Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc. v. Town of Plattekill

OPINION OF THE COURT

A duly enacted Town of Plattekill ordinance broadly forbids anyone other than those who reside or conduct an established business in the town from depositing within its boundaries any “garbage, rubbish or other articles originating elsewhere than in the Town”. The principal question we reach on this appeal is whether the ordinance, as applied, violates the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution (art I, § 8).

This case is a sequel to one by which, in 1976, the town successfully sought to permanently enjoin the plaintiff, Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc., from accepting refuse in violation of the ordinance. Dutchess, a State-licensed commercial carting and sanitary landfill company, until then

Turning then to Dutchess’ contention that the town’s ordinance is repugnant to the commerce clause, we begin with by then Justice Cardozo’s oft-quoted observation, made in the context of a commerce clause case, that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division” (Baldwin v G.A.F. Seelig ( 294 US 511 , 523). To that end, the clause has been read to assure that the basic economic unit is the country at large, that in matters of interstate commerce there are no State lines and that no State may thwart these concepts by placing itself in economic isolation. The credo is that the future of our Nation depends not on how certain parts of it fare but on how it does as a whole.

These interpretations hearken to the pragmatic political philosophy which guided the formation of our Nation. So fundamental is this unadorned and unqualified grant of Federal authority — “The Congress shall have Power * * * To Regulate Commerce * * * among the several States”— that the Supreme Court has taken the pains recently to reiterate that the clause not only invites Congressional regulation, but, even when the power to do so goes unexercised, it nonetheless restricts State regulation (Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 US 322 , 326; Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 , 621-623, supra). Indeed, history takes any element of surprise out of these declarations. For, as is true of the

The product of this background is a broad definition of interstate commerce. Thus, in Philadelphia, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a “two-tiered definition of commerce” which, while advocating “ ‘a very sweeping concept’ ” of commerce when supported by Congressional legislation, would have applied a narrower one where the clause itself was invoked to overturn a State enactment. At issue there was whether, in the absence of a Federal statute, the movement and deposit of refuse was commerce. The court’s reply was that commerce had but one definition under the clause: “Just as Congress had power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement” (Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 , 621, 623, supra). This maxim as a guide, two salient principles emerge from the cases.

One is that the clause protects against offending activities though, because these are carried out entirely within one State, their imposition on interstate commerce is only “indirect”. Thus, in Fry v United States ( 421 US 542 , 547), wage increases “even for employees of wholly intrastate operations” were held to affect interstate commerce. Similarly, in United States v Women’s Sportswear Assn. ( 336 US 460 , 464), a combination effectuated in Massachusetts to fix prices on services performed entirely in that State was found to be within the scope of the clause because the victimized customers were engaged in interstate commerce. And, in Wickard v Filburn ( 317 US 111 , 127-128), the clause was invoked to protect the Federally supported na

Furthermore, “the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities” (Pike v Bruce Church, 397 US 137 , 142; emphasis added). On that basis, when the effect of a statutory scheme is to make exclusion do the work of inspection in protecting a State’s or city’s residents from unwholesome milk, it has been declared unconstitutional on the ground that, given the possibility off inspection, the local interest could equally well be served by means far less disruptive of interstate commerce (e.g., A & P Tea Co. v Cottrell, 424 US 366 , 377; Dean Milk Co. v Madison, 340 US 349 , 355-356).

Consequently, bearing in mind that conservation of the landfill for use by the town’s own residents is not in itself a constitutionally acceptable goal (Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617 , 629, supra; cf. Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 US 322 , supra), the ordinance as applied here would not meet the less-burdensome-alternative analysis. Obviously, the only legitimate goal — protection of community health— might have been adequately effected, as in the milk cases, through such means, for example, as inspection carried out either by town officials or by the State Department of Environmental Conservation, or through nondiscriminatory, across-the-board limitation on the quantity, type or state of waste to be deposited or excluded. Instead, the path the town took was to regulate garbage on no criterion except its place of origin. In the absence of a reason, apart from its origin, to treat the out-of-town garbage differently from an equivalent quantity of the local product — and none is suggested— in actual operation respondent’s ordinance violates the principle of nondiscrimination imposed by the commerce clause. This it may not do.