Majority
Inlet is a town in Hamilton county, N. Y. It is entirely within the Forest Preserve of the State. Its area is 40,546 acres, all of which except 1,500 acres at most is wild forest land. About one-half of it is owned by the State. The permanent population, according to the last census, is 257. There is a transient summer population of perhaps 3,000. The center of the population both permanent and transient is the hamlet of Inlet.
In 1930 the town board, purporting to act pursuant to the provisions of the Town Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 62), sections 282 et seq., and of the General District Law (L. 1926, ch. 470), established a water district, the boundaries of which were coterminous with the boundaries
The case is here upon the principal contention that the judgment is in direct violation of article VII, section 7, of the State Constitution, in that the expense of the improvement, instead of being “ apportioned on the. public and private property and municipalities benefited to the extent of the benefits received,” has been made a charge “ upon the taxable property of the town,” without an apportionment of benefits. The effect of this, it is said, is not only to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right and adversely to affect his property and injure him, but also to burden the State with a heavy tax on its wild forest
We are disposed to doubt the legality of creating a water district which covers the entire area of a town. Section 282 of the Town Law relates only to the establishment of “ a water district outside of an incorporated city or village and wholly within such town.” Article 13 of the Town LaW will be searched in vain for any authority in a town as such to construct a water works system. Considering the wide range of legislation on the general subject of water supply for the various communities of the State, the omission of such authority may not be deemed inadvertent. What may not be done directly may not ordinarily be done by indirection. The desirability for financial reasons of including the State’s wild forest lands in the project here, is not an adequate ground for varying the general rule.
The fundamental difficulty with the entire proceeding lies in the fact that the town which is a municipality is not authorized to establish a water supply system; and that the water supply district, even assuming that it has been legally created, is not a municipality within the meaning of article VII, section 7, of the Constitution. It is there provided that: “ The lands of the State, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. * * * The Legislature may by general laws provide for the use of not exceeding three percentum of such lands for the construction and maintenance of reservoirs for municipal water supply, for the canals of the State and to regulate the flow of streams.”
The first sentence sounds the original and dominant note of the State’s policy with reference to the Forest
''A' municipal corporation ’ includes a county, town, school district, village and city and any other territorial division of the state established by law with powers of local government.” (General Corp. Law; Cons. Laws, ch. 23, § 3, subd. 1.) While a water district, for the special objects of certain statutes, has been included as a matter of convenient reference within the terms “ municipal corporation,” or “ municipality ” (e. g., Gen. Mun. Law, § 29; L. 1927, ch. 654, § 2), it is essentially and only “ a special administrative area.” (Holroyd v. Town of Indian Lake, 180 N. Y. 318 ; People ex rel. Farley v. Winkler, 203 N. Y. 445 ; People ex rel. Hon Yost v. Becker, 203 N. Y. 201 ; People ex rel. Desiderio v. Conolly, 238 N. Y. 326 , 331, 332.)
So far as section 540 of the Conservation Law purports to authorize a water district to make application for the construction and maintenance of a water supply reservoir on lands owned by the State in the Forest Preserve, it is without warrant in the Constitution. The Water Power and Control Commission, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the.application and to grant approval and consent.
The judgments should be reversed and judgment in favor of the plaintiff granted, with costs in all courts.
Pound, Ch. J., Crane, Lehman, Kellogg, O’Brien and Hubbs, JJ., concur.
Judgments reversed, etc.
Cases cited
- Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks v. MacDonald 253 N. Y. 234 p. 114, p. 117
- People v. Santa Clara Lumber Co. 213 N. Y. 61 p. 114
- People v. Gaylord 139 App. Div. 814 p. 114
- Pashley v. Bennett 108 App. Div. 102 p. 114
- People v. Adirondack Railway Co. 160 N. Y. 225 p. 114, p. 117
- O'Donoghue v. Boies 159 N. Y. 87 p. 114
- Claim of Doey v. Clarence P. Howland Co. 224 N. Y. 30 p. 114
- Holroyd v. Town of Indian Lake 180 N. Y. 318 p. 117
- People ex rel. Farley v. Winkler 203 N. Y. 445 p. 117
- People ex rel. Hon Yost v. Becker 203 N. Y. 201 p. 117
- People ex rel. Desiderio v. Conolly 238 N. Y. 326 at 331, 332 p. 117