People v. Adirondack Railway Co.

In 1882 the Adirondack Railway Company was incorporated for the term of one thousand years to construct and operate a railroad from Saratoga Springs to the River St. Lawrence, near the city of Ogdensburg. It was a reorganization of an older corporation known as the Adirondack Company, which was organized in 1863, under the provisions of chapter 236 of the laws of that year. Prior to the foreclosure which resulted in the reorganization, the Adirondack Company had constructed a railroad from Saratoga .Springs to "North Creek, in the county of Warren, and this railroad, together with the right to extend the same, became the property of the Adirondack Railway Company, which, in April, 1892, applied to the railroad commissioners for a certificate, under chapter 565 of the Laws of 1890, to relieve it from the statutory obligation of extending its lines and on the 9th of May following, the commissioners issued their certificate accordingly. The Adirondack Railway Company, thenceforth called the defendant, made no attempt to extend its road until the early part of 1897, when a survey was made for a proposed extension from FTorth Creek through the counties of Warren, Hamilton and Essex, to the outlet of Long Lake in Hamilton county, where it was expected that, by connecting with other roads, a route would be secured to the St. Lawrence river. Before anything further was done to extend the road, certain action, taken by the state, should be briefly alluded to.

In 1890 the forest commission was authorized to “ purchase lands so located within such counties as include the forest preserve, as shall be available for the purposes of a State park,” and in 1892 the Adirondack park was established and placed under the control of said commission. (L. 1890, ch. 37; L. 1892, ch. 707.)

The revised Constitution, which went into effect on the 1st of January, 1895, provides that'“the lands of the State, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forestlands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.” (Const, art. 7, § 7.)

In 1895, the legislation relating to the forest preserve and the Adirondack park was extended by the Fisheries, Grame and Forest Law, and it ivas declared by section 290 that “ such park shall be forever reserved, maintained and cared for as ground open for the free use of all the people for their health and pleasure and as forest lands necessary to the preservation of the head waters of the chief rivers of the state, and a future timber supply; and shall remain part of the forest preserve.” (L. 1895, ch. 395, §§ 270, 295.) During the same year the forest commission was authorized to purchase 80,000 acres for the use of the Adirondack park. (L. 1895, ch. 561.)

In 1897 an-act was passed, the object of which, according

On the 6th of August, 1897, after certain negotiations with the owners of a part of an extensive tract of land known as the Totten & Crossfield purchase, the forest preserve board passed a resolution accepting the offer of the owners of about 18,000 acres of township 23, and 32,000 acres of township 15 of that purchase for the sum of $149,000, of which $99,000 was for the land and $50,000 was for certain improvements at Indian Lake for the use of the state, to be made in accordance with the plans and specifications to be furnished by the state engineer. Township 15 of the Totten & Crossfield purchase lies, as is admitted in the answer, “ wholly within the bounds of the forest preserve and also of the Adirondack park.” Upon the 15th of August, 1897, a representative of the state engineer with a surveying party began surveying at Indian Lake for the purpose of constructing a dam at its mouth in

September 18th, 1897, the defendant caused a map and profile to be filed in the counties of Hamilton, Warren and Essex for the extension of its road across township 15, which the forest preserve board had agreed to purchase as aforesaid, and which lies partly in each of said three counties. It also gave notice of such filing to the occupants as required by statute, but did nothing else. About the 1st of October following, as the owners were about to convey to the state the lands covered by the resolution of August 6th, and receive their money, they were restrained from so doing by an injunction issued in an action brought by the Adirondack Pailway Company against them. Thereupon they placed the deed in escrow to be delivered when the injunction was dissolved, made another deed embracing the same premises, except the land described in the railroad survey, delivered it to the forest preserve board, and received the $99,000, according to agreement. Immediate steps were taken to vacate the injunction, but they were not at first successful, and on the 7th of October the forest preserve board met, and learning that the justice who granted the injunction had declined to vacate it, they took steps to appropriate the land in question for a park under the power of eminent domain. The state engineer having furnished a description in writing of the six-rod strip, which the defendant desires for a railroad, and certified that the same was correct, the three members of the forest pi'eserve board, acting under chapter 220 of the Laws of 1897, annexed thereto a certificate of condemnation and signed the same as the forest preserve board, in these words: “ State of Hew York, county of Albany, city of Albany, ss. We, Timothy L. Woodruff, Charles H. Babcock and Campbell W. Adams, being the forest preserve board, acting under and in pursuance to an act of the legislature of the state of Hew York, being chapter 220 of the Laws of 1897, entitled ‘An act to provide for the

On the 2nd of March, 1898, the injunction restraining the conveyance .of said lands to the state was reversed on appeal by the Appellate Division, and thereupon the original deed in escrow was. delivered and recorded. The defendant went on with its condemnation proceedings until it was restrained by a temporary injunction granted in this action, which was brought to restrain" that company and the other defendants from further continuing the proceedings to condemn.

