Majority
Headnote
I. The directors and officers of Paramount are accountable to it for haying caused its funds to be employed in the commission of a crime. (Pollack y. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 266 App. Div. 118 ; Roth v. Robertson, 64 Mise. 343; Runde y. Bankers Trust Go., 6 N. Y. S. 2d 623 ; Shea v. Mabry, 69 Tenn. 319 ; People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 187 N. Y. 410 ; Sagalyn y. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434 ; Mannheimer v. Keehn, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 542 ; London Trust Co. v. Mackenzie, 62 L. J. Ch. 870; Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455 ; Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Go. y. Gove, 303 Mass. 1 .) II. The giving of Paramount’s funds to Bioff and Browne constituted the commission of a crime. (Penal Law, § 380; Matter of Raplee, 257 App. Div. 408 , 282 N. Y. 605 ; Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153 ; People v. Clougher, 246 N. Y. 106 ; People v. Jackson, 191 N. Y. 293 .)This stockholders ’ derivative action was brought in behalf of Paramount Pictures, Inc., to compel its officers
Upon findings made and affirmed the case is this: The payments in question were coerced by threats of the payees that in the contrary event they would call a strike of the employees of Paramount Pictures, Inc.; the threatened strike would have been unlawful and was calculated to destroy the nation-wide business of the corporation. Special Term said: ££ There is not the slightest evidence that this duly appointed representative of a labor organization was or even pretended to be under any legal duty to cause a strike. He did not ask for pay to influence him in the performance of any duty, real or pretended. He simply threatened to do unlawful injury to Paramount, and other similar companies, by calling a strike or strikes he was under no duty to call, and the only part his position as a representative of a labor organization played in the matter was that it constituted such a source of power as to give meaning to his threat and thereby induce consent to the giving of the money he demanded. ’ ’
In the judgment of the courts below, the payments thus procured were not embraced by section 380 of the Penal Law. We think this ruling was right. Such a threat is a felony (Penal Law, §§ 851, 852) and such a payment is deemed to be so far involuntary as to raise an obligation to make restitution thereof. (See, Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts, § 218; 79 A. L. E. 655, 656.) In People v. Shakun ( 251 N. Y. 107 ) we said: ££ It is well settled that a criminal statute should narrowly be construed; that acts otherwise innocent and lawful, do not become crimes, unless there is a clear and positive expression of the legislative intent to make them criminal ” (p. 113. See, too, People v. Benc, 288 N. Y. 318 , 323; People v. Fein, 292 N. Y. 10 , 14). In that view, we are not ready to impute to section 380 of the Penal Law the meaning that one who is victimized
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Ch. J., LoughraN, Lewis, Conway and DesmoNd, JJ., concur; Rippey and Thacher, JJ., taking no part.
Judgment affirmed.
Cases cited
- Gilbert v. Finch 173 N. Y. 455 p. 469
- Norton v. Woodruff 2 N. Y. 153 p. 469
- People v. Clougher 246 N. Y. 106 p. 469
- Van Dyke v. Wood 60 App. Div. 208 p. 469
- Adams v. Irving National Bank 116 N. Y. 606 p. 469
- Barry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society 59 N. Y. 587 p. 469
- People v. Barondess 133 N. Y. 649 p. 469, p. 470
- People v. Sheridan 186 App. Div. 211 p. 469
- Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co v. Roach 80 N. Y. 339 p. 469
- Richard v. American Union Bank 253 N. Y. 166 p. 469
- Manson v. Curtis 223 N. Y. 313 p. 470
- Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 196 N. Y. 134 p. 470
- I. Townsend Burden v. Burden 159 N. Y. 287 p. 470
- Schindler v. Royal Insurance 258 N. Y. 310 p. 470
- People v. Shaken 251 N. Y. 107 p. 471
- People v. Benc 288 N. Y. 318 at 323 p. 471
- People v. Fein 292 N. Y. 10 at 14 p. 471