Matthews v. Victor Hotel Co.

The action is in replevin by a chattel mortgagee against defendant, a hotel keeper, and involves the question as to an innkeeper’s lien on property brought to the hotel by a guest as against the holder of a chattel mortgage. The piano, the property in question, was the property of the mortgagor and was brought to the hotel before the execution of the mortgage. Thereafter and after the execution and filing of the mortgage and the maturity thereof and default, and while the mortgagor, the guest, was still in possession of the piano, the defendant acquired the hotel and became the proprietor or innkeeper, and thereafter the indebtedness of the mortgagor, the guest, to the defendant arose. There is nothing to show that the defendant acquired by assignment or otherwise the rights as innkeeper of his predecessor in the ownership of the hotel, and the question therefore resolves itself to this, viz.: Where a guest brings to a hotel property subject to an existing chattel mortgage in default, does the innkeeper’s lien attach to the property, in the absence of actual notice to the innkeeper of the existence of the mortgage?

[1-2] Section 181 of the Lien Law is as follows:

“A keeper of a hotel * * * has a lien upon while in his possession and may detain the baggage and other property brought upon his premises by a guest, boarder or lodger for the proper charges due from him on account of his accommodation, board and lodging and such extras as are furnished at his reguest. If the keeper of such hotel * * * knew that the property brought upon his premises was not, when brought, legally in the possession of such guest, boarder or lodger, or had notice that such property was not then the property of such guest, boarder or lodger, a lien thereon does not exist.”

By the execution of the mortgage the legal title to the property was vested in the mortgagee; the right to possession, until default, remained in the mortgagor. On default the right to possession vested in the mortgagee, and the mortgagor became a mere naked bailee with the right of redemption. Fuller v. Acker, 1 Hill, 475 ; Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 403 , 3 N. E. 338 .

In the case of Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 106 App. Div. 431 , 94 N. Y. Supp. 702 , affirmed 189 N. Y. 302 , 82 N. E. 143 , 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 958 , 121 Am. St. Rep. 886 , it was held that the innkeeper’s lien extended to property brought into the hotel by the guest where such property was the subject of a conditional sale, which provided that title should remain in the vendor until fully paid for and that the vendee’s (the guest’s) right to possession should cease on default - in payment of any of the installments of the purchase price. For a full discussion of the authorities, see the opinions in the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals in that case. The title of a chattel

While the actual decision in Waters v. Gerard was limited to cases where the guest was in rightful possession, the authorities cited go much further and hold that the lien exists against the true owner even where the property has been stolen. It is not necessary, however, for the present case to go beyond the actual decision made. In Bauman v. Post (Com. P1.) 12 N. Y. Supp. 213 , cited by appellant, it was held that the claim of a chattel mortgagee where the mortgagor had made default was superior to the claim of a lien by a warehouseman; but that there was a difference in the case of an innkeeper’s or common carrier’s lien was distinctly pointed out. In Soltau v. Gerdau, 119 N. Y. 380 , 23 N. E. 864 , 16 Am. St. Rep. 843 , it was held that where the_ property had been stolen a factor’s lien could not be sustained. This decision was put upon the ground that an intentional parting with the property, by the owner, was necessary in the case of a factor’s lien, and where feloniously secured the parting was not intentional. Barnett v. Walker, 39 Misc. Rep. 323 , 79 N. Y. Supp. 859 , was the case of a boarding house keeper. There the property had been the subject of a conditional sale by the terms of which the title remained in the vendor until final payment. After default by the vendee and demand by the vendor, the vendee brought the property to the premises of the defendant, the boarding house keeper. It was held that both the legal title and the right to possession were in the vendor • that no lien thereon existed-; that the lien of a boarding house keeper, unlike an innkeeper’s lien, did not exist at common law, but was the creature of statute, and, if construed so as to deprive the real owner of his property, would be unconstitutional. This case was relied on by the justice writing the dissenting opinion in Waters Sr Co. v. Gerard, 106 App. Div. 431 , 94 N. Y. Supp. 702 . The prevailing opinion was, however, unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals. For the above several reasons these cases are not applicable on the question now presented.

[3] The appellant claims, however, that, even conceding that the innkeeper’s lien would be superior in the absence of notice of the existence of the mortgage, the chattel mortgage having been filed is constructive notice, and that therefore, although no actual notice was shown, the case comes under the latter clause of the lien law, above

[4] There is nothing in the innkeeper’s lien law to indicate that any other than actual notice was intended. Words must be construed according to their natural meaning (People ex rel. Smith v. Gilon, 66 App. Div. 27 , 72 N. Y. Supp. 1041 ; People ex rel. Kemp v. D’Oench, 111 N. Y. 361 , 18 N. E. 862 ; Tompkins v. Hunter, 149 N. Y. 117 , 43 N. E. 532 ) and where the statute provides that if the innkeeper had notice, etc., the lien does not exist, its natural and obvious meaning is that notice or information has been brought home to the mind of the person referred to. The claim here is made that when it says notice it means notice or the means of acquiring notice by the filing of a paper. This would be to incorporate an entirely new element into the statute. Two instances are cited in appellant’s brief, in which the word actual notice has been used in certain statutes, and it is argued from that fact that when the word notice alone is used it should be construed to include something more than actual notice. These were two city charters, wherein it was provided that the municipality should not be liable for injuries sustained by persons falling by reason of ice and snow upon the sidewalks unless a reasonable time had elapsed after actual notice to certain officials of their dangerous condition. The reason for using the words “actual notice,” in those particular instances, as pointed out in the case of McNally v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 350 , 27 N. E. 1043 , was that it had been previously held constructive notice to the municipality was alone sufficient and the Legislature evidently intended to change this and require actual notice to certain designated officials.

[5] It is argued by appellant that the fact that the clause in regard to notice was a later amendment to the statute, and that as originally drawn it contained only the provisions as to the hotel keeper’s knowing that the property brought upon his premises was not legally in possession of the guest, indicated that the notice referred to was intended as a still further restriction of the lien, and therefore should be considered as meaning constructive as well as actual .notice. It' may equally as well be said that the purpose of the amendment was to provide, in addition to actual knowledge, notice or information — that is, something less than knowledge — should be sufficient to defeat the lien. No case upon the precise point has been found; but a perusal of the

[6] An appeal was taken from an order denying the motion to review the taxation of costs and disallow the same. The bill of costs is not in the record. No reason for the motion appears except a statement in the affidavit that appellant objected to defendant’s right to costs, and no mention is made of the point in the briefs.

Judgment and orders affirmed, with costs and disbursements. All concur.