The defendant alone answered, and after a trial the Special Term rendered judgment for the People, perpetually- enjoining it from taking the land. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed by the Appellate Division and a new trial ordered, hy a divided vote, upon the ground that the company, by the

From the form of the decision of the Special Term, which did not separately state the facts found, and of the Appellate Division, which did not state that .the judgment was reversed upon a question of fact, it must be presumed that all the facts warranted by the evidence and necessary to support the judgment were found by the Special Term, and that the reversal by the Appellate Division was based wholly upon errors of law, the facts standing approved by that court. (Petrie v. Hamilton College, 158 N. Y. 458 , 463 ; Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1022,1338.) For the purpose of this appeal, therefore, we must assume that the condemnation proceedings instituted by the forest preserve board were fully completed, as required by the statute of 1897, before proceedings to condemn on its part were commenced by the defendant. Hence, if the Condemnation Act of 1897, under which the forest preserve board acted, is in all respects a valid and binding law, title to the strip of land in question passed to the State before the defendant began the proceedings sought to be restrained in this action. The moment the title passed, said land became a part of the forest preserve, and thereupon the Constitution spoke and commanded that it should not l£ be taken by any corporation, public or private.” (Art. 7, § 7.) If the state, at any time and by any method, became the lawful owner, whether legal or equitable, of the land in question, eo instanti, this general and sweeping command of the fundamental law was addressed to the defendant, and rendered unlawful every effort at con- ' demnation of that land on its part. Whether the state became the equitable owner through contract, possession and performance, we shall not discuss, as we think it became the legal owner through the power of eminent domain.

The defendant does not attack the regularity of procedure on the part of the state, but contends that the act, under which the state proceeded, is void, because it violates both the Fed

Due process of law, sometimes called the law of the land, is not defined by either Constitution or by any statute, and judges of the highest standing and widest experience, in various jurisdictions, have pronounced it incapable of definition, so exact as to fit all cases, and attempts to define have usually been confined to the facts of the case in hand. (Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 , 519; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 , 104.) While to a reasonable extent it may be regulated by statute, ordinarily it rests upon established custom, and a method of procedure having the sanction of settled usage is commonly regarded as due process of law. It does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding, for a man may be lawfully deprived of his property through the power of taxation, or of the use of his property through the police power without the intervention of any court: (McMillen v. Ander son, 95 U. S. 37 , 41.) In many cases due process of law is wanting when there is no opportunity for the person whose i-ights are affected to be heard, but this does not apply to the taking of private property by the state for public use through the power of eminent domain, except as to the subject 'of , compensation, unless some statute requires a hearing. (Cooley’s Const. Lim. 356.)

The power of taxation, the police power and the power of eminent domain, underlie the Constitution and rest upon necessity, because there can be no effective government without them. They are not conferred by the Constitution, but exist because the state exists, and they are essential to its existence. They are not rights reserved, but rights inherent in the state as sovereign. While they may be limited and regulated bv the Constitution, they exist independently of it as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. They belong to the state because it is sovereign, and they are a necessity of government. ■ The state cannot surrender them, because it cannot

The power of eminent domain is the right of ■ the state, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon making just compensation. The state has all the power of eminent domain there is and all that any sovereign has, subject to the limitations of the Constitution. Although exercised under our first Constitution, it is not mentioned therein, and it is now mentioned only for the purpose of limitation. The language of the Revised Constitution is as follows: “ No person * * * shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation; ” and “ when private property shall be taken for-any public use, the compensation to be made therefor, when such compensation is not made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.” (Const, art. 1, §§ 6 and 7.) This language, which presupposes the existence of the power outside of the Constitution, simply regulates the right to use it. It does not confer the power, but recognizing its existence, surrounds it with proper limitations. It prescribes no method of action, when the state acts for itself, but marks out certain boundaries which may not be crossed, even by the state. Within those boundaries, the state, acting through that department which exerts the legislative power, may proceed at will, and the extent, method an4

