PAUL BENOIT, CHARLES FORGET CHARLES NADEAU (Defendants) .....
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a pamphlet called "Quebec's Burning Hate" which was considered seditious at the time. There was no evidence that the plaintiff was distributing that particular pamphlet. She was detained in gaol over et al.
the week-end and was later offered her freedom in exchange for a release of all liability for her detention. When she refused to sign the release, she was charged with publishing and as being a party to a conspiracy to publish the pamphlet "Quebec's Burning Hate". She was freed at her preliminary hearing, and later brought an action for damages against the police officers who had arrested and charged her. The main defence pleaded by the three defendants was that the action, having been instituted more than six months after the arrest, was prescribed. The trial judge dismissed the action. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Held (Taschereau, Fauteux and Abbott JJ. dissenting in part): The action against the defendant Benoit should be maintained and the damages assessed at $2,500.
Held further, per curiam: The action against the defendants Nadeau and Forget should be dismissed.
Per Kerwin CJ. and Rand, Cartwright and Judson JJ.: The arrest and prosecution, as the Court of Appeal found, were quite without justification or excuse.
The real defence was that the action was not started within six months, as required by the Provincial Police Act and the Magistrate's Privilege Act. Both statutes apply to police officers, but while the latter requires good faith on the part of the officer, the former does not mention that condition. The limitation of the six months' prescription to acts done "in good faith" in s. 7 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act was nevertheless a condition of the limitation under s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act. The meaning in s. of "an act done . . . in his official capacity" was no different from the meaning of "anything done by him in the performance of his public duty" in s. 5 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act or "of his duty" in s. 7 of the same Act. An honest mind, intent on enforcing the law, and belief in facts justifying arrest, are essential elements in the performance by an officer of his public duty or of any act done "in his official capacity". The words "in good faith" in s. 7 are, in relation to s. 5, words of amplification not limitation, explicative not qualifying. That state of mind is as applicable to police officers under s. 24 as under s. 7.
In the case of the defendant Benoit, there was lacking that state of mind necessary to the benefit of the limitation under either s. 7 or s. 24, and his defence must be rejected.
In the case of the defendant Nadeau, he took no part in instituting the proceedings and it has not been shown that he was a party to the arrest.
In the case of the defendant Forget, it was clear that he took no part in the arrest or the imprisonment. As to the claim for malicious prosecution, assuming that the law in Quebec was that an action could be maintained against a defendant who had acted without malice provided he had acted without reasonable and probable cause, this Court, in the particular circumstances of this case, should not interfere with the view of the judges of the Courts below that Forget did not act without reasonable and probable cause. Per Locke and Martland JJ.: The action against Nadeau should be dismissed. He was not a party to the detention or in the laying ' of the charge. As to the unlawful arrest, the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence was that he believed in the existence BENOIT et al. of facts which would justify the arrest, and there was nothing to support the charge that he acted maliciously or in bad faith. The claim was, therefore, prescribed by s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act. Beatty v. Kozak, (1958] S.C.R. 177, 195.
As to the defendant Forget, he did not have a bona fide belief in the facts which could have justified his conduct as was required in order to invoke the Provincial Police Act. However, he was not a party to the arrest and the evidence did not show clearly that the false imprisonment resulted from the laying of the information. As to the claim for malicious prosecution, although neither of the statutes relied upon applied when malice was established, this Court was not justified upon the evidence in reversing the finding of the trial judge that Forget had not acted maliciously.
As to the defendant Benoit, his conduct was from the outset unlawful, and neither of the statutes relied upon applied to the claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. The statutes were each to be construed in the same manner as the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, 56-57 Vict. (Imp.), c. 61, which required good faith. The Quebec statutes were based upon the earlier English statutes to the same effect as the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, which merely declared the law as stated in the numerous decisions upon the earlier statutes, and they were subject to the same rules of construction.
As to the claim for malicious prosecution against Benoit, neither statute had any application. Newell v. Starkie (1920),
89 L.J.P.C. 1; 26 Halsbury, 2nd ed., p. 497. It was impossible to sustain a contention that there was any reasonable or probable cause for the arrest, imprisonment or prosecution, and as to malice, the evidence disclosed that he was actuated by indirect and improper motives. The cases decided in England interpreting the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, and the earlier Acts to the same effect, were to be considered in deciding the interpretation which was to be given to s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act. Section 41 of the Interpretation Act of Quebec and s. 15 of the Interpretation Act of Canada were simply restatements in statutory form of what was said in the judgment of the Barons in Heydon's case (1584), 3 Co. Rep. 7(b), which has been applied in England for more than 300 years. Per Taschereau, dissenting in part: The claim against Nadeau and Forget should be dismissed. They committed no fault which could have engaged their liability under art. 1053 of the Civil Code.
