Majority
Headnote
1. Municipal Corporations <@=>184—Police Force—Removal of Patrolman—“Probation.”[1] Counsel for the relator urges that the probationary period for patrolman is only to let the appointing power see how the officer has performed his duty during this period; that, if his probationary service has been good, the commissioner cannot go
“That your conduct and capacity as a probationary patrolman having been unsatisfactory to the police commissioner, you will not be appointed permanently at the end of your probationary period.”
Upon his application, the Special Term granted a writ of peremptory mandamus, directing the commissioner to appoint the relator. A probationary period for stich appointments is recognized as an important and necessary part of the examination itself, by which the commissioner of police can supplement the applicant’s written answers by investigation conducted by direct inquiry into the conduct of the applicant while he held prior positions. Laws of 1883, c. 343, § 2; Matter of Murray, 18 App. Div. 337 , 46 N. Y. Supp. 172 ; People ex rel. Van Petten v. Cobb, 13 App. Div. 56 , 59, 43 N. Y. Supp. 120 ; People ex rel. Sweet v. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368 , 52 N. E. 132 .
[2] By the present Civil Service Law:
“All appointments or employments in the classified service [except veterans] ' shall be for a probationary term not exceeding the time fixed in the rules.” Laws of 1909, c. 15 (Consol. Laws, c. 7) § 9.
The rules may fix the time or length of probation, but cannot annex an unauthorized limitation. People ex rel. Kastor v. Kearny, 164 N. Y. 64 , 67, 58 N. E. 14 . “Probation,” as defined, signifies a proceeding to ascertain the truth, to determine character and qualification. Rule 11 of the municipal civil service commission provides for such probationer that:
“If his conduct or capacity on probation be unsatisfactory to the appointing officer, the probationer shall be notified in writing that at the end of such period he shall, for that reason, not be retained.”
This rule is not to be construed to limit the full scope and purpose of probation which the statute commands. Civil Service commissions and examiners- have not facilities for making thorough investigation by outside inquiries into the applicant’s personal records. We cannot circumscribe the statutory probation, so as to deprive the commissioner of the salutary check by looking up past records, besides those of the actual service of the probationer, to the end that, before making a permanent appointment, the probationer’s conduct, capacity, and fitness may be found satisfactory.
[3] And this same ruling, in February last, was made by the Appellate Division of the First Department (People ex rel. Holsten v.
The order should therefore be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and relator’s motion denied, with $25 costs. All concur.
Cases cited
- Murray v. Welles 18 App. Div. 337 p. 873
- People ex rel. Van Petten v. Cobb 13 App. Div. 56 at 59, 43 p. 873
- People ex rel. Sweet v. Lyman 157 N. Y. 368 p. 873
- People ex rel. Kastor v. Kearny 164 N. Y. 64 at 67, 58 p. 873