p. 119did not appear thereon. Thereafter, a motion on affidavits showing these facts was made on behalf of the defendants, Stimmel and Warnsdorfer, for leave to pay the amount of said mortgage into court, and that the United States of America be substituted as the defendant therein, or that it be brought in as a defendant in their stead. The motion was granted and the plaintiff was directed to discharge the mortgage upon payment of the amount due on the mortgage, with costs. Directions were given as to the appearance of the United States, its submission to the jurisdiction of the court, and consent that the title to the mortgage debt be determined in the action. In default of such submission and consent, or in case of such submission and of final judgment for plaintiff, the clerk of the court was directed to pay over the moneys deposited to the plaintiff.
Hamilton Wallis for appellant.
The claim of the United States is a mere nominal one, and would not support an inter-pleader. (Thu rber v. Blanck, 50 N. Y. 80 ; U. S. Trust Co. v. Wiley, 41 Barb. 477 ; Morgan v. Fillmore, 18 Abb. Pr. 217 ; Castle v. Lewis, 78 N. Y. 131 .) A sovereignty cannot be impleaded in court without its consent. (U. S. Rev. Stat., § 771; U. S. v. Ames, 1 W. & M. 76; U. S. v. Boyd, 5 How. 29 ; Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 84 .) An interpleader cannot be ordered between a creditor and an attaching creditor. (U. S. Trust Co. v. Wiley, 41 Barb. 477 , 479; Sherman v. Partridge, 4 Duer, 649 .) The order appealed from should be reversed, because it can accomplish nothing. (U. S. v. Ames, 1 W. & M. 76.)He Witt O. Brown for' respondents.
There is no absolute right to costs to either party in a common-law action till judgment, and at any time before judgment the court has entire control over costs. (Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 3228, 3229, 3230 ; Crosby v. Day, 81 N. Y. 242 ; Carleton v. Darcy, 75 id. 375 ; Morris v. Wheeler, 45 id. 708 ; Gallagher v. Egan, 2 Sandf. 742 .) It is no valid objection to the order that the government of the United States is made a conditional de
p. 120fendant in the action. (Republic of Mexico v. Arrangois, 11 How. Pr. 1 ; Maning v. State of Nicaragua, 14 id, 518.)Armour G. Anderson for respondent Stimmel.
The court will not, on an application for interpleader, pass upon or determine the validity of the - claim or demand of the parties. (Bleeker v. Graham, 2 Edw. Ch. 647 , 650.) Defendants, having expressed their readiness to pay the amount into the court, should be allowed to do so, leaving the contestants to settle the controversy between themselves as to which is entitled to the amount. ( Van Buskirk v. Roy, 8 How. Pr. 425 ; Johnston v. Lewis, 4 Abb. [N. S.] 150; The B. & C. R. R. Co. v. Arthur, 13 N. Y. Weekly Dig. 333 ; Fletcher v. The T. S. B., 14 How. Pr. 383 ; Dryer v. Rauch, 42 id. 22; Ball v. Liney, 48 N. Y. 6 -13; Bruggleman v. The Bk. of M., 1 City Court, 86; Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121 , 134.) -They will not be required to exercise any judgment on the subject of conflicting rights of the parties. (1 Wait’s Pr. 165; 4 Wait’s Actions and Defenses, 150.) Where matters are so entangled that the party is liable to double recovery against him for a valid debt, the court will direct an order of interpleader to be made. (Board of S. of S. Co. v. Deyoe, 57 How. Pr. 135 .) An order of interpleader may be procured in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, where the only question in dispute is the ownership of the mortgage. (Tanton V. Groh, 39 How. Pr. 147 .) The court had the right to bring in a new defendant. (Code, § 452.) This being an action in equity to foreclose a mortgage, plaintiff is not entitled as a matter of right to costs; they are in the discretion of the court. (Pratt v. Ramsdell, 16 How. Pr. 60 ; Barlow v. Cleveland, 16 id. 364; Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 708 ; Losee v. Ellis, 20 Hun, 655 .) .The United States may consent to be sued, and may yield this consent upon such terms and under such restrictions as it may think just. (Murray v. H. L. & I. Co., 18 How. [U. S.] 283 ;. People of the S. of M. v. The P. B. of N. Y., 4 Bosw. 382 ; Manning v. The State of Nicaragua, 14 How. Pr. 517 .) The fund being in this State, and the claim of the
p. 121United States being interposed within this jurisdiction, it is most proper that the courts of this State should be able to obtain full jurisdiction over the parties. (Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Blake, E'xr, B. Y. Daily Reg., Dec. 27, 1881.)Bo suit can be brought against the United States without the consent of Congress. (Marriott v. Brune, 18 How. U. S. [Curtis] 285.) But the United States may sue its debtor in any court of law having jurisdiction of the subject matter. (Ib.)
The attorney of the United States for the district in which the action is brought is the proper officer to bring such action. (U. S. R. S., § 771.) .
The United States while nominally a defendant is in fact made a plaintiff by the order appealed from. It comes in not to defend an action brought against it, but as a claimant to the fund in question.
The next and more difficult question raised by the appeal is, whether the United States can, in the present action pending in the State court, enforce its claim to the fund in question. Under the decisions of this court it certainly cannot. (Thurber v. Blanck, 50 N. Y. 80 ) It has no judgment against its alleged debtor, Harrison Johnston, the former owner of the bond and mortgage, and may never have. Had the attachment been issued in an action pending in the courts of this State, a different question would be presented. But the action in which the attachment was issued was pending in the Circuit Court of the United States, a court not bound to follow the decisions of a State court.
Such court may hold that the United States, by service of the attachment, did acquire a lieu upon the debt. But by voluntarily appearing in a State court as a claimant to a fund in such court the United States subjects itself to the jurisdiction of such court, and like any other litigant will be bound by its decision. It is insisted that as the plaintiff’s action is against other defendants, upon whom the warrant of attachment had not been served, it should be permitted to proceed
p. 122against them as if no attachment had been issued. The liability of the several defendants is for the same debt; payment made by any one of them will satisfy the plaintiff’s claim against all. The debt has been paid, by paying the amount with costs of the action into court.
The only remaining question to be determined is, whether the plaintiff or the United States own the fund, and in this question none of the former defendants have now any interest. . The order should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Order affirmed.