Lafayette Trust Co. v. Beggs

The facts submitted by the respective parties, briefly stated, were: “ That on the 30th day of November, 1908, the superintendent of banks took possession of the property, business and assets of the plaintiff, pursuant to section 19 of the Banking Law, and since said date the superintendent of banks has continued in possession of the plaintiff as aforesaid for the purpose of liquidating its affairs in accordance with section 19 of the Banking Law.”

That on the 30th day of November, 1908, plaintiff was the owner of a certain parcel of land in the borough of Brooklyn. On December 6th, 1912, the superintendent of banks in the name of the plaintiff, entered into an instrument in writing with the defendant in and by the terms of which plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant the property referred to, free from incumbrances, and the defendant contracted to purchase the property subject to the approval of the contract by the Supreme Court, to be evidenced by an order of the court to be obtained upon application by the superintendent of banks. Such order was obtained by the superintendent of banks on the 10th day of January, 1913, wherein the contract of sale was approved and the superintendent of banks was directed to execute and deliver on behalf of the plaintiff a conveyance of the premises.

Subsequent to the taking possession of the property and business of the plaintiff by the superintendent of banks,

On the 3rd day of February, 1913, the superintendent of banks tendered to the defendant a deed of the premises in accordance with the terms of the contract and the order of the court approving the same, which the defendant refused to accept, and the question of law presented upon the controversy was whether or not the deed tendered would convey a marketable title to the premises free from all incumbrances. •

Section 19 of the Banking Law is extremely voluminous. So far as material to be considered here it authorized the superintendent of banks to take possession of the property and business of the plaintiff whenever it appeared to that officer that the corporation (1) had violated its charter or any law of the state, or (2) was conducting its business in an unsafe or unauthorized manner, or (3) if the capital of such corporation was impaired, or (4) if such corporation refused to submit its books, papers and affairs to the inspection of any examiner, or (5) if any officer thereof should refuse to be examined upon oath touching the concerns of the corporation, or (6) if such corporation had suspended payment of its obligations, or (7) if from any examination or report made the superintendent should conclude that the corporation was in an unsound or unsafe condition to transact business, or (8) that it was unsafe and inexpedient for the corporation to continue business, or (9) if the corporation refused to observe an order of the superintendent made under section 17 of the Banking Law to make good a deficiency in the capital stock within the time therein referred to. The superintendent was authorized to retain such possession until the corporation should resume business or its affairs be finally liquidated as provided in said section.

The section made provision with reference to the

The fact that the superintendent of banks in November, 1908, took possession of the property and business of the plaintiff, pursuant to this section of the Banking Law, since which time he has continued in possession of the same for the purpose of liquidating its affairs, negatives a consent by the superintendent to a resumption of business by the plaintiff; or the grant of an order of the court permitting the plaintiff to resume its corporate business.

The word “ liquidation ” is susceptible of but one meaning when construed in connection with the language of the Banking Law, and the circumstances to which it was intended to apply. The agreement of the parties that the superintendent took charge of the affairs of the corporation for the purpose of “liquidating ” its affairs, necessarily excludes his possession for any other purpose. The word “liquidation ” is synonymous with “winding up or settlement with creditors.” In its general sense it means “ the act or operation of winding up the affairs of a firm or company by getting in the assets, settling with

Immediately when the superintendent took possession of the property and business of the trust company under the Banking Law and commenced a liquidation of its business on ¡November 30th, 1908, the right of plaintiff to exercise the incidental powers necessary to carry on the business of the trust company was superseded. The superintendent of banks, having been continuously engaged in liquidating the business of plaintiff, it could not, since his possession, receive or pay out moneys or .prosecute the business for which it was organized. As a legal entity it continued to exist, but it could not exercise its powers as a corporation. It was deprived of the possession of its property as effectively as though a receiver of the same had been appointed by the court and title to its property was vested in the officer designated in the statute, to wit, the superintendent of banks, for the purposes of liquidation and an equitable and ratable distribution of assets among creditors.

