Majority
Headnote
1. Mechanics’ Liens (§ 137[1] )—Notice of Lien—“Owner.”The decision of this controversy requires a determination of the validity and priority of certain mechanics’ liens filed by appellants and respondents against real property in the city_ of Rochester. The facts in the case are disclosed by evidence suggesting little, if any, direct conflict. While in some important particulars we have reached conclusions as to what the facts established by the evidence are different from those arrived at by the learned trial court, yet that result is due largely to our having drawn different inferences of fact from uncontradicted testimony. A recital of the facts which we deem the evidence establishes will aid in stating the reasons for our conclusions that the judgment should be reversed. The defendant Genesee Amusement Company is a corporation organized prior to July 33, 1907, at which time it entered into a written contract with the defendants Montgomery for the construction at an agreed price of a building upon the premises in question. At this time the title to the premises was owned by one Kimball, and Charles A. Drake had an option contract to purchase the same, obtained by him before the formation of the Genesee Amusement Company, of which company he became the president. Work was begun by the Montgomerys under their contract with the amusement company; and had substantially progressed prior to December, 1907. What the exact arrangement was between Drake, the holder of the option, and the amusement company, does not appear; but it is apparent that it was understood that the company had succeeded to his rights, and that the company was erecting the building on the premises in its own interest. Prior to December, 1907, the amusement company had applied to one of the Rochester savings banks for a loan upon the property. This bank, as a condition of making the loan, required, under its rules for making loans, that the directors of a corporation to which it loaned money upon a mortgage of real estate must personally sign the bond accompanying the mortgage. At least one of these directors was unwilling to do this. To obviate this difficulty, it was then arranged, satisfactorily to the bank, that title to the premises should be taken in the names of two persons, Harris and Hooker, who should thereupon give a mortgage thereon with their bond accompanying it. Pursuant to this arrangement on December 11, 1907, Kimball gave a deed of the premises to Harris and Hooker. Harris and Hooker gave to the savings bank a mortgage on the premises accompanied by their bond for $60,000, and a second mortgage to Kimball for $36,000, apparently to secure the part of the purchase price unpaid. At the same time and as part of the same transaction, Harris and Hooker conveyed the premises by their deed to the amusement company subject to the lien of the two mortgages, which the amusement company assumed. At the same time Harris and Hooker gave an order to pay over to the amusement company the proceeds of the bank mortgage. Harris and Hooker never had any real or valuable interest in the premises, except for the purposes above indicated, never paid any amount upon the purchase price thereof, and were not entitled to and did not receive the proceeds of the mortgage, and were no't interested in any contracts for building upon or improving the premises. As a part of
(1) Palmer Lumber Company (appellant) March 20, 1908, 9:27 a. m... $2,272 76:
(2) Becker Glass & Paint Co. (appellant) March 23, 1908, 9:06 a. m. . 1,255 62"
(3) Weaver, Palmer & Richmond (respondent) March 23, 1908, 4:58
p. m..................................................... 1,750 00-
(4) Warren Chemical & Manufacturing Company (respondent) March
24, 1908, 11:10 a. m........................................ 1,123 57'
(5) Charles P. Evans Company (respondent) March 24, 1908, 12:40
p. m...................................................... 2,415 15
(6) Better Paint Company (respondent) Blarch 28, 1908, 11:59 a. m.. 62 99-
(7) Vogel & Binder Co. (plaintiff-respondent)' Blarch 28, • 1908,
12:00 m.................................................... 1,670 34
(8) Warren Chemical & Blanúfacturing Co. (respondent) April 20,
1908, 11:17 a. m........................................... 1,123 57"
The lien of Weaver, Palmer, & Richmond, No. 3 above, consists-of an order drawn by the Montgomerys against the owner, Genesee Amusement Company, directing the payment of the sum of $1,750-out of the fund and duly accepted in writing by the Genesee Amusement Company. No question seems to be made either by appellants- or respondents that this was properly allowed by the trial court as a lien upon the premises. In liens Nos. 1, 2, and 4 the Genesee Amusement Company alone is named as owner. In lien .No. 5 Harris and Hooker and Genesee Amusement Company- ar.e; named as - owners, and their respective interests in the premises are stated to be as to-
The trial court has found and the judgment as entered determines that appellants’ liens, Nos. 1 and 2 above, as well as the first lien of the Warren Chemical & Manufacturing Company, No. 4 above, are invalid and void, and it further directs their cancellation and annulment of record. It is further found and determined that the other liens are valid, and appropriate direction is given for their enforcement and payment. Appellants do not assail the validity of the other liens; but do insist that their liens are valid, and, having been filed first in time, are superior in right to those of the other lienors.
