Mangam v. City of Brooklyn

The plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum. of $100, for each of the years 1879, 1880, 1881 and 1882, as the balance of her intestate’s salary as policeman in the city of Brooklyn, alleged to be remaining unpaid by the defendant. Said intestate was appointed policeman prior to 1877. The claim is made by virtue of the charter of that city,' appearing in chapter 863, Laws of 1873, which fixed the compensation of patrolman at the sum of $1,100 per annum. It is answered to this claim that the common council of Brooklyn, by virtue of authority conferred upon them in chapter 459, Laws of 1877, have reduced the annual compensation payable to patrolmen in that city, from $1,100 to $1,000. It is also claimed that the same reduction was effected by chapter 467 of the Laws of 1879. If the validity of the reduction made under either authority is established, it constitutes a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action. The appellant asserts, however, that these acts do not affect the questions in dispute, for the reasons:

First. That both of them were, by their terms, restricted to officers to be thereafter elected or appointed; and

Second. In case the first proposition fails, that such acts are obnoxious to the provisions of section 18, article 3 of the Con stitution, as being local bills, and “ creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentage or allowances of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.”

The first proposition depends upon the meaning and effect to be ascribed to the following sections of the acts in question: Section 6 of chapter 459, Laws of 1877, and section 7 of chapter 467 of the Laws of 1879, is similar, reads as follows : “ The provisions of this act shall not apply to any officers, who, under the provisions of the Constitution, cannot have their fees, percentages or allowances increased or diminished during their present terms of offices; but said provisions shall apply to all of those hereafter elected or appointed to perform any service within the city of Brooklyn.” The language of this section is upon its face ambiguous and equivocal, and requires an inquiry into its meaning before the provisions of the act can be understandingly enforced.

In accordance with settled canons for the construction of statutes, however, some effect must be given to all of the language employed in framing them, * provided the intent of the legislature is discoverable from the words employed, or other sources of information open to the consideration of the court, and such construction is reasonable and does not lead to absurd or unjust results.

It is quite obvious, from the language of the act, that the legislature had in mind section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution in framing it, because they use the precise language employed in that section in describing the class of officers who are not to be affected by its provisions. Thus, they say it is those officers “ who, under the provisions of the Constitution, cannot have their fees, percentage or allowances increased or diminished during their present terms in office.” This language is used in section 18, article 3, and in no other place in the Constitution, and unless held to apply to that section, it must be denied any application whatever. It does not follow,

It would seem, therefore, that the first' clause of section 6 was inserted merely as a tentative provision . to save the act from possible condemnation as being in conflict with the Constitution.

It is evident, from the consideration suggested, that no conclusive inference can be drawn from the insertion of the clause in question, that the legislature intended thereby to exempt officers from the operations of the act who would otherwise be included in its provisions, but it would seem that they intended to leave the act open in that respect, to he determined by the solution of the question as to their constitutional power to pass it. The act is clearly hypothetical, and its true reading, if paraphrased according to its apparent object and meaning, would be as follows: This act shall not affect any officers named therein whose compensation cannot constitutionally be increased or diminished during their existing terms; and if so read, there is afforded no room for the contention that the legislature intended thereby to exempt the existing police force from its operation.

We thus arrive at the question whether the statutes referred to violate section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution.

The Constitution prohibits the legislature, by local or private bills, from increasing or diminishing the “ fees, percentage or allowances ” of certain officers during existing terms of office. The act of 1877 refers only to salaries, and does not purport, in itself, either to increase or diminish those, but attempts only to confer power upon the common council to fix and regulate such salaries as are payable from the municipal treasury.

The appellant claims, however, that the act is within the spirit and meaning of the constitutional provisions, and that, therefore, the attempt, by the common council, to reduce the patrolmen’s salaries was ineffectual. The rules applicable to the construction of constitutional provisions are the same generally as those applying to statutes, and the object in both cases is to arrive at the intention of the law makers.