That the superintendent of banks is clothed with all of the powers and duties of a. receiver is apparent from an examination of the statute. It provides that on taking possession of the property and business notice of such fact is to be given by the superintendent to any and all banks, trust companies, associations and individuals, holding or in possession of any assets of the corporation, and no bank, trust company, association or individual so notified or knowing of such taking possession shall have a lien or charge for any payment, advance or clearance thereafter made or liability thereafter incurred against any of the assets of the corporation in the possession of the superintendent. The superintendent is authorized to collect moneys due to the corporation, to do all acts necessary to

In Matter of Union Bank of Brooklyn ( 204 N. Y. 313 , 316) this court, Judge Werner writing, having under consideration a construction of this section of the Banking Law. said:

“ The events which led to its enactment are familiar history, of which we may take judicial notice. The financial depression of 1907, and the resulting embarrassment of many banks, culminated in a series of receiver-ships in which the demands for commissions and counsel fees were so extravagant as to arouse an instant popular demand for reform. To that end the superintendent of banks was by statute invested with the powers which had previously been exercised by receivers appointed by the courts. * * * The statutory enumeration of the superintendent’s duties * *■ * indicates the legislative intent to transfer to the superintendent the general duties and functions which had theretofore been exercised by receivers.”

In Van Tuyl v. Scharmann ( 208 N. Y. 53 , 63) this court, having under consideration the same section of the Banking Law, quoted the language of Judge Werner, and added: “ The scheme of the statute was to provide a procedure for the liquidation of delinquent corporations through a department of the state for the benefit of creditors, which would be economic and speedy.”

When the superintendent of banks took possession and control of the assets of the plaintiff, the property of the trust company was “in eustpclia legis,” and any interference with such property by plaintiff or any person would be a contempt punishable as such, for the rule is applicable to any receiver, sequestrator, committee or custodian of any name or nature. (Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige’s Chancery, 513; Walling v. Miller, 108 N. Y. 173 .)

This conclusion is justified by a consideration of the duties imposed upon the superintendent by the provisions . of the Banking Law to which reference has been made.

The statute contemplated in cases of liquidation an equitable and ratable distribution of the assets of the bank amongst its creditors through the order of the court, to be paid in the nature of dividends “ to such persons and in such amounts and upon such notice as may be directed

Appellant urges that the judgments obtained against the plaintiff subsequent to the taking possession of the property and business by the superintendent are preserved as hens upon the real property of plaintiff by section 1251 of the Civil Code. Section 1251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as material, is as follows: “ * * * A judgment, hereafter rendered, which is docketed in a county clerk’s office, as prescribed in this article, binds, and is a charge upon, for ten years after filing the judgment roll, and no longer, the real property and chattels real, in that county, which the judgment debtor has at the time of so docketing it, or which he acquires at any time afterwards, and within the ten years. * * * ”

When the superintendent of banks assumed possession and control of the property and business of the plaintiff he became in equity the owner of the real estate then held by it. The only title which remained in the trust company was merely formal and was held in trust for the superintendent. (Matter of Attorney-General v. Atlantic Mutual Life Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 279 ; Matter of

The equitable title to the real estate of the plaintiff having vested in the superintendent of banks at the time that he took possession of the property of the plaintiff, which antedated the recovery of any judgments against the plaintiff now sought to be established as liens upon its real estate, the title in the superintendent was superior to the judgments, which were not liens upon said property under section 1251 of the Code, as the liens therein specified are confined to the real property and chattels real which the judgment debtor has at the time of docketing the judgment.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

I concur in the conclusion reached by my brother Hogan. The lien of a judgment perforce of section 1251 of the Code of Civil Procedure takes effect only on the actual interest of the judgment debtor in the land and is, of course, subject to prior equities. (Towsley v. McDonald, 32 Barb. 604 ; Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N. Y. 180 ; Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N. Y. 221 ; Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205 .) The statute contemplates that upon taking possession of a delinquent or insolvent bank, the superintendent “shall proceed to liquidate ” its affairs unless either the bank, with the consent of the superintendent, is permitted to resume, or the Supreme Court enjoins further proceed- - ings and directs the superintendent to surrender its business and property to it on its application made within ten days after such taking possession. The agreed fact in this case is that on November 30th, 1908, the superintendent took possession, and has since continued in possession, for the purpose of liquidating the affairs of the plaintiff. Judge Werner, speaking for a majority of the

The statute makes no provision for enjoining creditors from the commencement or prosecution of actions, but does expressly provide that rejected claims, and claims to which objections are sustained, must be established by a judgment. If, after the superintendent has determined to liquidate, creditors may gain a preference by obtaining judgments, the scheme and purpose of the statute will be frustrated. They may have their claims established by judgment, but whether they will thus gain any priority over other creditors is, as was said in Pringle v. Woolworth ( 90 N. Y. 502 ), “another and quite independent question.”

