Majority
Headnote
1. Insurance (Fire) — Apportionment op Loss—Definition op Term “Whole Insurance.” The words “whole insurance,” as used in an apportionment clause of a fire insurance policy providing that the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the amount insured by its policy should bear to the whole insurance on the property, means the face value of the policy together with the face value of all policies issued by other insurers upon the same property, and for the purpose of apportioning a loss, all.other insurance is to be included, whether made by another company alone or by a contract between it and the insured by which in case of á partial loss each stands part as a co-insurer.This controversy was submitted upon an agreed statement of the facts, which, so far as material to the appeal, ate as follows:
In May, 1898, the defendant, by a policy of the standard form, insured certain buildings belonging to the plaintiff in the city of Flew York against loss by fire for the term of three years from the 23rd of May, 1898, “ to an amount not exceeding $60,000.” On the 14th of June, 1900, such insur
On the 5tli of June, 1900, the plaintiff procured other insurance on the same property “to an amount-not exceeding $5,000 ” in each of the following companies: The Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Company, The Providence Washington Insurance Company, and the Westchester Fire Insurance Company, and “to an amount not exceeding $2,500 ” in the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, making $17,500 as the maximum amount for which these four companies could in any event become liable. / Each of these policies contained a paragraph headed : “ Percentage Co-Insurance Clause,” of which the following is a copy: “ In consideration of the premium for which this policy is issued it is expressly stipulated that in the event of loss -this company shall be liable for no greater proportion thereof than the sum hereby insured hears to 80 per cent, of the cash value of the property described herein at the time when such loss shall happen; nor more than the proportion which this policy bears to the total insurance.”
On the first of July, 1900, a fire occurred by which the property insured, the cash value of which was $124,660," was damaged to the amount of $45,321.18, as ascertained by an appraisal duly had.
The plaintiff claims that the amount due from the defendant under its policy, “ by reason of the fire loss,” was $38,177.26, while the defendant claims that such amount was but $32,102.50, which it has paid to the plaintiff under an agreement that such payment should be without prejudice. The Appellate Division rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the -difference between these sums, amounting
The decision of the controversy turns on the meaning of the words •“ whole insurance,” as used in the apportionment clause of the defendant’s policy. ' It was there provided that the defendant should not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than thejamount insured by its policy should bear to the whole insurance on the property. There is no disagreement as to the amount of insurance made by the defendant’s policy which was absolute, but the controversy, is over the amount made by the four other policies which were not absolute, owing to the co-insurance clause. The defendant claims that the whole insurance was $60,000, comprising the $42,500 made by its own policy and $17,500, or the greatest sum for which in any event the four companies could become liable, and that the plaintiff was a co-insurer to the extent of the difference between the amount for which they are liable and the maximum amount for which they might be liable. This would reduce the indemnity furnished by the defendant’s policy from $38,177.26, the amount claimed by the- plaintiff, to $32,102.50, the amount paid by the defendant.
The plaintiff claims and the Appellate Division held that, under, the circumstances, “ the amount of insurance effected by the four policies is identical with the amount of the loss, and that the extent of that insurance could not be ascertained until after a loss, for the insurance was to an ’amount not exceeding a stipulated sum and was, therefore, indefinite.” This conclusion gives no force to the apportionment clause in the defendant’s policy when construed in connection with the co-insurance clause of the other policies. Moreover, all five insurance policies, including that issued by the defendant, are indefinite in the same way, for they all make insurance to an amount not exceeding a sum named which is usually regarded as the amount of insurance effected. 1 -
The four companies stipulated that they should “ be liable for no greater proportion” of the loss, which was $45,321.18," “ than tlie sum hereby insured,” or $17,500, “ bears to 80. per
The words of the co-insurance clause, viz., “ the sum hereby insured,” indicate the amount of insurance. That sum is fixed, definite and always the same. It should not be confounded with the actual liability under special circumstances, for all open policies are necessarily indefinite as to the sum to be paid until the amount of the loss is known. The liability can never exceed the value of the property, but the insurance may, for a house worth but $1,000 may be insured for
The question involved is new and we are without controlling authorities to. guide us, but the discussion of a subject somewhat related in a recent case has aided us in reaching the conclusion announced. (Continental Ins. Co. v. Ætna Ins. Co., 138 N. Y. 16 , 21.)
It may be asked why, if the whole insurance was $60,000, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover his entire loss, which was but $45,321.18, and the answer is that he agreed in a certain contingency to stand part of the loss himself. He accepted four policies which provided for the payment to him of not exceeding $11,500 in case of a total loss, or in case the loss was partial and his insurance amounted to -80 per cent of
We think that the “ whole insurance ” was $60,000, the face value of all the policies, and that the judgment appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and judgment ordered for defendant, on the merits, with costs.
Parker, Ch. J., Gray, O’Brien, Martin, Cullen and Werner, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Continental Insurance v. Ætna Insurance Co. of Hartford 138 N. Y. 16 at 21 p. 243, p. 248
- Matthews v. American Central Insurance 154 N. Y. 449 p. 243
- Janneck v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 162 N. Y. 574 p. 243
- Allen v. St. Louis Insurance 85 N. Y. 473 p. 243
- Herrman v. Merchants' Insurance 81 N. Y. 184 p. 243
- Michael v. Prussian National Insurance 171 N. Y. 25 p. 243