Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations (§ 398[2] )—Public Improvements — Streets — Change of Grade—Damages.[1] This is a certiorari to review an award made by defendant, known as the “change of grade commission.” The property affected is situated on the southerly side of East 149th street, and consists of a parcel of land with two buildings thereon. This prop"erty was acquired in 1881 by relator’s testator, John Bee, and Elizabeth Bee, his wife, as tenants by the 'entirety, and was so held by them until April, 1892, when Elizabeth Bee died, and her husband, who survived her, became the sole owner. The map showing the proposed change of grade was filed Eebruary 21, 1871, before John Bee and his wife acquired title; but the grade was not physically changed until July, 1886, 15 years after the map had been filed and 5 years after John Bee and his wife had acquired title and erected houses on the lot. The commissioners have awarded damages only for the damage done to the lot by the change of grade, and have refused to allow anything for damages to the houses, and, of the damages found, have awarded only one-half to relator’s testator.
We are of opinion that the defendants erred, both in refusing to consider the damage done to the houses by the change of grade, and in awarding to relator’s testator only one-half of the amount of damage suffered by the lot. The question whether or not an owner of land who has erected a house, after the filing of a map showing a proposed change of grade and before the change is actually made, should be allowed for the damage done to his building, has been the subject of some difference of opinion. In Matter of Rogers Place,
“It may very well be in some cases that the mere filing of a map by the municipal authorities would not now be held to operate as a prohibition upon owners erecting buildings upon their land to conform to natural grades, for proceedings might not be taken to open streets for decades after the filing of maps.”
In Matter of Tiffany St., 84 App. Div. 525 , 82 N. Y. Supp. 852 , the court had to deal with a case in which it was left doubtful whether such a map had been filed as to give constructive notice to the owner of an intended change of grade. It was held that an owner could not be denied damages to buildings by reason of doubtful information as to an intended change of grade, and the court further said:
“Nor can the city file a map giving notice of an intended regulation and grade and then lie by for a long period of years without making the contemplated improvement and deprive the owner of making use of his land at peril of loss.”
In Matter of Briggs Avenue, 196 N. Y. 255 , 89 N. E. 814 , the Court of Appeals was called upon to consider the claim of an owner who had erected a building upon his land after proceedings had been begun to condemn it for a public street. His claim was rejected because it was found that he had acted in bad faith (of which there is no suggestion in the present case). The court held, however, that where there was no question of good or bad faith, a property owner is entitled to make the ordinary use of his land even between the commencement of condemnation proceedings and the final order vesting title in the city.
In Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577 , 32 N. E. 976 , 18 L. R. A. 543 , the Court of Appeals condemned as unconstitutional section 677 of the New York City Consolidated Act (chapter 410, Laws 1882), which provided that in street opening proceedings no allowance should be made for any building erected upon the land to be taken after the filing of the map showing the intended appropriation of the land for street purposes. This case, of course, is not decisive of the present question, for the change of grade does not involve the taking of any property, and therefore no constitutional question is involved. The reasoning of the court, however, is instructive. It was; in effect, that to restrict or limit the free use of property is equivalent to taking property, for:
“All that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the fruits of that use, and whoever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title or possession.”
The defendants are required by statute to award claimants “such relief as in their judgment is just and equitable in view of the circumstances of each case brought before them, * * * and shall determine what relief, if any, is to be awarded in respect of each lot or parcel of land with the buildings and improvements thereon, if any, and what award, if any, is to be allowed as damages upon such lot or parcel.” Chapter 537, Laws 1893, § 6. The actual damage is done, and the consequent loss incurred, when the physical change of grade
[2] The other question inviting our attention is as to what proportion of the damage done to the property should have been awarded to relator’s testator.
As has been said, John Bee and his wife owned the property as tenants by the entirety when the buildings were erected, and when the physical change of grade was effected, and consequently so held it when the property was injured by the change of grade. At that time, however, there was no provision of law by which these damages could be recovered, and whatever injury was done to the property was “damnum absque injuria,” and so it continued until after the death of Mrs. Bee in 1892. When she died, the whole estate, in its condition of impaired value, passed to her husband as survivor. No right to compensation for damage ever vested in her, and consequently none could have passed to her personal representative. The act providing for compensation was passed by the Legislature ex gratia in 1893, and then for the first time had any one a right to recover compensation. It was inaccurate to say that this right accrued in 1886 when the grade was changed. It accrued when the act was passed, although the damages were suffered in 1886. The title by which the property was held when the grade was changed was peculiar and has a direct bearing upon the present question. John Bee and his wife did not hold as tenants in common or as joint tenants, but each was seised of the entirety, “per tout et non per my,” and upon the death of either the whole survived to the other; but the survivor took the estate, not by virtue of survivorship simply, but by virtue of the grant which vested the entire estate in each grantee. Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 , 44 Am. Rep. 361 . John Bee was therefore the owner of the entire estate when the damage was done to the property, as well as when the act was passed providing for compensation, and consequently, his wife having died, was entitled to an award for the whole damage. And this is just and reasonable, because the estate came to him, not through his wife, but through the original grant, impaired in value by reason of the change of grade.
We see nothing contrary to this view in Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306 , 39 N. E. 337 , 30 L. R. A. 305 , 43 Am. St. Rep. 762 . All that was held in that case was that since the married women’s acts the husband is no longer entitled to enjoy the sole use of the usufruct' of real estate held by the entirety, but that as to such property the husband and wife are tenants in common or joint tenants of the use;
It follows that the writ must be sustained and the proceedings remitted to the defendants for determination upon the principles hereinbefore laid down, with $50 costs and disbursements to the relator. All concur.
Cases cited
- In re Mayor 65 App. Div. 1 at 72 p. 223
- In re the City of New York 196 N. Y. 255 p. 223
- Forster v. Scott 136 N. Y. 577 p. 223
- Bertles v. Nunan 92 N. Y. 152 p. 224
- Hiles v. Fisher 144 N. Y. 306 p. 224