Majority
Headnote
In an action to have certain taxes imposed upon real estate in the city of New York in and for the year 1882, adjudged void and cancelled, and to restrain their collection, the following facts appeared: The premises were purchased by one D., and were conveyed to him individually prior to the assessment and imposition of the tax; he purchased, however,for and with the moneys of plaintiff, a Roman Catholic church, of which he was pastor. It was common for priests of the church to have church property conveyed to them in this way. Prior to said conveyance, and ever since, said premises were and have been used exclusively for school purposes, under the management of D., as pastor —all branches of common school education being taught. Plaintiff was not incorporated as a religious body until in 1885, whenD. conveyed the premises to it. The school has never been incorporated. A judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff. Held, error; that said premises were not “a school-house” within the meaning, and were not exempt under the provisions, of the Revised Statutes (1 R. S., 388, § 4); that plaintiff being, when the tax was imposed, unincorporated, was nota “religious society” within the meaning of the acts (chap. 282, Laws of 1852, and § 827, chap. 410, Laws of 1882) with reference to exemptions from taxations in the city of New York, which declare that the exemption of a school-house or other seminary of learning shall not apply unless the building is “ exclusively the property of a religious society;” that the words refer to a society that has been incorporated.Among the property exempted from taxation in the Revised Statues is the following: “ Every building erected for the use of a college, incorporated academy or other seminary of learning; every building for public worship, every schoolhouse, court-house and jail, and the several lots whereon such .buildings are situated, and the furniture belonging to each of them.” (R. S. part 1, ch. 13 tit., 1 § 4. sub. 3.) Hnder this provision it has been held that no “ seminary of learning ” is ■exempt from taxation unless it is incorporated and that no school-house ” is exempt unless it belongs to the public common school system of the state. (Chegaray v. Mayor, etc., 13 N. Y. 220 ; People ex rel. v. Board of Assessors, 32 Hun, 457 , affirmed in this court 97 N. Y. 648 ; Association for Colored Orphans v. Mayor, etc., 104 N. Y. 581 ). If, therefore, the exemption here claimed depended upon the Revised Statutes it is clear .that it would have to be denied. There has been, however, ■further legislation.' In 1852 (chap. 282), the act “defining .the exemptions from taxation on public buildings in the city .of Hew Y orle ” was passed, the first section of which is as follows
“ The exemption from taxation of every building for public worship and every school-house or other seminary of learning, under the provisions of subdivision three of section four, title ■one, chapter thirteen of part first of tile Revised Statutes, or .amendments thereof, shall not apply to any such building or premises in the city of Hew York, unless the same shall be -exclusively used for such purposes, exclusively the prop■erty of a religious society, or of the New Yorh Public School Society.” And this provision was subsequently embodied in •.the consolidation act relating to the city of Hew York, except
The provision above quoted is not happily worded, and its precise scope and meaning are not entirely clear, and the language has given some trouble to those who have had to deal with it. (Association for Colored Orphans v. Mayor, etc., 38 Hun, 593 ). It was apparently the purpose of the act of 1852 fo limit and confine in the city of Hew York the exemptions contained in the Eevised Statutes, and not to extend them, and hence the qualifying words “ exclusively used for such purposes and exclusively the property of a religious society,” were added. But without undertaking to give a precise construction to these qualifying words, we think this at least is clear, that before a school-house can be exempted it must belong to the public school system A the city or be “exclusively the property of a religious society.” We have, therefore, only to determine whether this school-house belonged to a religious society. We will assmne that it belonged to the society at the time called the Church of St. Monica, although the legal title was held either by the. insurance company or Father Dougherty. But that was an unincorporated society, and not, we think, such a society as the law-makers meant to include in the words “ religious society,” used in the act of 1852. They evidently had in mind religious societies incorported under the act of 1813 entitled an act “to provide for the incorporation of religious societies,” or under some one of the other numerous acts for the same purpose. The words “ religious society ” when used in the laws of this state, as they frequently are, generally have reference to an incorporated religious society. It cannot be supposed that it was the legislative intention that any number of persons could come together for some religious purpose and set up a school and then claim the exemption. In using the words “religious society ” it is most .probable that the law-makers had in mind
We are, therefore, of opinion that upon the facts found, the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed, and that the judgment should be reversed, and as there is no probability that the facts can be changed, the complaint should be dismissed with costs.
All concur.
Judgment accordingly.
Cases cited
- Chegaray v. Mayor of New York 13 N. Y. 220 at 229 p. 93, p. 94
- Price v. Brown 112 N. Y. 677 p. 93
- Schultze v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty 103 N. Y. 307 p. 94
- Ass'n for the Benefit of Colored Orphans v. Mayor of New York 104 N. Y. 581 p. 94