If the meaning of a given provision be clear and unambiguous, and leads to no absurd or unjust result, it leaves no room for the application of rules of interpretation, and must, therefore, be enforced according to its letter and spirit. (Potter’s Dwarris on Stat. and Const. 9; Jackson v. Lewis, 17 Johns. 475 .) It was said in Newell v. People (3 Seld. 97), “ whether we are considering an agreement between parties, a statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If thus regarded, the words embody a definite meaning which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning upon the face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed.” (See, also, McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 602 ; Johnson v. H. R. R. R. Co., 49 id. 455.) If the words used in a statute are susceptible of different

The omission of the word “ salaries,” and the use of the rather uncommon word “ allowances ” in section 18, considered by itself, would be quite significant, and suggestive of great doubt as to the real signification of the provision; but when considered in connection with other occasions where the framers of the Constitution and the law-makers have been called upon to express themselves on the subject of payments to public servants, we shall find a uniform and invariable use of language, showing that' the respective phrases of “compensation,” “salary,” and “ allowances” have been used discriminatingly by them, and with a perfect understanding of their true meaning. Thus we find that the Constitution provides that “ each member of the legislature shall receive for his services an

“No officer whose salary is fixed by the Constitution shall receive any additional compensation. Each of the other State officers named in the Constitution shall, during his continuance in office, receive a compensation to be fixed by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which he shall have been elected or appointed, nor shall he receive to his use any fees or perquisites of office, or other compensation.” (§ 9, art. 10.)

“ Judicial officers in office when this Constitution shall take effect may continue to receive such fees and perquisites of office as are now authorized bylaw, until the first day of July, 1847.”

It is seen by this review that'the word “ allowance” is used in the Constitution in a sense entirely different and distinct from that of salary. The only instance in which it is employed, aside from the section in question, being to denote something to be given or yielded by the State in addition to a stated compensation, termed a salary. The generic term used by them to cover all forms of payments made to public officers for services is invariably that of compensation, and the specific term used to denote payments to officers having a fixed, definite and ■stated compensation, is that of salary.

"A brief reference to the action of the several conventions which preceded the adoption of the present Constitution will show that the words of the existing section were deliberately selected after the rejection, by the people, of a provision couched in more comprehensive language. Among the sections submitted to the people by the constitutional convention of 1867, was the following: ■ § 17. “ The Legislature shall not grant any extra compensation to any public officer, servant or contractor, nor increase or diminish any compensation, except that of judicial officers, during their term of office.” (Proceedings and Debates, p. 3961, Atlas Ed.) This provision, together, with the Constitution, of which it was a part, was rejected by the people. Subsequent to this rejection, a convention assembled under the authority of chapter 884, Laws of "1872, and framed provisions, which, after being revised by the action of the subsequent legislature, resulted in the submission to the people of the Constitution as it now stands, and as thus submitted it was approved and adopted by them.

It will thus be seen that the framers of the Constitution, when they attempted to draw provisions specifically limiting .the power of the legislature over the compensation of public .officers, used the most appropriate, natural and comprehensive

The natural interpretation of these provisions is that they were intended to include only those irregular, indefinite and uncertain modes of compensating public servants which were indicated by words of like character and meaning, as those of “fees,” “ percentages,” etc. The case of McGaffin v. City of Cohoes ( 74 N. Y. 389 ) is illustrative of the rule referred to. There the words “ contract, obligation or liability ” were held, by force of the maxim in question, to exclude liability for torts ; the late Chief Judge Church saying, that “ words are often used redundantly or repetitiously, without strict regard to the meaning of each, but for greater caution to express the full meaning of the principal subject. In such cases, the maxim noscitur a sociis is' applied.” In the case of Corning v. McCullough ( 1 N. Y. 47 ), it was held that a clause in a statute prescribing three years limitation “ for any forfeiture or cause, the benefit and suit whereof is limited to the party aggrieved,” should be construed as meaning actions for a forfeiture, or cause of action of like nature only, and not to apply to