Bow, what does the phrase “due process of law” mean, when thus applied to the exercise of a sovereign power, and to the effort of government through that power to accomplish a great public purpose ? Does it have the same meaning as when applied to the action of the state in punishing a man for crime, or of oue individual in seeking to enforce a civil right against another ? Due process of law necessarily varies with the facts of the case and depends upon the necessity for safeguards against the exercise of arbitrary power. It consists in the observance of those safeguards which time and experience have shown are necessary to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property. In public prosecutions, as well as private controversies, an opportunity to be heard is essential to protect private rights; but here we have a case where the state has the right to take a man’s property against his will, although he has been guilty of no wrong. It is a case where of necessity, if there is any action at all, it must be arbitrary. The state needs the property and takes it, and while the citizen cannot resist, he has the right to insist upon just compensation to be ascertained by an impartial tribunal. It is a compulsory purchase by public authority, and the

As we have already seen, a method of procedure based upon long-established usage is ordinarily due process of law. “ It is sufficient * * to say that legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates, and is enforceable in the usual mode, established in the administration of government with respect to kindred matters: that is, by process or proceedings adapted to the nature of the case.” (Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 , 124.) How does the procedure prescribed by the statute under consideration stand this test ? What has been the course of proceeding

All the canals of the state were built under these acts, and much property of great value was appropriated solely under their provisions. For many years the powers thus conferred were in constant exercise, and although these statutes were often before the courts, not one was ever declared unconstitutional because of the summary method authorized in appropriating property. There was neither hearing nor notice, for the canal commissioners, or their agents, simply took possession of and used “ all lands, streams and waters” which they deemed necessary for the use of the canals. This completed the condemnation, except that the damages when ascertained were paid by the state. Under some of the acts, if the property owners filed their claims within one year after the appropriation, they received the amount awarded by the appraisers, and unless they filed their claims within the period mentioned they received nothing in the absence of special legislation. Adjudications made many years ago, and acquiesced in ever since, sustained, some directly and others indirectly, the constitutionality of this legislation, and without further discussion sve hold that the statute under consideration is not unconstitutional because it does not provide for condemnation by due process of law. ( Wheelock v. Young, 4 Wend. 647 ; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 ; Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735 .)

Just compensation, tobe ascertained in the absence of agreement by an impartial tribunal, is an absolute right belonging to the owner of the property taken, but it is not necessary to provide for payment in advance, if a certain, convenient and adequate source and means of payment is provided. A distinction is made between direct action by the state and. action under power delegated to a corporation created by the state, as the one is presumed to be solvent while the other is not. Where, as in this case, the treasury of the state is pledged to meet the claim, payment need not be concurrent with the taking. (Matter of Mayor, etc., 99 N. Y. 569 .)

The act under which the plaintiff proceeded provides for service upon and compensation to the owners only. (L. 1897, ch. 220, §§ 4 and 51) It differs in these respects from the canal statutes above referred to, which provided for no service upon any one, but authorized “ every person interested in premises so appropriated ” to file a claim for compensation. (1 R. S. [6th ed.] 647, § 16, and 659, § 48.) The theory of the statute before us is, that money is substituted for land, for by the 19th section provision is made for liens and incumbrances by the deposit of the amount awarded to the claimant, “ to be paid and distributed to the persons entitled to the same as directed by the judgment” of the Court of Claims. (L. 1897, ch. 220, § 19.) Whether this provision is in all cases adequate, inasmuch as it does not necessarily give the owner of a lien on the premises, created by contract, such as a mortgage, an opportunity to be heard as to the amount of compensation, it is unnecessary to now decide, for, as we think, the defendant, by merely filing its map and profile and serving notice on the occupants, acquired no lien and no property right as against the state.

