People v. Coleman

OPINION OF THE COURT

The Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (see L 2009, ch 56, § 1, part AAA, § 9 [hereinafter 2009 DLRA]) provides remedial resentencing to low-level nonviolent felony drug offenders who meet various basic eligibility requirements (see CPL 440.46 [1]). The 2009 DLRA, however, denies resentencing to any offender who is serving a sentence for an “exclusion offense,” which is, among other things, an “offense for which a merit time allowance is not available pursuant to [Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii)]” (CPL 440.46 [5]; CPL 440.46 [5] [a] [ii]). Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii), in turn, makes a merit time allowance unavailable to an offender who is serving a sentence imposed for any of the violent or sexual crimes specifically enumerated in that statute, without regard to the offender’s predicate sentencing status (see Correction Law § 803 [1] [d] [ii]). That statute also prevents any offender serving a sentence “authorized for an A-I felony offense” from receiving a merit time allowance (id.), thereby denying such an allowance to anyone who has been sentenced as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law §§ 70.00 [2] [a]; [3] [a] [i]; 70.10 [2]).

In interpreting the language of these interlocking statutes, the Departments of the Appellate Division are divided over the proper answer to the following question: does the DLRA resentencing exclusion apply to all offenders who are ineligible to receive a merit time allowance, including those who cannot receive those allowances solely by virtue of their recidivist sentencing adjudications; or, to the contrary, does it apply only to offenders who have been convicted of certain serious crimes that are specifically listed in Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) and eliminate the possibility of a merit time allowance regardless of an offender’s recidivist sentencing adjudication? We hold that the exclusion applies only to offenders who have been

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n 2001, defendant Earl Coleman was convicted, after a jury trial held before the County Court of Sullivan County, of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (see Penal Law § 220.39 [1]). Based on defendant’s prior felony convictions for robbery in the third degree (see Penal Law § 160.05) and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree (see Penal Law § 165.50), the court exercised its discretion to adjudicate defendant a persistent felony offender and sentenced him to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life. The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed defendant’s conviction on direct appeal, and a Judge of this Court denied him leave to appeal (see People v Coleman, 4 AD3d 677 , 677-679 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 2 NY3d 797 [2004]).

On November 25, 2009, defendant filed a motion in County Court for resentencing pursuant to the 2009 DLRA, as codified in pertinent part in CPL 440.46. Defendant contended that he met all the statutory eligibility requirements and should be resentenced. The People opposed defendant’s resentencing application on the theory that he was serving a sentence on a conviction for an “exclusion offense” which rendered him ineligible for resentencing (CPL 440.46 [5]).

In his motion papers, defendant also asked the court to assign him counsel pursuant to CPL 440.46 (4). The court took no action on defendant’s request for the assignment of counsel, and defendant litigated his resentencing motion without the assistance of counsel. Following motion practice, the court denied defendant’s resentencing motion on the ground that he was ineligible for resentencing under the statute. Defendant appealed from the order denying his resentencing motion, and the Appellate Division reversed and remitted the matter to County Court for further proceedings, finding that County Court had erroneously failed to assign counsel to represent defendant in the resentencing proceedings (see People v Coleman, 83 AD3d 1223 , 1223 [3d Dept 2011]).

Upon remittal, defendant, now represented by counsel, submitted additional papers in support of his resentencing ap

The People renewed their opposition to defendant’s resentencing application, asserting that he was serving a sentence upon a conviction for an “exclusion offense.” According to the People, because defendant had been sentenced as a persistent felony offender on the instant drug crimes and could not obtain a merit time allowance, his current drug offenses qualified as “exclusion offenses” under the merit-time-related resentencing exclusion. County Court issued an order denying defendant’s resentencing application, finding him ineligible for resentencing on essentially the grounds advanced by the People. Defendant appealed.

A divided panel of the Appellate Division reversed County Court’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings (see People v Coleman, 110 AD3d 76 , 77-79 [3d Dept 2013]). The majority held that, because defendant met the basic eligibility requirements for resentencing under the 2009 DLRA and had no conviction for an “exclusion offense,” he was eligible for resentencing (id. at 77-78 [op by Peters, PJ.]). Observing that the Penal Law defines an “offense” as criminal conduct and

Indeed, the majority opined, the remedial purpose of the 2009 DLRA compels the conclusion that the latter type of offender is among the low-level nonviolent drug offenders upon whom the statute liberally confers relief, and only the former type of offender is unable to be resentenced (see id. at 77 ). The majority concluded that, because defendant had no conviction for an offense that automatically precluded his receipt of a merit time allowance, his inability to receive a merit time allowance as a result of his persistent felony offender adjudication did not make him ineligible for resentencing (see id. at 78 ). In light of its finding of eligibility, the majority remitted the case to allow County Court to determine whether substantial justice dictated the denial of defendant’s resentencing application (see id. at 78-79 ).

One Justice dissented and voted to affirm County Court’s order (see id. at 79-80 [Stein, J, dissenting]). The dissent asserted that the 2009 DLRA’s definition of an “exclusion offense” “clearly references Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) without limitation,” including that Correction Law provision’s prohibition against merit time allowances for offenders serving sentences for class A-I felonies (id. at 80). Thus, according to the dissent, the resentencing exclusion applies to all offenders who, like defendant, are persistent felony offenders serving sentences authorized for class A-I felonies, and defendant was ineligible for resentencing (see id. at 79-80 ). The dissenting Justice of the Appellate Division granted the People leave to appeal (see 21 NY3d 1078 [2013]), and we now affirm.

