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Colet v. The Queen

[1981] 1 SCR 2 Court SCC Decision date 1981-01-27 English

PartiesFranz Colet Appellant·Her Majesty The Queen Respondent

Counsel (4)
Jay Clarke, for the appellant.
W. G. Burke-Robertson, Q.C., and M. G. A. Angene, for the respondent.
Solicitors for the appellant: Clarke, Covell, Banks, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the respondent: The Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria.

Judges Laskin, Bora; Ritchie, Roland Almon; Dickson, Robert George Brian; Estey, Willard Zebedee; McIntyre, William Rogers; Chouinard, Julien; Lamer, Antonio

Delivered by Judgment of the Court

On appeal from British Columbia

Subjects Criminal law

Contents

Judgment of the Court

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

The plain meaning of "to seize" does not, by definition or implication, indicate to me a power to enter or to search.
The special procedures in Pt. XIII of the Criminal Code—specifically ss. 443 and 447—refer to seizing and searching, which suggests to me one does not necessarily include the other, nor are they synonymous.
Other sections of the Criminal Code that recognize the distinction between searching and seizing can be found in ss. 353(1) and 181.
In the 1968-69 session of the Parliament of Canada, the gun control legislation was substantially altered. At that time, the present s. 105 was introduced as a new concept; namely, a procedure to remove from the citizen any weapons he otherwise lawfully possessed on the grounds that such removal was for his or others' safety: see 1968-69, c. 38, s. 98o.

At the same time, Parliament and presumably the legislative draftsmen amended the search and seizure authority section of the Code where such authority is given without a warrant if, on reasonable and probable grounds, a peace officer believes that an offence is being or has been committed. Here see former s. 96(1), 1953-54, c. 51, and the amended version, 1968-69, c. 38 98E(1).

It seems to me that Parliament, if it had intended that the peace officers authorized to seize were to have the extraordinary powers to search dwelling houses, property and/or persons, such powers would have been spelled out with particularity at the same time such as they were in s. 96(1), 1968-69, c. 38.

It seems to me on principle that, if a citizen is to have his rights or freedoms restricted or impaired, the legislation should clearly delineate the impairment, and restrictive rather than a broad interpretation should be placed on such legislation.

Footnotes

  1. [1] (1979), 46 C.C.C. (2d) 243.
  2. [2] 77 E.R. 194,5 Co. Rep. 91 a.
  3. [3] [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739.

Statutes and regulations cited