine life and habitat. Because the Commission had “existing authority” when the MLPA was enacted to designate new marine ecological reserves that are substantially equivalent to MPAs as defined in the MLPA, even under Coastside’s construction of the phrase “existing authority” in Fish and Game

Code section 2861, former subdivision (c), the Commission had authority to designate new MPAs for the North Central Coast Study Region through the NCC regulations before completion of the MLPA master plan.

Coa

stside’s main challenge to the NCC regulations is that the Commission was required to comply with the Improvement Act in designating MMAs, but failed to comply with section 36800, which provides that the Coordinating Committee “shall review proposals for new or amended MMAs to ensure that the minimum required information is included in the proposal, to determine those state agencies that should review the proposal, and to ensure consistency with other such designations in the state.” It is undisputed that there was no Coordinating Committee review of the MMA proposals that became the NCC regulations. Coastside contends the Commission’s failure to comply with the Coordinating Committee requirement of section 36800 renders the NCC regulations void.

Coastside first argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Fish and Game Code section 1590 authorized the Commission to designate MMAs as a “stand-alone statute” outside the Improvement Act and that, therefore, Coordinating Committee review was not required. We agree that Fish and Game Code section 1590 does not provide “stand-alone” authority to designate MMAs outside the Improvement Act. It is well settled that the provisions of a statute may be incorporated by reference and become a part of another statute. (Greene v. Town of Lakeport (1925) 74 Cal.App. 1 , 9 [ 239 P. 702 ]; Don v. Pfister (1916) 172 Cal. 25 , 27-28 [ 155 P. 60 ]; Palmero v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 , 58-59 [ 195 P.2d 1 ] [“[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference ... .”].) Fish and Game Code section 1590 expressly authorizes the Commission to designate marine recreational management areas, state marine reserves, and state marine conservation areas^[20] “as delineated in subdivision (a) of Section 36725 of the Public Resources Code.” (Italics added.) The quoted language of Fish and Game Code section 1590 clearly incorporates Public Resources Code section 36725, subdivision (a), by reference. “To ‘delineate’ means ‘. . . to describe in detail, esp. with sharpness or vividness’ [citation]; ‘. . . to describe, portray, or set forth with accuracy or in detail ....’” (Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1472 , 1480 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 ].) Accordingly, we

construe the language in Fish and Game Code section 1590 giving the Commission the authority to designate MMAs “as delineated in subdivision (a) of Section 36725” to mean that the Commission’s authority to designate MMAs is whatever authority is described and set forth in section 36725, subdivision (a), which is part of the Improvement Act. It follows that any statutory limits, qualifications, or conditions that apply to the Commission’s designating authority under section 36725, subdivision (a), apply equally to the Commission’s designating authority under Fish and Game Code section 1590. This point is underscored by Fish and Game Code section 1591, subdivision (b), which provides that “[sjtate marine recreational management areas established by the commission for hunting purposes, state marine reserves, and state marine conservation areas shall be designated, deleted, or modified by the commission pursuant to [the Improvement Act]. The restrictions and allowable uses applicable to those areas are as set forth in that act.”^[21] (Italics added.)

Thus, resolution of the issue of whether the Commission adopted the NCC regulations in excess of its statutory authority under section 36725, subdivision (a), turns on whether the requirement of Coordinating Committee review under section 36800 applies to the proposed MMAs that became the NCC regulations and, if so, whether it was a mandatory requirement. We conclude that Coordinating Committee review under section 36800 was not required for MMA proposals that became the NCC regulations and, therefore, the Commission acted within its statutory authority in adopting them.

In construing section 36800 and related statutes, we are mindful that “ ‘[a]n individual statute must be construed in the context of the comprehensive statutory scheme of which it is a part. Statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. Where uncertainty exists, appellate courts must construe provisions in a reasonable, common sense fashion taking into consideration the practical consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.’ ” (Wirth v. State of California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 131 , 140 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 623 ].)

As noted, section 36800 provides that the Coordinating Committee “shall review proposals for new or amended MMAs to ensure that the minimum required information is included in the proposal, to determine those state agencies that should review the proposal, and to ensure consistency with other such designations in the state. The committee shall also serve to ensure the proper and timely routing of site proposals, review any proposed site-specific regulations for consistency with the state system as a whole, and

and to ensure consistency with other such designations in the state.” The Coordinating Committee is also responsible for ensuring that existing MMAs are reclassified in accordance with the Improvement Act (§ 36750), establishing standard instructions for each of the six MMA classifications defined in section 36700 to guide organizations and individuals in submitting MMA proposals (§ 36870), and forwarding MMA proposals to a scientific review panel to be established by the Secretary of the Resources Agency (§ 36900, subds. (a) & (b)).

The NCC regulations adhere to the classification system mandated by the Improvement Act,^[22] and there is no dispute as to whether the Integrated Preferred Alternative proposal that the Commission adopted as the NCC regulations complied with the requirements for proposals set forth in section 36870. The Coordinating Committee function of determining which state agencies should review the proposal was unnecessary to achieve the objective of interagency coordination in the adoption of the NCC regulations, because the involvement of interested agencies—both state and federal—was built into the NCC MOU process. The NCC MOU stated that the Resources Agency sought “to ensure comprehensive and coordinated management, conservation and enhancement of California’s ocean resources for their intrinsic value and for the benefit of current and future generations,” and would “provide state policy leadership and direction, including coordination with state agencies in furtherance of the state commitments made in this MOU.” As noted, under the NCC MOU, the DFG was extensively involved in the development of the Integrated Preferred Alternative proposal adopted by the Commission. The administrative record reflects that the Department of Parks and Recreation also supported and provided substantial input into the Integrated Preferred Alternative proposal, and that the proposal was supported by numerous other public agencies, including the California Coastal Commission and the federal Bureau of Land Management. The regional stakeholders group, which was extensively involved in the NCC MOU process, included representatives from state and federal agencies as well as private entities.

The adoption of the NCC regulations satisfied the Coordinating Committee objective of ensuring consistency with other MMA designations in the state because the NCC regulations were developed as one of five phases of an overall MLPA master plan for the entire state prepared through the MLPA Initiative. Finally, the requirement under section 36900 of scientific review after Coordinating Committee review was substantially met as to the NCC regulations. Under the NCC MOU, the DFG appointed a “Science Advisory