The map was filed in 1897, when the defendant had 985 years of corporate existence before it, and it had then been relieved for all time by the action of the railroad commissioners from the obligation of extending its road. If a lien upon the real estate covered by the map was thus created, it was good for the long period named and was virtually a perpetual incumbrance placed upon the property, which impaired its value by hindering sales and preventing improvements, and yet the holder, of the lien was neither obliged to do anything by virtue thereof for the benefit of the public, nor even to compensate the' owner. No action had been taken or money expended to extend the road when the state acted. Did the state by creating the defendant and giving it the

But assuming it to be a lien, or something in the nature of a lién, as it was created by statute and not by contract, it can be done away - with by statute, without liability to make compensation, unless some vested right has accrued under it. Under a statute substantially like the one before us, so far as the point under consideration is concerned (L. 1836, ch. 242), it was held, in a well-considered case, that in proceedings to condemn land judgment creditors were not required to be made parties because they were in no sense owners; that upon completion of the proceedings and payment of the compensation to the owner, the right was acquired to possess and use the lands free from all judgment liens; that the lien of a judgment upon real estate is purely statutory and that it is within the power of the legislature to abolish it at any time ' before rights have become vested; that a provision causing the lien of a judgment, which has not ripened into a title, to be superseded by the taking of the land through the right of eminent domain, on payment of compensation to the owner of the land only, is valid. (Watson v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157 .) In deciding that case Judge Rapadlo said: “ A judgment creditor of an owner has no estate or proprietary interest in the land. He stands wholly upon the law, which gives him a remedy for the collection of his debt by a sale of the land under execution, in case sufficient personal property of the debtor should not be found. This remedy is not secured by contract, but is purely statutory * * *. The duration of this lien and the mode of its enforcement and discharge are subjects which appertain to the laws for the collection of debts; and the rules upon those subjects have been

We can see no difference in principle between that case and this. E either the lien of the judgment in that case, nor the pretended lien of the map in this, was created by contract, and no vested right had accrued under either. The state, therefore, had absolute control of the subject in the one case as much as the other. If there was any lien in the case before us it was created by statute and could be abolished by statute, either after the map was filed, or by doing away in advance with the ordinary effect of the map if filed after the passage of the act, which, when reasonably construed, in the light of the broad purpose to be accomplished, had that effect in this case the same as it had in the Watson case. See, also, Moore v. City of New York (8 N. Y..110), where it is held that when lands are taken for public use under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of their value to the owner of the fee, the public acquires an absolute title divested of the wife’s inchoate right of dower.

We do not think, however, that any lien, or any right in the nature of a lien, can be created as against the state by the simple filing of a map by a corporation organized to construct a railroad. As there is no language expressly giving it that

The general language used in certain cases relied upon by the defendant should be read in the light of the facts then before the court. (Rochester, H. & L. R. R. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 128 ; Suburban Rapid Transit Co. v. Mayor, etc., 128 N. Y. 510 .) These cases simply involved controversies between corporations created by the state as to a located line, the legislation necessary to enable one corporation to condemn land previously condemned by another and the like. The state was not a party to any of them, and the only question involved was as to which corporation was ahead. The so-called lien was simply an exclusive right of one of two contending railroad corporations, as against the other, to build a road on a certain piece of land, or of a

That the use for which, the land in question was appropriated is a public use cannot well be questioned. The object of the legislature was to create a great public park for the promotion not only of health and pleasure, but of commerce as well. The statute declares that it is “ for the free use of all the people for their health and pleasure,” as well as “ the preservation of the head waters of the chief rivers of the state, and a future timber supply.” (L. 1895, eh. 395, § 270.) The creation of the park is a part of the permanent policy of the state, for the people have embedded the project in the Constitution and have made the lands devoted to the purpose absolutely inalienable. (Const, art. 7, § 7.) The use is not restricted,

Considering the language of the Constitution and statute, the situation, nature and object of the park, the constitutional inhibition against transferring any part of it, the well-known danger of destruction of forest lands by fires communicated by locomotives, and it is clear that the two uses, for such a park and for a railroad operated by steam, are inconsistent public uses which cannot stand together. The primary object of the park, which was created as a forest preserve, was to save the trees for the threefold purpose of promoting the health and pleasure of the people, protecting the water supply as an aid ¿o commerce and preserving timber for use in,the future. The command of the Constitution, that the lands of the forest preserve cannot be “ taken by any corporation, public or private,” shows an unmistakable intention to keep railroads out of the Adirondack park.

There are other questions in the case, but they cannot be discussed without unduly lengthening this opinion. After examining them all, we are of the opinion that the order appealed_ from should be reversed and the judgment entered upon the decision of the Special Term affirmed, with costs.

All concur (Gray, J., in result, upon the ground that the act of 1897, under which the forest preserve board acted, was constitutional, and the state acquired the land in question by the exercise of a power which superseded any lien the defendant might have obtained by the initiatory steps taken, and Haight, J., concurs in result).

Order reversed and judgment entered upon the decision of the Special Term affirmed.