It is true the statute does not expressly provide for a ratable distribution of assets among creditors, but such a distribution being essential to the scheme is necessarily implied. The statute is far from being a model, and it is not our province to make a new statute, still I think its provisions are workable, if effect be given to what is necessarily implied, as well as to what is written.

Whilst the corporation continues to exist, the ordinary functions of its managers are suspended and the superintendent, as a liquidator, acts in its name and stead. It may still sue and be sued and it retains the legal title to its property; but by necessary implication, after a liquidation has been determined upon, it holds the legal title

I assume that the determination to liquidate must be evidenced by acts indicating that to be the purpose of the superintendent in taking or continuing possession. The express provision authorizing the superintendent to sell upon the order of the Supreme Court all the real and personal property of the corporation necessarily implies, to my mind, a sale free from the lien of judgments obtained subsequent to the actual commencement of liquidation. What would happen in the unusual case of a suspension of the liquidation and a resumption of business by the corporation is not now before us. It would not seem to be difficult in such case to impress a lien in favor of judgment creditors on the proceeds of sales of real property by the liquidator. Such a difficulty is theoretical, not real. A resumption of business by a bank having unpaid judgments against it is hardly to be expected. .

A construction of the statute under which, after the actual commencement of liquidation, the bank is to retain the legal title to its property, but in trust only, and, therefore, not subject to the lien of judgments subsequently docketed, is necessary to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature, and to make the statute workable. Under that construction no one will be harmed. If it turn out that the assets are more than sufficient to pay the debts all creditors will be paid in full. If it happen that there is a deficiency all will be treated alike, their equities will be determined as of the commencement of • the liquidation, and no one will gain an unfair advantage by subsequently obtaining a judgment which the statute makes necessary to establish a claim if disputed.

• The judgment should be affirmed.

Since November 30, 1908, the superintendent of banks of the state has been in the possession of the property, business and assets, for the purpose of liquidating the affairs, of the plaintiff, a domestic banking corporation, pursuant to the provisions of section 19 of the Banking Law. (Laws of 1892, ch. 689, § 18, as amended by Laws of 1908, ch. 143; Laws of 1909, ch. 10, § 19, as amended by Laws of 1910, ch. 452.) On December 6, 1912, the superintendent of banks, in behalf and in the name of the plaintiff, and the defendant entered into a contract, subsequently approved by the Supreme Court, for the sale by plaintiff and purchase by defendant of lands owned by the plaintiff, the fee of which it was to convey, upon fulfillment hy the defendant, free from all incumbrances. The defendant refused upon a proper tender of the deed to fulfill the contract upon the ground that between the time at which the superintendent took possession, of the plaintiff’s property and the time of the tender of the deed certain money judgments were recovered against the plaintiff and docketed in the office of the clerk of Kings county, in which the lands are located. Otherwise, the lands and fee title are unincumbered. The only question which the court is asked to determine is whether or not the deed tendered will convey a marketable title free from all incumbrances.

Originally section 19 was added to the Banking Law as section 18. (Laws of 1908, ch. 143, § 3.) In the Consolidated Laws it became section 19 of that law. (Laws of 1909, ch. 10, § 19.) It was amended by chapter 452 of the Laws of 1910, and, although the superintendent took possession of the property and business of the plaintiff in November, 1908, the effect of his possession depends upon its present provisions. I will quote or refer to such parts only as seem to me to be relevant to the present question. It provides:

“Whenever it shall appear to the superintendent that any corporation or individual banker to which this chap

The statute makes five conclusions clear and certain. (1) The plaintiff is not dissolved and has retained the title to all of its property. (2) Neither the possession nor the power to liquidate evidences that the plaintiff was or is insolvent. (3) Legal actions and proceedings against the plaintiff are not forbidden or enjoined. (4) The section contemplates that the plaintiff could be sued. (5) The docketing of any judgment against it is not inhibited, and there is no express restraint upon the legal effect or enforcement of any judgment. Certain and clear, also, is it that the statute is the sole source and definition of the powers of the superintendent.

