Robinson v. Gray

In June, 1888, Henry V. Sloat made an oral contract with the defendant for the building of a dock on Motthaven Canal. ' Being in need of lumber, he applied to the plaintiffs, lumber ■dealers, for the material necessary to construct the dock. The plaintiffs refused to furnish the material unless its payment was guarantied by the defendant. Thereupon Sloat drew the following order:

“Robert J. Gray, Esq.—Dear Sir: Please pay Robinson & Booth two hundred and sixty dollars ($260), and charge same to my account.

“Yours, truly, H. Y. Sloat.”

“R. J. Gray, Esq.—Dear Sir: Mr. H. Y. Sloat has ordered of us $820 worth of timber for docks which we understand he is building in part for you at 138th street. Will you guaranty payment to us of $260 of this amount? We await your immediate response,—as we cannot deliver Mr. Sloat the timber until we have favorable reply,—as he is in a hurry for it.

“Yours, truly, Robinson & Booth.”

Thereupon the defendant wrote plaintiffs the following:

“Messrs. Robinson & Booth—Gentlemen: Answering yours 15th inst.: Mr. Sloat is about building a dock for me—and at a price at which I think he can make some money—and he is also doing some work for neighbors of mine. When he finishes his contract in a satisfactory manner to me X intend paying him for his work at such time if he will give you an order on me for $260 (two hundred and sixty dollars) with the understanding that it is to be applied in part payment of the amount on my contract with him, I will honor it.

“Yours, respectfully, Robert J. Gray.”

These two letters and the order present the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Thereafter, some one from the dock department, insisting that it had jurisdiction over docks built in that part of the city, requested a different construction; and the defendant and Sloat thereupon entered into a written contract, enlarging the provisions of the oral one theretofore made, and agreeing to make the dock conform to the requirements of the dock department, but the amount payable thereunder was the same as that agreed to be paid under the first contract. At the time the written contract was made, the lumber had not been used in the construction of the dock. It was used, however, under the new agreement. The plaintiffs knew nothing of the change of contract. Sloat being unable to carry out the written contract, the work was thereafter finished by the defendant. The defendant rendered the plaintiffs an account showing that Sloat was indebted to him, after the completion of the work, in the sum of $382.47; including as a charge against Sloat the plaintiffs’ bill, in the amount of $274.87, for which the defendant apparently considered himself liable. The plaintiffs admitted that, so far as the defendant was concerned, the first contract was never completed. Upon the conclusion of the trial, defendant’s counsel asked leave to go to the jury upon the question whether Sloat had performed contract No. 1, and whether he fulfilled contract No. 2, which motion was denied, and the defendant excepted. The court thereupon directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of $260, mentioned in the order, with the interest thereon, making $361, to which direction the defendant excepted.

The defendant’s motion to go to the jury was properly denied, for it was practically conceded that Sloat had not performed either contract, and there was evidently nothing upon which the jury were required to pass.

The question is whether, upon the established facts, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. If entitled to recover at all, it was upon the theory that the defendant, by making the second contract with Sloat without their knowledge or consent, prevented Sloat from completing the first, and disabled him from earning the fund which was to

“Can they [the defendants] give this draft, and then set up their own default to defeat its payment? We think not. For a sufficient consideration they gave this draft, payable out of a particular fund; and they cannot, by their own default, prevent the creation or realization of that fund, and then set up the absence or the failure of the fund as a defense to this action. Having by their own fault prevented the condition from arising which would make the payment to the plaintiff due, they are estopped from setting up the failure of the condition to defeat the plaintiff’s claim.”

In Gallagher v. Nichols, supra, it appeared that the defendant, who was the owner of certain lots, accepted an order drawn upon him by one Lewis, a contractor, for $3,750, due to the subcontractors, “payable at the time when the first tier of beams shall be laid and leveled up.” Before the building had arrived at that stage the defendant sold the property, and, by consent, canceled the contract with the contractor. The action was by the subcontractors in whose favor the order was drawn, and the court said:

“It is insisted that there was a failure of the condition precedent, which required that the first tier of beams should be laid on and leveled up before any payment was to be made. The answer to this position is that the act of the defendant prevented the laying of the first tier of beams. The walls were ready for them, and the defendant was bound to have them laid within a reasonable time. Instead of this, defendant and Lewis canceled the contract by mutual consent on the 12th of August, and defendant sold the lots. The defendant thus made it impossible for this to be done, and he is estopped from insisting upon any such condition.”

The contract under consideration in Kingsley v. City of Brooklyn, supra, provided that a percentage of the moneys earned should be reserved until the contract was' completed, duly certified to, and accepted. By the act of the defendant in preventing the plaintiffs from

In Mersereau v. Villari, supra, the contractors for building a house drew an order on the defendant, the owner, to be paid “out of the last payment to become due on the contract,” which order the owner accepted. It was conceded that the work-had not been completed, and “claimed upon the trial that the contractors were wrongfully prevented from completing their contract by the defendant,” and “there was some testimony to support that” contention.” In affirming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court said:

“If, without the fault of the defendant, no money became due under the contract upon the last installment, the payment of the order did not become obligatory. But the defendant cannot set up her own default to render the order inoperative. She could not wrongfully prevent the creation of the fund, and then set up its failure as a defense to an action on the draft.”

And such is the tenor of the controlling cases upon the subject.

If the defendant had notified the plaintiffs of the abrogation of the first contract, and the making of the new one, they might, perhaps, have saved their claim, because there was sufficient of their lumber upon the dock to have satisfied the indebtedness, and Sloat might not have opposed their taking it. But, having no notice, they were unable to do anything in this direction, and had to rely, as they lawfully might, upon the carrying put of the original contract. If Sloat had been unwilling to go on with the first contract, the plaintiffs might, perhaps, have been willing to finish it, to save their debt, as the court intimated might be done in Bank v. Drumgoole, supra. But the defendant, after having induced the plaintiffs to part with their lumber upon his promise to pay out of the moneys coming to Sloat, canceled the contract out of which they were to be paid, and ignored the plaintiffs altogether, as if they had no rights which required protection. This he could not legally do, in view of his obligation to them.

The suggestion that the dock department prevented the carrying out of the contract was not pleaded as a defense, nor was it established at the trial. It does appear by the evidence that some one from the department made objection, and that the matter was finally discussed at the office of the dock board, but no official action by the department seems to have been taken. If the department had taken official action, and it had been pleaded in defense (Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171 ), its jurisdiction over the subject-matter would have been open to review, and might have led to the pertinent inquiry whether Mt. Morris Canal, where the dock was erected, was not private property, exempt from its supervision or control. The matter did not go that far, for the claim asserted was acquiesced in by the defendant and assented to by Sloat, although he contends he was coerced into making the new contract by the defendant by reason of these objections. In view of what occurred on the trial, we think this element of the case does not come before us in a manner that requires more than passing notice.

The defendant, knowing the obligation he had assumed to the