Farrell v. Drew

The sole issue, on this direct appeal from orders of the Civil Court of the City of New York, is the constitutionality of section 143-b of the Social Welfare Law, known as the Spiegel Law, providing rent abatement for welfare tenants who live in buildings that contain a ‘ ‘ violation of law * * * which is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health.”

In the situation presented by the cases before us, it is the landlords of welfare recipients who, the Legislature found, ‘‘ conspicuously offend ”. To-be sure, they are not the only landlords who fail to make repairs in slum dwellings. But welfare recipients have even less freedom than other tenants of deteriorated buildings in selecting a place to live (see, e.g., Matter of Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc 2d 722 , 729), and the landlords of welfare recipients, secure in their receipt of rents directly from public funds, have even less incentive than other landlords to make repairs. Under circumstances such as these, if the Legislature chooses to select one class of landlords and impose a special sanction against them, the equal protection clause does not forbid it. (See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 , 732-733, supra.)

It is likewise clear that the' State may, in the exercise -of its police power, provide for the curtailment of rent payments to landlords as a means of inducing them to eliminate dangerous housing conditions. (See, e.g., Matter of Department of Bldgs. of City of N. Y. [Soltzer], 16 N Y 2d 915 , supra; Matter of Department of Bldgs. of City of N. Y. [Philco Realty Corp.], 14 N Y 2d 291 , supra; Nordred Realties v. Langley, 279 N. Y. 636 , cert. den. 306 U. S. 655 ; cf. People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429 , supra.) We have, in the past, upheld and applied statutes or regulations, not too unlike the one before us, which provide for (1) rent reduction (see Matter of F & M Realty Co. v. Gabel, 21 A D 2d 853 , mot. for lv. to app. den. 14 N Y 2d 490 ), (2) partial rent abatement (see Nordred Realties v. Langley, 169 Misc. 659 , 661, affd. 279 N. Y. 636 , cert. den. 306 U. S. 655 , supra) and (3) rent receivership. (See Matter of Department of Bldgs. of City of N. Y. [Soltzer], 16 N Y 2d 915 , supra; Matter of Department of Bldgs. of City of N. Y. [Philco Realty Corp.], 14 N Y 2d 291 , supra.)

Nor is the .statute subject to criticism on constitutional grounds because it does not, in so many words, call for notice

It is clear, too, that section 143-b does not effect any unconstitutional impairment of the landlord’s contractual rights. “ If the legislation before us ‘ is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end ’ ”, this court declared in the Philco Realty case (14 N Y 2d, at pp. 297-298), ‘ ‘ it may not be stricken as unconstitutional, even though it may interfere with rights established by existing contracts. (Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 438.) It is ‘ fundamental ’ * * * that ‘ the state may establish regulations reasonably necessary to secure the general welfare of the community by the exercise of its police power although the rights of private property are [thereby] * * * curtailed and freedom of contract is abridged.’ ” And, after noting that contracts are made subject to the exercise of the State’s power when justified, we went on to say that, whether this protective power of the State be treated as “an implied condition of every contract and, as such, as much part of the contract as though it were written into it ” or as “ ‘ an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the * * * general welfare of the people * * * paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals ’ ” (East New York Bank v. Hahn, 326 U. S. 230 , 232-233), it is “ 6 settled law ’ ” that ‘ ‘ ‘ the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as * * * are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected.’ ” (Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 , 437.) The remedial legislation chai

•The appellant’s remaining points bear on the wisdom rather than the constitutionality of this legislation and require no discussion. As we have sought to demonstrate, section 143-b of the Social Welfare Law is free from any constitutional impediment.

The orders appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

A mere statement of the provisions of section 143-b (subds. 2, 5) of the Social Welfare Law, in their application to this case, should be enough to demonstrate its unconstitutionality, both as denying the equal protection of the law and depriving appellant of property without due process of law (U. S. Const., 5th and 14th Amdts.; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 6). Ter.ants on welfare (as distinct from tenants not receiving public relief) are exempted from payment of rent, as well as dispossession, for any period during which there is outstanding anywhere in the building any violation of law relating to dangerous or hazardous conditions or conditions detrimental to life or health. There are no building violations in any of the three apartments in this building from which tenants—-who have not paid their rent—are sought to be evicted. There is no violation anywhere in the building which is dangerous or hazardous to these welfare tenants or detrimental to their health. It happens that in the apartment of a fourth tenant—not a welfare recipient — a door did not fit properly. The inspector testified that, when he called it to the landlord’s attention, it had been repaired “ but still the door would bind slightly. In other words, it would not close fully.” The inspector added: “ The tenant seemed happy, but I wouldn’t accept it.” Of course, that tenant, in whose apartment this “ violation ” existed, is obliged to continue to pay his rent out of his own pocket-because he is not receiving public relief. The statute discriminates with, as it seems to me, no constitutional basis for classification, in favor of those who do not support themselves. Because of the fact that this door will not completely close, the tenants of three other apartments in the build

This statute recites that it was adopted to aid in eliminating slums. It would be related to that objective if payment for the use and occupation of the apartments were channeled to the landlord in such manner that the landlord would be required to spend it for the improvement of the property, but these provisions of this statute are unrelated to that end. They prevent the rent from being paid in any manner so that it could be used for repairs or improvements. Such provisions have no relation to slum clearance except to prevent it.

The orders appealed from should be reversed and dispossess warrants issued.

Judges Burke, Bergan, Keating and Breitel concur with Chief Judge Fuld; Judge Van Voorhis dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Scileppi concurs.

Orders affirmed.