Majority
Headnote
1. Witnesses (§ 159[1] )—Transactions with Deceased Persons—Competency.The action is brought to recover from the defendant bank a deposit of $500, claimed by the plaintiff as a gift mortis causa from her deceased sister. William J. Doherty, as administrator of the sister’s estate, was made a party defendant. No money judgment was demanded against him, but he appeared and defended, and the formal judgment entered contains an adjudication that the money on deposit in the bank is no part of the decedent’s estate and the administrator has no bona fide claim against it.
[1] In the course of the trial the plaintiff was permitted to testify to conversations and transactions had with the deceased. On motion the testimony as to conversations was stricken out, but that as to the personal transactions allowed to remain, over the objections of counsel. An exception was duly taken. They include the very transaction in which the deceased is alleged to have given the bank book, representing the deposit sued for, to the plaintiff. This testimony was improperly received. Griswold v. Hart, 205 N. Y. 384 , 98 N. E. 918 ; Clift v. Moses, 112 N. Y. 426 , 20 N. E. 392 ; Richardson v. Emmett, 170 N. Y. 412 , 63 N. E. 440 .
[2] The only other evidence to substantiate the plaintiff’s claim is the testimony of Catherine Hannah, an aunt of the plaintiff, who says that she witnessed the transaction; but she admits that she did not notice the bank book which was delivered by the deceased to the plaintiff, and did not know whether it was the one sued upon or not. ■ Without the plaintiff’s testimony, there was no evidence to identify the subject-matter of the gift. The judgment 'must therefore be reversed.
[3] As the case must be retried, it is necessary to pass upon the further claim of the appellants that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action in the form in which it was brought. We are of opinion that there is no merit in this contention. The action is merely one at law to recover a sum of money. By section 42, subd. 2, of the Municipal Court Act (Daws 1902, c. 580):
“Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff or who is a necessary party defendant for the complete determination or settlement of a question involved therein. * * * ”
It was proper practice, therefore, to join the administrator as a defendant and determine his rights. Furthermore, by section 187 of the Municipal Court Act, the bank, if sued alone, could have brought in the administrator as a party and interpleaded him with the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff foresaw this contingency, and to save time joined the administrator as an original party. At the trial the plaintiff offered to discontinue as to the administrator; but on demand
[4] The pleadings were oral, so the objection only related to the manner of bringing him into court. As he appeared generally by attorney, the court had ample jurisdiction on that ground alone to retain him as a party and determine his claim.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and a new t.rial ordered, with costs to appellants to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Griswold v. Hart 205 N. Y. 384 p. 940
- Clift v. Moses 112 N. Y. 426 p. 940
- Richardson v. Emmett 170 N. Y. 412 p. 940