Majority
Headnote
Municipal corporations—Assessments—Street railroads.On the 16th of March, 1888, when the common „ council determined by a resolution to repave Genesee street, there rested upon the street railway the burden of repaving that portion thereof occupied by the railroad and two feet outside of its tracks. The burden was imposed by the resolution passed by the common council in 1862, to which the street railway had subjected itself in accepting the permission upon the condition mentioned in the resolution, and by assumption of such burden by the terms of the lease under which the present railroad became possessed of the right to operate the same in Genesee street. Besides, in chap. 28 of the Laws of 1870, § 79 of the charter was amended so as to confer power upon the common council to enforce the burden resting on the railroad.
In the fifth subdivision of § 79, it is provided, viz.: “ The com
If the common council had exacted from the railroad a perfor- , manee of its duty, the burden cast upon the taxpayers and the plaintiff and other adjacent owners would have been much less. The effect of the resolution of 1862, and the provision in the act of 1870 (subd. 5, § 79), relieved the plaintiff and other adjacent owners as well as the taxpayers from the burden of maintaining the pavement on that portion of the street occupied by the street railway.
In effect, the expense of repaving such portion of the street was not only imposed upon the street railway, but the liability therefor was withdrawn from the adjacent owners and from the taxpayers at large.
' We agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that “the railroad’s liability, if any, is a matter between it and the city,” but we do not agree with him in the assumption that the adjacent
By chap. 426 of the Laws of 1887, § 99 of the charter was amended, and a mode was prescribed for enforcing the collection of expenditures in grading, leveling or paving or repaving streets; however, we find nothing in that statute which relieves the railroad from the burden resting upon it to maintain the pavement between its tracks and the two feet adjacent thereto. We think the words “ the common council shall then determine the expense of the whole work ” may receive reasonable construction by applying them to the expenditures upon that portion of the street not occupied by the street railway. We think the words were not intended to authorize a transfer of the burden resting upon the railway to the adjacent owners or to the taxpayers at large.
There is nothing in the case to indicate that the street railway company was unable to perform the obligations imposed on it The common council therefore ought to have exacted a performance on the part of the railway company. In the Matter of Appleby, 26 Hun, 429 , the court says: “ The omission to enforce it (ordinance), and to secure so much of the pavement under it as the railroad company was obliged to lay, was a material error and defect in the proceedings themselves, of which the applicant as the owner of the property fronting upon the avenue has a legal right to complain. Matter of Casey, 5 Hun, 463 ; Matter of N. Y. Prot., etc., School, 75 N. Y., 324 . Ho part of the cost of this twenty-five feet of pavement was legally chargeable to him, but under the terms of the ordinance it is clear that it should have been imposed upon the railroad company. A portion of it was included in the assessment required to be paid by him, and to that extent he has been made the subject of injustice.”
O'Reilley v. City of Kingston, 114 N. Y., 440 ; 23 N. Y. State Rep., 799, is distinguishable from the case before us, as the case arose under a different statute and a different resolution of the common council from the one we have been considering. In that case the assessment was to be made upon land bordering upon the street, and it was held that the land occupied by the railroad “ did not border on or touch the street within the meaning of the charter; it being simply a part thereof.”
Whether the contractor, the Warren Scharf Asphalt Paving Company, can enforce its contract against the city is a question which we need not now determine. As was said by Allen, J., in Moore v. Mayor, 73 N. Y., 251 , “ While a local assessment may be void, a contract fully performed, made in pursuance of the same ordinance, may be valid.” If the contractor has fully performed and is entitled to enforce payment of his contract price from the city, that fact does not of itself stand in the way of the plaintiff’s enforcing his legal rights, nor make against the propriety of his resisting an overburdensome assignment
Upon the questions we have alluded to, further views are expressed in the opinion delivered at special term, as well as upon
We think the plaintiff was entitled to the relief awarded at the special term.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Martin and Merwin, JJ., concur.