In re the Accounting of Martin

The questions raised by .this appeal relate wholly to the claim of the appellants to double commissions as executors and trustees under the will of Mary J. Martin, deceased. The appellants were named in said will as “ executors and trustees ” and they each claim to be entitled to one full commission in both capacities. Without going into the details of the various provisions of the will upon which they rely to support their contention, we deem it sufficient to say that we think this will falls within the general classification exemplified in McAlpine v. Potter ( 126 N. Y. 285 ) and not within the opposing class represented by Olcott v. Baldwin ( 190 N. Y. 99 ). As to the corpus of the estate the executorial and trust duties of the appellants were so blended as to render them practically incapable of separation, and this is fairly evidenced by the acts of the appellants in administering the estate. Under this general statement as to our construction of the will, the decision of the Appellate Division as to commissions would be entirely correct, if it were not for special circumstances which take the case out of the ordinary rule. The recital of a few facts will indicate the

The testatrix died in July, 1896, leaving six daughters and one son, who were the only beneficiaries under her will. The appellants entered upon the performance of their duties as executors and trustees and continued until 1901, when they were prepared to make and file an account down to December 31st, 1900. For several reasons they had been recpiested, by some of the parties in interest, not to file a formal account in the Surrogate’s Court. For the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of all the beneficiaries, the appellants mailed to each of them a letter expressing a willingness to refrain from filing an account in the Surrogate’s Court, if by the consent of all concerned the appellants could be assured of legal protection and of the right to their legal commissions. To this end’ the appellants submitted to the beneficiaries a proposed decree, to the entry of which they all consented in writing, except the respondent Bobinson and Katharine T. Martin ; the signature of the latter being unnecessary, as she was one of the accounting parties. The respondent Bobinson acquiesced in the plan for the informal accounting and ajiproved the account, but declined to sign the consent for the entry of the decree upon the sole ground that she objected to the amount of the commissions claimed by the executors and trustees, and desired to have that question held open for disposition by the surrogate when a final accounting should be made. Thus the situation remained until 1907, when the surrogate made the original decree herein. That decree provided for one full commission to each of the appellants herein on the amount which they received and paid out as executors, and another full commission on the amount which they received and paid out as trustees. Their account was also credited with the sums which each had retained as commissions on the income which, from time to time, had been paid to the several beneficiaries. From the decision thus made by the surrogate the respondent Bobinson appealed to the Appellate Division, where the decree of the surrogate was modified upon the

1. We agree with the learned Appellate Division in the construction to be placed on the will herein, and also in the conclusion that under ordinary circumstances each of the executors and trustees herein would only be entitled to one full commission as executors upon the corpus of the estate collected and paid out. We think, however, that the six beneficiaries who expressly consented in writing to the informal accounting in 1901, and who acquiesced in the original decree, are bound by their acts. (Hurlburt v. Durant, 88 N. Y. 121 ; Hancox v. Meeker, 95 N. Y. 528 .) That decree granted to each of the executors and trustees full commissions in each capacity. Six of the beneficiaries filed no objections thereto and took no appeal therefrom. Under these circumstances they must abide by the original decree. A different situation exists as to the respondent Robinson who refused to consent to the commissions claimed by the executors, and later took an appeal from the surrogate’s decree

The appellants’ commissions on the two separate trust funds provided for by the will, viz., one of $50,000 and the other consisting of a one-seventli part of the residuary estate, seem to have been fixed by the 'original decree, and no question in regard thereto is before us on this appeal. As to such commissions, of course,-there is no occasion for change in the decree of the courts below.

2. The second question is as to the method of computing commissions on income received and paid out by the appellants as trustees after the informal accounting in 1901. It appears that they collected the income and made annual payments thereof to the parties entitled thereto, but did not render an account of such collections and payments to the Surrogate’s Court. Under the last decree of the surrogate made pursuant to the direction of the Appellate Division, the commission on income thus collected and paid out was based upon the total of income, rather than upon each year’s income stated separately. We think that the appellants are entitled to have their commissions upon the income paid out as trustees, after the informal accounting of 1901, computed on the basis of .annual rests as against all the beneficiaries, including the respondent Eobinson. (Hancox v. Meeker, supra; Matter of Mason, 98 N. Y. 527 , 535; Olcott v. Baldwin, supra.)

The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be modified in accordance with the foregoing views, and as modified affirmed, without costs to either party. If, however, the parties cannot agree upon a recomputation of the figures

Cullen, Ch. J., Haight, Vann, Willard Bartlett, Hiscock and Chase, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.