There can be little doubt that the appellants had the right to file their notices of lien directed to the Genesee Amusement Company as owner, and that the lien attached to such interest as the company had as an owner, whatever that might be, except as their right to such lien may be modified by section 13 of the mechanic’s lien law, to which reference will be made hereafter. Strauchen v. Pace, 195 N. Y. 167 , 170, 88 N. E. 51 . In this case the court in discussing the effect and application of sections 2 and 9 of this law clearly states that a failure to name the true owner in the notice of lien and assert a claim against him eo nomine does not impair the effect of the notice for the purpose of impressing a lien upon whatever interest, the party named in and against whose interest a lien is therein stated to be claimed may have, provided only that interest is one of those specified in section 2 of the act. The amusement company was in possession of the premises with the title thereto under its unrecorded deed. Actual possession of real estate -“is notice to all the world of the existence of any right which the person in possession is able to establish,” and it does not seem material for the purpose of charging every one with such notice that such rights or even the fact of possession were unknown to the person- to be charged with such notice. Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587 , 23 N. E. 1109 , 8 L. R. A. 211 ; Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N. Y. 39 , 52, 54 N. E. 726 , 46 L. R. A. 694 ; Shneider v. Mahl, 84 App. Div. 1 , 5, 82 N. Y. Supp. 27 . The amusement company, being in possession of the premises claiming under a valid conveyance of title, was not only an “owner” within the definition of an “owner”
Respondents, however, insist that their liens have by express provision of the statute priority over appellants’ claims. The statutory provision to which we are referred as sustaining this claim is found in section 13 of article 1 of the lien law (Laws 1897, p. 520, c. 418);, which provides that:
“A lien for materials furnished or labor performed in the improvement of real property shall have priority over a conveyance, judgment, or other claim against such property not recorded, docketed or filed at the time of filing the notice of such lien.”
We are not assisted in applying this provision of the statute to a determination of the rights of the several parties in this action by any direct authority construing it, to which our attention has been directed. It would seem that the underlying purpose of this provision was to relieve the lienor from the possible result of having his lien, otherwise perfect, as a claim upon the real estate it describes, made ineffectual by some secret transfer, or other incumbrance, upon the property, which was asserted to prevent the lien’s attaching to the property, or reducing its value, or extent. It should be borne in mind that appellants’ liens attached to the interest of the Genesee Amusement Company in the property, whose title was as to “all the world” that of- an owner of the fee. Record of its deed was not necessary for the purpose of giving notice as to it of the title it claimed and had. Appellants’ liens attached to that title. Their liens were duly filed. It is only as to conveyances, judgments, or other claims, not recorded, docketed, or filed, that the statute in terms applies to subordinate them to subsequent liens properly filed against the property. Any purchaser or mortgagor of the premises taking title from the amusement company would be bound by these notices of lien. We think the same reason applies for holding the respondents bound to recognize appellants’ liens, not only as prior in time, but prior in right. To adopt respondents’ construction of the statute would lead to results which we cannot believe it should be held the statute permits. For instance, if appellants’ position is correct, ail of these lienors might have filed their claims against Harris and Hooker alone. The Genesee Amusement Company, the real owner, with whom alone the contract for the erection of the building was made, not having notice of the liens, might have paid to the contractors the full contract price for the building, and then be required to pay in addition the full amount of the liens. We cannot accept a construction of the statute which necessarily permits such a possibility.
Judgment reversed on the law and facts, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellants to abide the event. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents upon the ground that the word “owner,” as used in the statute, means the owner as disclosed by record, and that a lien filed against such owner is superior to one filed against the owner under an unrecorded deed.
Cases cited
- Strauchen v. Pace 195 N. Y. 167 at 170, 88 p. 13
- Phelan v. Brady 119 N. Y. 587 p. 13
- Marden v. Dorthy 160 N. Y. 39 at 52, 54 p. 13