People v. Doyle

Petitioner David Buckley Doyle was convicted of vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs causing great bodily injury, and fleeing the scene of an accident involving great bodily injury or death. He was sentenced to 11 years in prison. His sole claim on appeal is that he was not fully advised of his constitutional right to a jury trial before waiving that right and proceeding to a bench trial. Before accepting his waiver, the trial court conducted a brief colloquy with Doyle. The colloquy did not inform him of any differences between a jury trial and a bench trial. Nor did the trial court ask Doyle whether he had had adequate opportunity to discuss the waiver decision with counsel or whether he understood the nature of the right he was purporting to waive. The Court of Appeal upheld the waiver, relying on the rule we first stated in People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425 , 341 P.2d 303 ( Langdon ) that a trial court's failure to "explain[ ] to [a] defendant the nature and possible consequence of his action in waiving a jury trial" is not grounds for finding the waiver invalid where the defendant "was represented by counsel, and he fails to indicate anything in the record to show that either he or his counsel was misled as to the result which might occur from his waiving a jury trial." ( Id. at p. 432, 341 P.2d 303 .) As explained below, we have not relied on the Langdon rule to uphold a jury trial waiver in nearly 50 years. Instead of requiring a defendant who was represented by counsel to affirmatively demonstrate that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent, our case law has upheld the waiver of a jury trial "only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent." (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961 , 991, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 777 , 400 P.3d 385 (Daniels ) (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) This approach reflects our recognition that the constitutional right to a jury trial is "fundamental" and cannot be validly waived unless the defendant has " ' " 'a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' " ' " (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297 , 305, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 (Collins ); see Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145 , 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 ["trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice"].) Because there is serious reason to question the continuing vitality of the Langdon rule, I would order briefing and decide the merits of this case instead of dismissing review.

This case is the third time in recent months that we have been confronted with a troublingly spare colloquy in evaluating

In upholding the validity of the waiver, Miller cited several cases, including Lookadoo, as "controll[ing]" precedent. ( Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 567, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 .) "In each of those cases," we explained, "the defendant had a limited education and a borderline intelligence, but was represented by counsel and benefited from a detailed examination by the trial court into the nature and consequences of a waiver of jury trial; in each, we held that the defendant was capable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right, and had done so on the record before us." ( Ibid. ) Miller did not rely on the portion of Lookadoo that affirmed Langdon's rule that an express waiver by a counseled defendant is presumed to be knowing and voluntary unless the record shows otherwise. (See Lookadoo, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 311, 57 Cal.Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 .) Instead, what Miller deemed "controll[ing]" was Lookadoo's reliance on affirmative indications in the record that the defendant not only had counsel but also had "benefited from a detailed examination by the trial court into the nature and consequences of a waiver of jury trial." ( Miller, at p. 567, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ; see Lookadoo, at pp. 311-312, 57 Cal.Rptr. 608 , 425 P.2d 208 .) In describing

In Robertson, we upheld the defendant's penalty phase waiver on the basis of ample indications in the record that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. ( Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 35-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 .) We specifically held that "[a]lthough the court would have done better to explain to defendant the effect of a jury deadlock, its omission does not invalidate defendant's waiver" ( id. at pp. 37-38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ) given the fact that he "was represented by two apparently competent counsel who over the course of several days discussed with him 'at length' the consequences and nature of his proposed waiver. Absent an assertion or evidence to the contrary, we presume that competent counsel would have informed defendant of the effect of a jury deadlock" ( id. at p. 36, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ). We went on to observe: "Counsel in defendant's presence expressed on the record their sound tactical reasons for advising defendant to waive a jury and consenting to the waiver. The court, before accepting defendant's waiver, engaged him in an extensive and thorough voir dire expressly directed to determining his waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary." ( Id. at p. 37, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 , fn.omitted; see id. at p. 37, fn. 5, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 [reprinting the waiver colloquy].) Among several advisements given during the lengthy colloquy, the trial court said to the defendant: " 'You understand ... that if you do waive jury and submit it to the Court, the Court will act solely. If you have a jury trial, before a verdict can be returned either way, it requires unanimous agreement of all 12 jurors; do you understand that?' " ( Ibid. ) The defendant answered, " 'Yes, Your Honor.' " ( Ibid. ) As to the defendant's claim that the trial court "failed to conduct the hearing on his jury waiver with the 'special attention and care" that he asserts his allegedly 'borderline intelligence' merited," we said "[t]he record is otherwise." ( Id. at p. 38, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 .) In Diaz, we upheld a penalty phase jury trial waiver where the trial court had advised the defendant that the jury's " 'first function is to decide the question of your guilt or innocence.

