Pierce v. Kinney

This is an action brought for the purpose ■of foreclosing a mechanic’s lien, which was duly filed in Otsego county clerk’s office against the real estate and premises formerly owned by one Claudine Knapp.

It is claimed in the complaint that between the 20th day of April, 1910, and the 2d day of May, 1910, the plaintiff, at the request and with the knowledge, consent, and approval of ^Claudine Knapp, performed on the real property herein described, for the use and benefit of said Claudine Knapp, work and labor, and furnished materials, in and toward the alteration; improvement, and reconstruction of a building upon her premises, which was theretofore a henhouse and thereafter a cigar factory, and that said work, labor, and materials were reasonably worth the sum of $47.90, which said sum Claudine Knapp promised and agreed to pay to the plaintiff, and no part of which has been paid. It appears that at the time the notice of lien was filed in the clerk’s office, and for some time prior to the commencement' of this action, Claudine Knapp was the owner in fee of the

[1] On the trial, as a preliminary objection, the defendant Hugh G. Kinney insists that there is a defect of parties, in that Claudine Knapp is necessary and indispensable as a party defendant, for the reason that the lienor must establish the debt which is the basis of the lien; and, in order to procure a judgment of foreclosure of the lien upon this property, the debt must be established against her, she being the owner in fee at the time the lien was filed, and it is her interest only that can be decreed to be sold. I am not convinced- that this is good law.

Claudine Knapp may be a proper party, but is she a necessary party? Some time prior to the commencement of this action, she con- ' veyed her interest in the premises against which the lien was filed to these defendants, and the defendants took the conveyance in fee with full notice of the mechanic’s lien set forth in the complaint, then of record in Otsego county clerk’s office. It may be conceded that it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish the debt which is the basis of the lien; but the presence of Claudine Knapp in court, as a party ■defendant, cannot seriously affect the interest of the defendants to their prejudice, as they were at perfect liberty to produce her in court as a witness in their behalf.

[2] Assuming that Claudine Knapp was a necessary party to the determination of the validity of the lien, this defect clearly appears upon the face of the complaint; and the proper remedy, therefore, of the defendants is by demurrer. Code Civ. Proc. § 488; Smith v. Irvin, 113 App. Div. 55 , 98 N. Y. Supp. 945 . If the defect in question is not shown on the face of the complaint, then it must be alleged in the answer. Code Civ. Proc. § 498; Hawkins v. Mapes R. Constr. Co., 178 N. Y. 241 , 70 N. E. 783 ; Jones v. Gould, 200 N. Y. 18 , 92 N. E. 1071 . The defect, not having been raised by demurrer or answer, has been waived. Code Civ. Proc. § 499; Fawcett v. City of New York, 112 App. Div. 155 , 98 N. Y. Supp. 286 ; Jones v. Gould, supra.

It further appears from judgment rolls of the City Court of Oneonta, in evidence here, that William H. Pierce, this plaintiff, on or about the month of August, 1910, commenced an action in the City Court against Lyman G. Knapp and Claudine Knapp for the purpose of foreclosing the mechanic’s lien sought to be foreclosed in this action. It was claimed in the complaint in the action in the City Court that Claudine Knapp was the owner in fee of the real property de- • scribed; that the defendants employed the plaintiff to rebuild the .small building referred to in the complaint; that such employment was with the knowledge and consent of Claudine Knapp; and that, with such knowledge and consent, the plaintiff performed work and labor, and furnished materials in the sum of $47.90. Judgment was prayed for the foreclosure of the lien and for personal judgment for

On or about the month of October, 1910, the city judge of Oneonta rendered a judgment in said action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Claudine Knapp and Lyman G. Knapp for the relief demanded in the complaint, namely, that the real property described in the notice of lien, as being situate on the east side of Clinton street, known and designated as No. 44, on said street, being a city lot with a house and small building in the rear, used as a 'cigar factory, be sold according to law; and out of the moneys arising from such sale the plaintiff be paid the amount due on said lien, viz., $47.90 damages and $6.05 costs, amounting in all to $53.95, and that the defendants, or either of them, be adjudged to pay so much of said amount as should not be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of said real property, and that the plaintiff have execution therefor, ac-' cordingly.

An appeal was taken from said judgment to this court, and such proceedings were had thereon that a reversal of said judgment was had, and a new trial in said action was directed. Under said order and judgment of reversal, a new trial was had and such proceedings taken thereunder that on the 14th day of April, 1911, the city judges of Oneonta rendered judgment in said action in favor of said William H. Pierce, and against the defendant Lyman G. Knapp only, for the amount claimed in the complaint, with costs; and said judgment is still in full force and effect.