Even if the statute by the provision “ the superintendent may, in the name of the delinquent corporation or

The question to be decided by us is, are the judgments recovered against the plaintiff incumbrances against or upon its title to the real estate; do they create in the judgment creditors any interest or right in or claim or lien upon the land which would curtail the full ownership or enjoyment of it by the defendant or diminish its value? (Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577 .)

It is a general rule that a judgment against an insolvent corporation after the appointment of a receiver of its property, business and assets for the purpose of ratable distribution among its creditors or against the receiver does not give the creditor who ’obtained it a preference over general creditors in the distribution of the corporate assets. (National Bank of Commonwealth v. Mechanics’ Nat. Bank, 94 U. S. 437 ; Denton v. Baker, 79 Fed. Rep. 189 ; Earle v. Penn., 178 U. S. 449 ; Clark v. Bacorn, 116 Fed. Rep. 617 .)

The authority of the superintendent is somewhat analogous (but with differences) to that of a receiver of a national bank appointed by the comptroller of the currency. The receiver of a national bank is appointed only upon the insolvency of the bank, that is, when it “has refused to pay its circulating notes * * * and is in default.” (U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 5234, 5236, 5237.) The receiver pays over all moneys to the comptroller, and (§ 5234) the comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money so paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have been proved to his. satisfaction or adjudicated

By section 1251 of the Code of Civil Procedure each of the judgments docketed against the plaintiff “binds and is a charge upon, for ten years after filing the judgment roll, ” the real estate in question. The statement in the opinion of the majority of the court that when the superintendent of banks assumed possession of the property

The stipulation as to the facts is silent upon the question of the solvency of the plaintiff and we can draw no inference from the facts as stipulated. (Bradley v. Crane, 201 N. Y. 14 , 20; N. Y. Tel. Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 202 N. Y. 502 , 506.) As already stated, the possession of the superintendent does not, as a matter of law, evidence that the plaintiff is insolvent. The direction or power to liquidate the affairs of the corporation does not necessarily imply or connote that the corporation is insol

Neither does section 19 provide for a ratable distribution of the assets among the creditors. The moneys collected by the superintendent shall be from time to time deposited in a bank and the Supreme Court may by order authorize the superintendent to declare dividends, “such dividends to be paid to such persons and in such amounts as may he directed by the supreme court.” This is a statutory application of the principle enunciated in Pringle v. Woolworth (supra), “ it will be for the court to direct

The effect of section 19, as applied to the facts here, "is: The superintendent might have defended each of the actions in which the judgments were docketed; therein he might, in case the ' plaintiff was insolvent and the cause of action was not disputed, have applied to the court for and obtained an order restraining each action, or, in case the cause of action was disputed, obtained the order restraining the action and compelling the submission of it as provided in the section, or allowing it to proceed to judgment for the purpose of establishing the claim. He did not defend the actions and the j udgments were obtained and he entered into the contract for the sale. The sale must be “on such terms as the court shall direct.” In applying for the direction of the court, notice of the application should have been given to the judgment creditors. They were deeply interested in the subject-matter of the application. Their judgments and the charge thereof upon the real estate, if any, could not be affected by an order obtained ex parte by the superintendent or upon notice to the defendant only; nor will the result of the present action affect them. The court upon the proper application for leave to make the sale and the terms of it might have directed that the sale be subject to the judgments, or that the judgments did not charge the land, or that the charges of the judgments, if any, should be transferred to the avails of the sale, their validity or priorities to be determined by the court when application for declaration of dividends was made.

For the reasons stated, the judgment should be reversed and the controversy be dismissed, without costs to either party.

Chase, J., concurs with Hogan, J.; Oardozo, J., concurs with Miller, J.; Willard Bartlett, Ch. J., and Werner, J., concur with Collin, J.

Judgment affirmed.