In Scott, before the trial court accepted the defendant's jury trial waiver, "[t]he prosecutor explained what a jury trial was and that the jury would have to agree unanimously on guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. He explained the charges, including the special circumstance allegations, and their significance, and that, if defendant waived a jury trial, the judge alone could find defendant guilty, find the special circumstances true, and impose the death penalty, with no need for anyone else to agree. He also explained the nature of a penalty trial. Defendant repeatedly said he understood." ( Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) Further, the "defendant requested and was given an opportunity to consult with his attorney." ( Ibid. ) "Defense counsel stated that he and defendant had discussed the matter, and both agreed that the waiver was in defendant's best interests 'in terms of trial tactics.' Defendant personally stated he agreed. When the court noted that defendant had hesitated slightly at one point, defendant reiterated his desire to waive a jury. He said he had had enough time to talk to his attorney and felt comfortable with his decision." ( Ibid. ) On this record, we said the trial court properly accepted the waiver. ( Id. at p. 1210, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 .) In Collins, the trial court observed that "defense counsel had spoken with defendant about giving up his right to a jury trial and having the trial take place solely before a judge." ( Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 301, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) In addition, the trial court extensively advised the defendant on the nature of a jury trial, including the fact that "in order to return a verdict of guilty, all 12 jurors would have to agree to the verdict" ( id. at p. 301, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ) and the fact that "defendant would relinquish solely his right to trial by jury [by waiving] and would retain all his other rights" ( id. at p. 302, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ). The trial court also "questioned defendant to determine whether defendant had sufficient knowledge of the right being waived, and obtained defendant's repeated affirmations that he understood the difference between trying his case to a jury and trying it to the court." ( Id. at p. 311, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 .) We said the trial court gave "appropriate explanations and advisements concerning the right to jury trial" "in order to determine whether defendant's decision to waive that right was knowing and intelligent." ( Ibid. ) In Weaver, the defendant "executed a two-page written waiver of his right to a jury trial" in which he affirmed "that defense counsel 'has fully explained' to defendant the terms 'jury trial' and 'court trial' and the 'difference between a "jury trial" and a "court trial." ' " ( Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1070, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 .) The trial court then "explained to defendant a number of differences between a court trial and a jury trial," including the jury unanimity requirement and the fact that a jury is composed of 12 members of the community. ( Ibid. ) The defendant confirmed that he understood those concepts and reiterated that defense counsel had explained to him the differences between a jury trial and a bench trial. One of the defendant's attorneys then "stated that he, the other defense attorney, defendant, and defendant's father

In Cunningham, we noted that "[i]n response to questioning by the court, defendant indicated he understood (1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in a jury trial, if one of the 12 jurors was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty, the jury could not return a guilty verdict, (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, instead of 12 people deciding the issue of his guilt or innocence, the judge alone would make that decision, and (4) it could be easier for the prosecution to convince only one person, as opposed to 12, that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 636, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In addition, the defendant "confirm[ed] he had discussed the issue with his counsel, who concurred in the waiver." ( Ibid. ) On this record, we held: "The conclusion defendant's waiver of a guilt phase jury was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary is supported by his clear express waiver, made in open court, with counsel's consent and agreement, and after a full explanation from the court of the right and the consequences of the waiver." ( Id. at p. 637, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) In the cases above, we did not purport to establish minimum requirements for a knowing and intelligent jury trial waiver, nor did we presume the validity of a waiver based on the fact that a defendant was represented by counsel. Instead, we examined the totality of the circumstances in each case to decide whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. In every case beginning with Miller, we have relied on affirmative indications in the record-through questioning by the court ( Cunningham, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 636, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 ; Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 ; Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 311, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836 , 27 P.3d 726 ; Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ; Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 37, fn. 5, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ; Miller, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 566-567, 102 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 498 P.2d 1089 ) or by the prosecutor ( Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1208, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240 , 939 P.2d 354 ), or through representations by defense counsel ( Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 359, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 )-that the defendant understood the nature of the right he or she was waiving. Even in Sivongxxay, which involved a less-than-ideal waiver colloquy, we upheld the jury trial waiver after a searching review of the record for indications that it was knowing and intelligent. ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167-168, 174, 189-190, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) Like the other cases above, Sivongxxay did not rely on Langdon's rule that a jury trial waiver made by a defendant with counsel is presumed to be knowing and intelligent. Moreover, in addressing the significance of counsel, many of our cases have relied on affirmative indications in the record that counsel had discussed the jury trial right "fully," "thoroughly," or " 'at length' " with the defendant ( Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1071, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 ; Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 571, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ; Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 36, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 767 P.2d 1109 ) or that the defendant "had had enough time to talk to his attorney" (

It is true that we have "eschewed any rigid formula or particular form of words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver." ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) But in the

The waiver colloquy in Sivongxxay, a capital case, mentioned that a jury is made up of 12 members of the community, that the defendant and his counsel would participate in jury selection, and that the judge alone would decide the question of guilt if a jury trial was waived. ( Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 165-166, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 396 P.3d 424 .) But the Sivongxxay colloquy did not mention that all 12 jurors must be unanimous in order to render a verdict, nor did the trial court inquire whether the defendant understood what a jury trial is, whether the defendant had discussed the decision with counsel, or whether the defendant had any questions about the jury trial right. Based on the totality of circumstances, including the colloquy and the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system, the court concluded that his waiver of a jury trial as to the guilt phase was knowing

Other jurisdictions have eliminated the guesswork by taking a more prescriptive approach. The New Jersey Supreme Court, like our court, has not constitutionalized any requirements, but it has exercised its supervisory powers to require a jury waiver form as well as a colloquy, each of which must include the four advisements we recommended in Sivongxxay. ( State v. Blann (2014) 217 N.J. 517 , 90 A.3d 1253 , 1253.) The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a valid jury trial waiver requires a colloquy "designed to ensure that the defendant [among other things] was aware of the nature of a jury trial, such that it consists of a panel of 12 people that must agree on all elements of the crime charged" and "had enough time to discuss this decision with his or her attorney." ( State v. Anderson (2002) 249 Wis.2d 586 , 638 N.W.2d 301 , 310.) In Colorado, a state rule of criminal procedure provides that a court may not accept a jury trial waiver "without first determining [among other things] [¶] ... [¶] [t]hat the defendant understands that: [¶] (i) The waiver would apply to all issues that might otherwise need to be determined by a jury including those issues requiring factual findings at sentencing; [¶] (ii) The jury would be composed of a certain number of people; [¶] (iii) A jury verdict must be unanimous; [¶] (iv) In a trial to the court, the judge alone would decide the verdict; [¶]