Under the 2009 DLRA, a defendant who meets the basic statutory eligibility requirements is eligible for resentencing unless he or she “is serving a sentence on a conviction for or has a predicate felony conviction for an exclusion offense” (CPL 440.46 [5]; see CPL 440.46 [1]). Here, it is undisputed that de

CPL 440.46 (5) (a) defines an “exclusion offense” in pertinent part as:

“a crime for which the person was previously convicted within the preceding ten years, excluding any time during which the offender was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony, which was: (i) a violent felony offense as defined in [Penal Law § 70.02]; or (ii) any other offense for which a merit time allowance is not available pursuant to [Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii)]." (CPL 440.46 [5] [a] [emphasis supplied].)

Thus, a defendant is ineligible for resentencing if, inter alia, he or she has previously been convicted of an “offense” that prevents the defendant from receiving a merit time allowance (CPL 440.46 [5] [a]). Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii), to which the definition of a merit-time-ineligible “exclusion offense” refers, describes the circumstances under which a defendant may not receive a merit time allowance, stating:

“[A] merit time allowance shall not be available to any person serving an indeterminate sentence authorized for an A-I felony offense, other than an A-I felony offense defined in [Penal Law article 220], or any sentence imposed for a violent felony offense as defined in [Penal Law § 70.02], manslaughter in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, criminally negligent homicide, an offense defined in [Penal Law article 130], incest, or an offense defined in [Penal Law article 263], or aggravated harassment of an employee by an inmate.” (Correction Law § 803 [1] [d] [ii] [emphasis supplied].)

Because, under the Penal Law, a defendant will receive a sentence authorized for a class A-I felony if he or she is sentenced as a persistent felony offender (see Penal Law §§ 70.00 [2] [a]; [3] [a] [i]; 70.10 [2]), Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) necessarily makes a merit time allowance unavailable to a defendant who has been adjudicated a persistent felony offender.

Interpreting the 2009 DLRA’s merit-time-related exclusion in People v Gregory ( 80 AD3d 624 [2d Dept 2011], lv denied 17

As reflected in the divergent views of the Appellate Division Departments, there is some ambiguity in the critical subparagraph of CPL 440.46 (5) (a), which defines an “exclusion offense” as an “offense for which a merit time allowance is not available pursuant to [Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii)]” (CPL 440.46 [5] [a] [ii]). Certainly, that language suggests that a defendant has a conviction for an “exclusion offense” only if the defendant’s “offense,” i.e., his or her criminal conduct (Penal Law § 10.00 [1]), constitutes a crime that necessarily causes a person convicted of it to lose any chance of obtaining a merit time allowance. On the other hand, the same subparagraph’s citation to Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) leads to the opposite conclusion, for that statute, when read literally, prevents a defendant from obtaining a merit time allowance based on the sentence authorized or imposed for his or her offense rather than the offense itself (see Correction Law § 803 [1] [d] [ii]).

In choosing between these two plausible readings of the statute, we are guided by the precept that the plain terms of the 2009 DLRA, like any statute, should be interpreted in a manner that effectuates the intent of the legislature (see People v Mitchell, 15 NY3d 93 , 97 [2010]; People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179 , 182 [2000]). Although there is virtually no official legislative history of the particular resentencing exclusion at issue here, we may look to the broader purpose of the DLRA as a whole for guidance in divining the meaning of the exclusion. Indeed, in our prior decisions interpreting the DLRA resentencing exclusions, we have relied on the legislative intent underlying the remedial framework of the 2009 DLRA, which we summarized in detail (see People v Sosa, 18 NY3d 436 , 441-442 [2012]; People v Paulin, 17 NY3d 238 , 244 [2011]). As we have made clear, when the legislature enacted the 2009 DLRA, it sought to ameliorate the excessive punishments meted out to low-level, nonviolent drug offenders under the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, and therefore the statute is designed to spread relief as widely as possible, within the bounds of reason, to its intended beneficiaries (see Sosa, 18 NY3d at 438, 441-442 ; Paulin, 17 NY3d at 244 ; see also Assembly Sponsor’s Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2004, ch 738 at 6 [discussing the similar legislative intent behind the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004]).

We adopt defendant’s interpretation of the relevant resentencing exclusion under the 2009 DLRA because it is more consistent with the statute’s remedial purpose than the People’s interpretation. As interpreted by defendant, the statute would grant the benefits of remedial resentencing to a broad array of nonviolent offenders, including those who could have received a merit time allowance had they not been sentenced as persistent

Here, defendant has never been convicted of any of the crimes which eliminate the possibility of a merit time allowance under Correction Law § 803 (1) (d) (ii) within the relevant time period, and he meets all other eligibility criteria under the 2009 DLRA. Thus, we conclude that defendant is eligible for resentencing. In light of that determination, we find it unnecessary to consider defendant’s remaining arguments regarding his eligibility for resentencing.

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Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Rivera concur.

Order affirmed.