All of the proceedings taken and, had on both trials in the City Court have been stipulated as evidence in this case, subject to the objections of the defendant Kinney as raised by his answer. From an examination of the record it appears that on the last trial in the City Court “it was stipulated that the evidence in the former trial be regarded as evidence in this trial, and for a copy of the evidence reference is directed to the return on the former trial.”

The last described judgment was rendered therein in favor of the plaintiff, William H. Pierce, and against the defendant Lyman G-Knapp, which said judgment the defendant Kinney set up in this action and pleads as a defense and bar to the foreclosure of the lien in this court. It should be stated that the action thus described was-sent back to the City Court for a new trial, on the ground, among • others (1) that there was no jurisdiction in the City Court of Oneonta, a court not of record, to grant the judgment of foreclosure and sale of the real estate in question; (2) that sufficient facts were not stated in the complaint to permit judgment to be rendered in the City Court to foreclose the lien, to wit, a simple money judgment to-be enforced by execution, authorizing the sheriff to sell the right, title, and interest which the judgment debtor had in the land at the time the lien was filed. Drall v. Gordon, 51 Misc. Rep. 618 , 101 N. Y. Supp. 171 . It was also held by the appellate court that, after finding the facts to be with the plaintiff, as he did against both defendants,

It is the contention of the plaintiff in - this action that, although the action which he commenced in the City Court was brought to foreclose the lien, by reason of a defective complaint he was permitted to recover a money judgment only, and that execution upon that judgment has been issued and has been returned ‘wholly unsatisfied, and that, therefore, he has the legal right to commence a new action in this court to foreclose his lien; that his remedies are cumulative, he has not had as yet one satisfaction, and that the enforcement of his lien was not involved in the prior .litigation. I am not able to find any authority upon that proposition in the cases which have been thus far adjudicated in this state.

[3] It is doubtless true that a creditor may always pursue as many remedies as he has, unless expressly forbidden by the statute. He may have dual or plural remedies, but he can have but one satisfaction. An action to enforce,the lien is no bar to an action against the contractor or other party liable for the debt. The remedies are not only cumulative, but concurrent, and may be pursued simultaneously. 'The right of a plaintiff to pursue his right for the debt or for the enforcement of his lien, at the same time but by different actions, can no longer be questioned. Power v. Onward Const. Co., 39 Misc. Rep. 708 , 80 N. Y. Supp. 950 ; Robinson v. Fay, 19 N. Y. Supp. 120 ; Bryson v. St. Helen, 79 Hun, 167 , 29 N. Y. Supp. 524 ; Knapp v. Brown, 45 N. Y. 207 ; Biershenk v. Stokes, 18 N. Y. Supp. 854 ; Cornell v. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394 ; Teeman v. Lustbader, 55 Misc. Rep. 535 , 105 N. Y. Supp. 941 .

In the City Court the plaintiff was only allowed to take ¡ a personal judgment for his debt against the defendants for the reasons heretofore stated, and this is the form of judgment he was awarded, which; on the first trial, was against both defendants, and on the second trial against the defendant Lyman G. Knapp only. In my opinion, if a serious question had not arisen as to the findings on the facts on the second trial, as relating to the defendant Claudine Knapp, and which must be considered here, the plaintiff in this action had the right to seek the foreclosure of his lien in this court. In,other words, he is justly entitled to his day in court to establish, if possible, the validity ;of his lien and to enforce it. Power v. Onward Const. Co., supra; Webb v. Van Zandt, 16 Abb. Prac. 190 ; Raven v. Smith, 71 Hun, 197 , 24 N. Y. Supp. 601 ; Matter of Gould Coupler Co., 79 Hun, 206 , 29 N. Y. Supp. 622 ; Raven v. Smith, 87 Hun, 90 , 33 N. Y. Supp. 972 ; Smith v. Fleischman, 23 App. Div. 355 , 48 N. Y. Supp. 234 .

[4] After having heard all the evidence in the case on the merits of the claim against both defendants Knapp, in rendering judgment on the second trial against the defendant Lyman G. Knapp only, the learned city judge thereby held, in effect, that the plaintiff in that action, who is the plaintiff here, had no claim whatever against Claudine Knapp, the individual against whose real estate the lien was filed,

Complaint dismissed.