It seems to us that we cannot, without doing violence to the meaning and intent of the authors of the Constitution, ascribe to them, by the use of such a word, in such a relation, an intention to reach and affect so important a subject as that embraced in regulating the compensation of those numerous public servants whose services are compensated by fixed salaries. Whether we consider the ordinary and popular signification of the word, ór the more accurate and technical meaning attached to it by lexicographers, it is entirely inappropriate to express the idea of a fixed compensation adopted for the payment of services rendered by one person to another. The word “ allowance ” imports the voluntary act of one party in doing something which is in his discretion to perform or withhold at pleasure. To allow implies the right, to determine, and is the act of a superior toward a dependent granting a privilege which he has authority to confer or deny. It does not express the relations existing between co-contractors, vendor and- vendee, or employer and employe where there is a right secured by contract on one side, and no power of voluntary action on the other.

Allowances are made by husband to wife, parents to children, the head of a family to its members, superannuated dependents and servants, from the benevolent to the poor, and in cases where the act is discretionary with the donor, as a reward for benefits conferred, or services voluntarily rendered by oné to another.

Referring to some of the uses of. the words in question adopted by the legislature in statutes we find by section 3, chapter 521, Laws of 1880: “Eo officer or person who is paid a salary from the city treasury shall receive to or for his own use any fees, costs, allowances, perquisites of office, commissions,” etc., and the comptroller is empowered to examine any such officer under oath touching “ the amount of any fees, costs, allowances, perquisites, etc. ” Allowances have been authorized to be made by the court to parties in actions in certain cases, and extra allowances in actions

To the uses of the words shown by these citations, others of the same character could be made indefinitely, and we have yet to discover any employment of the word “ allowance ” by law-makers or others which is the exact equivalent of either of the words “ salary ” or “ compensation.” Eeference to the works of the lexicographers shows Webster’s definition to be, “ The act of allowing, granting or admitting.” “ Permission or license.” “ That which is allowed; a portion appointed; a limited quantity of meat and drink when provisions fall short.” “ A cus

Worcester gives a definition similar to that of Crabbe, but refers to the word “ salary"” as one of the synonyms of “ allowance,” distinguishing them, however, by stating that the latter is gratuitous and the former a stated compensation, payable under a contract. Richardson’s English Dictionary gives, “ to permit, to concede, to suffer, to assent, to yield.” Other lexicographers give definitions similar to those of Worcester and Crabbe, and seem to exclude the idea that the terms are analogous, except, perhaps, in a very loose and imperfect sense.

It would seem from the foregoing illustrations that the word “ allowance ” has a plain, definite and precise meaning attached to it by authors and law-makers, and the duty of the court to enforce it as it reads, is clear and unmistakable. We have no power, and it is not our office to stretch the meaning of words used, for the purpose of covering an object which we have no other means of determining to have been within the contemplation of the authors of the Constitution, than that of the language employed by them. It, therefore, seems to us, not only a reasonable, but a necessary inference from the invariable use by the authors of the Constitution of the words “ salary ” and “ compensation ” when' .referring to that kind of payment made to public officers by way of salary, and their deliberate exclusion from the clause in question, that they did not intend to include salaried officers within its meaning.

This view is greatly strengthened by the express provisions made in that instrument with reference to the immutability of the compensation of a large number of such officers, and the inference which may be drawn therefrom that they did not intend to enact general provisions to accomplish similar objects.

In opposition to our views it "is urged that such a construction would leave no subject of importance for the provisions in

We are quite aware of the great importance of the question presented, and of the divers views existing with reference to it among judges and members of the legal profession; but no sufficient reason has been suggested, as we think, which authorizes the importation into the Constitution of a meaning which does not flow naturally and obviously from the language employed in it.

Other minor questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant have been examined by us, but we find none of sufficient plausibility to raise serious doubt as to the correctness of the judgment appealed from.

The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.