Chellis v. Chapman

The plaintiff has recovered a verdict for $8,000, ;as damages for the breach by defendant of his promise to marry her. The proofs abundantly justified the jury in finding as they did, but the defendant insists that the trial judge erred in his rulings upon the evidence and in his charge. He does not raise any question about the fact of his agreement to marry the plaintiff, and, indeed, he could not well do so, as it was established out of 1ns own mouth. But he thinks his case was prejudiced by the admission 'of certain evidence, and by the way in which the trial judge submitted the question of the damages to the consideration of the jury, and that he should, therefore, have a new trial. The General Term, in affirming

Evidence of the defendant’s general reputation as to<s$yealth, at the time of the agreement of marriage, was admitted against the objection to its competency upon the subject of damages in such an action The exception to its admission presents an interesting question, and one which may be deemed not altogether free from difficulty. Such evidence, on first consideration, seems to conflict with the general rule that in actions for a breach of a contract evidence as to the defendant’s wealth is inadmissible. The plaintiff, in such actions, is entitled to recover only those damages which he may prove that he has suffered in consequence of the defendant’s failure to perform on his part. The defendant’s solvency, or insolvency, has nothing to do with the issue, and furnishes no measure for the computation of damages. And this rule of exclusion as to such evidence has been also applied to cases where damages are sought to be recovered for seduction, or for criminal conversation. (James v. Biddington, 6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y. 191 .) Baron Alderson, in James v. Biddington, an action by a husband for criminal conversation with his wife, assigned as the reason for holding such evidence to be improper, that “ the plaintiff is entitled to as much damages as a jury thinks is a compensation for the injury he has sustained, and the amount of the defendant’s property is not a question in the case ” Judge Gardiner, in Dain v. Wycoff, an action by a father for the seduction of his daughter, reasoned upon the exclusion of proof of what defendant was worth, that the jury should not be allowed “ to go beyond the issue between the parties litigating, and after indemnifying the plaintiff for the injury sustained by him, proceed as conservators of the public morals to punish the defendant in a private action for an offense against society.” The principle underlying the exclusion of this kind of evidence, in the latter class of cases, is that vindictive, or punitive

In the case at bar, the plaintiff was forty-seven years of age and the defendant seventy-four. Six- years previously he had sought her acquaintance, unsolicited by her and with matrimonial views on his part. He had visited her more or less frequently, and had twice proposed marriage, before their engagement in 1886. She was and had been supporting herself as a teacher and superintendent in city schools. He had never been married and had lived in the country as a farmer. He was possessed of pecuniary means, considerable in amount in the general estimation of his neighbors, and not inconsiderable if we take his own estimate. Though pretending to some cultivation of mind, which, among other ways, if we may

Where, therefore, the defendant has demanded an engagement of marriage, it seems proper enough that the jury should know what possible re-enforcement his suit may have had and what were the inducements offered by his social standing and surroundings. In the case of James v. Biddington (supra), Baron Aldersom, while holding it improper to give evidence of the amount of defendant’s property, in an action for crimnal conversation, said: “ In a case of breach of promise of marriage, the amount of the defendant’s property is very material as showing what would have been the station of the plaintiff in society if the defendant had not broken his promise.” (And see Berry v. Da Costa, L. R. [1 C. P.] 331; Wood v. Hurd, 2 Bing. N.

In Kniffen v. McConnell ( 30 N. Y. 289 ), which was an action for a breach of promise of marriage, Judge Inge a i-iam, delivering the opinion for the court, held that: “ It may be objectionable to particularize the defendant’s property, and such evidence should be confined to general reputation as to the circumstances of the defendant. To that extent I think it admissible.” The learned judge does not reason upon the rule, but I am not aware that this decision has ever been questioned, and I do not think it well can be.

In Kerfoot v. Marsden (2 Foster & Finlason’s Nisi Prius Reports, 160), an action for breach of promise of marriage, in 1860, Wilde, B., ruled: “You may ask in' a general way as to the defendant’s property, but you cannot go into particular items as to Ms property.”

I think we must conclude, upon authority as well as upon the reason of the thing, that evidence of the reputation of the defendant as to wealth is admissible in these cases. The belief of the plaintiff must .have been influenced by the opinions, or beliefs, of the members of the community in which the defend

„ The action is intended as an indemnity for the temporal loss which the plaintiff has sustained,.and that embraces the mortification to the feelings, the wounded pride and all the disappointments from the failure of marriage, as well in the losses it has occasioned as in the blow to the affections.

The appellant insists upon the error of the trial judge in submitting to the jury the question of exemplary damages. But we think, in such a case, that it is the province of the jury to determine, upon the proof of the facts and of the surrounding circumstances, what damages should be awarded. z If the conduct of the defendant in violating his promise is characterized by a disregard of the plaintiff’s feelings, or reputation ; if he has-placed her, or induced her to place herself, in a false position, or to forego temporal advantages; if the breach of his promise is unjustifiable ; if he spreads upon the record matters in defense of the action which are scandalous and tend to reflect discredit upon the plaintiff, or stain her reputation, then these are all circumstances, which may be considered by the jury and may be availed of by them to enhance the damages. Here the trial judge did not say in his charge that this was a case for the infliction of punitive damages. He instructed the jury, in substance, that if the plaintiff was entitled to damages they should certainly give compensatory damages, and that in the exercise of their discretion, based on the proofs and circumstances of the case, they might award exemplary or punitive damages. Hpon this subject, of when such damages might be awarded, he read at length from the opinions of this court in Thorn v. Knapp ( 42 N. Y. 474 ), and Johnson v. Jenkins (24 id. 252), for the purpose of showing the rule to be applied. It is clear that he left it to them to arrive at a decision upon the propriety of giving exemplary damages from a consideration of the defendant’s motives and conduct. How

The appellant alleges another error in the charge when the trial judge instructed the jury “ in fixing the amount (of damages), the plaintiff is entitled at least to such damages as would place her in as good pecuniary condition as she would have been if the contract had been fulfilled.” This was, of course, a careless use of language, but it could not have prejudiced the defendant’s case. It was very plain from all the charge, in what preceded as in what immediately followed the sentence picked out for objection, that the trial judge intended to and did instruct his jury that they should compensate the plaintiff for what she had lost and was deprived of by the failure of the marriage. They might affix to the marriage with the defendant that pecuniary value which, in their judgment, upon all the circumstances of the case, it would have to the plaintiff. The jury could not reasonably have understood the judge otherwise. It may often occur in a charge to the jury that particular words, or expressions used, when taken by themselves, will be objectionable, or seem to be erroneous, but they should not ■be considered independently of contextual phrases. If, when read in connection with the rest of the charge, the sense of

There is no occasion for a further discussion of any questions, and the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed with costs.

All concur, except Earl and Peckham, JJ., who dissent on the ground that it was error to receive proof of the defendant’s wealth by reputation.

Judgment affirmed.