Majority
Headnote
1. Dismissal and Nonsuit (§ 48[1] )—Involuntary Dismissal.Plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries. Defendant’corporation is the owner of a building. Defendant Shrage is a tenant, who conducts a factory on the third floor of the building, and is the employer of the plaintiff. On January 1, 1914, defendant Shrage’s shop was in operation, and plaintiff came to work in the morning at 8 o’clock. The elevator (the usual means of access) was not running, so she used the stairs. At the close of work, 6 o’clock in the evening, she descended the stairs. The last flight, leading to the ground floor, was very 'dark, and there was no banister. Plaintiff testifies: “I didn’t see how to step, and I fell down. There wasn’t anything to keep my hand.” Plaintiff served the notice required by the Employers’ Liability Act.
[1] At the trial, before plaintiff’s case was concluded, at the suggestion of the learned judge below, counsel for defendant Shrage moved to dismiss the complaint as to him, which motion was granted. It is quite evident that such action was erroneous, as in that stage of the case plaintiff had not completed her proof, and there was nothing to indicate whether or to what extent defendant Shrage had right in or control over the halls and stairway affected, so that the question of his obligation to maintain reasonably safe access and egress (see Dorney v. O’Neill,. 49 App. Div. 8 , 10, 63 N. Y. Supp. 107 ) was still open. At the close of the entire case the defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss was granted. Its answer admits that it is the owner of the premises and that the various floors were let to tenants, including the defendant Shrage.
[2,3] Under the circumstances, it seems to me that, on the record, as matter of law, the defendant corporation was liable both for failure to light the stairs and for failure to safeguard them with a balustrade, and that the case should have been submitted to the jury to determine the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
The respondent corporation seeks to justify the dismissal by its interpretation of the provisions of the present Labor Law. Section 79c requires handrails on the stairs of “tenant factories.” Section 94 makes the owner of the building responsible for any failure to observe sections 79 and 80. The provision for handrails under the Labor Law of 1910 (Laws 1910, c. 461) was contained in section 80. Section 94 has remained practically unchanged: Respondent contends that by reason of the change in the section numbers the owner is no longer liable for failure to maintain a. handrail. The statute, however, is remedial, and should receive a construction tending to effectuate its purpose. It is quite evident that, when the provisions as to handrails in old section 80 were transferred to the new section 79c, section 94 was, by an oversight, not amended in detail to correspond; but, under the circumstances, I think that the provisions of section 94, making the owner liable -for the observance of the requirements of section 79, must be held to refer as well to section 79c.
[4] But, whatever doubt may be entertained as to this conclusion, I have none as to the owner’s responsibility for failure to light the hall. Indeed, the defendant admits that this requirement, contained in subdivision 3 of section 81 of the present act, would ordinarily be binding
As there is, therefore, nothing in the language of the act under consideration to exclude the notion of the owner’s liability on January 1st, when the building was open, and as it would be contrary to the spirit of the act to assume that it intended to relieve the owner of responsibility on a day when it was perfectly lawful to work, I cannot agree with the respondent’s contentions in this respect.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
Cases cited
- Dorney v. O'Neill 49 App. Div. 8 at 10, 63 p. 351
- Page v. Shainwald 169 N. Y. 246 p. 353