As to the defendant Benoit, whether he committed a delict by acting intentionally or a quasi-delict by his negligence or imprudence in the exercise of his official capacity, the service of the action was made late and the action must therefore be dismissed.
The whole case turns upon the civil law of Quebec as found in art. 1053 of the Civil Code and upon s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act which is a special Act of provincial origin enacted after the coming into force of the Civil Code, the supreme authority in the matter. That statute governs the police force and prevails over the Magistrate's Privilege Act, and presupposes a fault under art. 1053 of the Civil Code. The action under art. 1053 is normally prescribed by two years; but the Legislature has enacted that if a police officer has et al.
acted in his official capacity that prescription was to be reduced to six months. The only condition precedent was that the officer had acted in his official capacity; good faith on his part was not required. Whether Benoit committed a fault in acting recklessly without reasonable and probable cause, he nevertheless acted in his official capacity. Forfeitures, such as found in the statute here, are imperative and cannot be suspended or interrupted. Consequently even if the action had been served on the other defendants within the time limit, it could not serve as an interruption as regards the defendant Benoit. Furthermore, the prescription could not be interrupted in that way because the action was dismissed as against the other defendants.
Per Fauteux J., dissenting in part: The action against the defendants Nadeau and Forget should be dismissed. This Court should not modify the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal that none of the acts invoked against them by the plaintiff constituted a fault engaging liability.
The action against the defendant Benoit should also be dismissed because service of it was not effected within the six months prescribed by s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act. This was an action claiming damages, in a delictual matter, against an officer of the provincial police. Obviously, the dispositions of the Civil Code applied. Under art. 1053 of the Civil Code, it is sufficient to give the right of action that the act causing damage be illicit; malice is not required. The laying of an information under conditions authorized by the penal law cannot constitute an illicit act. All that is required under the penal law is the belief in the guilt based on reasonable and probable causes. In this view there is no conflict between the civil law of Quebec as to the action in damages for malicious prosecution and the Canadian public law conditioning the right to lay an information. The incidence of malice not being required under the public law, the public law cannot be invoked as modifying the private law, or to contend that Parliament has considered essential for the prosecution of the crime that the absence of malice be per an absolute defence in a civil action for malicious prosecution.
Section 24 of the Provincial Police Act, the origin of which was provincial, reduced to six months the prescription of two years generally applicable in the case of actions for damages resulting from delicts or quasidelicts. This reduction is not based on reasons characterizing the simple prescription but, being part of the very character of the law enacting it, on the intention of the legislature to establish, for reasons related to the administration of the police force, a stipulated delay. Good faith on the part of the officer is of no moment. The prescription is an absolute bar to the action, if the officer acted in his "official capacity". There was no doubt that all the acts done by Benoit were done in his "official capacity".
Per Abbott J., dissenting in part: The action against the defendants Nadeau and Forget should be dismissed since, as found by the Court below, they committed no fault.
The action against the defendant Benoit should also be dismissed. In placing the plaintiff under arrest and in causing the complaint to be lodged, Benoit was acting "in his official capacity" although such actions were to his knowledge completely unjustified. The right of BENorr al. action in damages such as that asserted here is a civil right and must be founded upon the law in force in Quebec-in this case art. 1053 of the Civil Code. The extinguishment of any such right of action by prescription is similarly governed by the law of Quebec and unless a. 24 of the Provincial Police Act is applicable that right of action would be prescribed by two years. Benoit was not entitled to avail himself of the special protections and limitation of action provided by the Magistrate's Privilege Act, since he was not acting in good faith. However, the language of s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act, the provisions of which are said to prevail over those of every other general or special Act, is clear and has the effect of substituting a prescriptive period of six months for the normal period of two years. The prescriptive period of two years applies whether or not the defendant has acted in good faith and with reasonable and probable cause. There are no grounds to limit the period of six months, provided for in s. 24, to those cases in which a police officer has acted in good faith and with reasonable and probable cause.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec', affirming a judgment of Montpetit J. Appeal allowed, Taschereau, Fauteux and Abbott JJ. dissenting in part.
W. Glen How, for the plaintiff, appellant.
Honourable Gustave Monette, Q.C., for the defendants, respondents.
CARTWRIGHT J.:-The relevant facts are set out in the reasons of other members of the Court and I will refer to them only so far as is necessary to make clear the reasons for the conclusion at which I have arrived.
The appellant asserts two causes of action, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
As to Nadeau, I agree that the appeal fails. He took no part in instituting the proceedings against the appellant and consequently is not concerned in the claim for malicious prosecution. In regard to the claim for false imprisonment, for the reasons I am about to state, I have, although not 1 [1958J Que. Q.B. 237.
without some hesitation, reached the conclusion, in agreement with my brother Rand, that Nadeau was not a party to the arrest of the appellant.
The learned trial judge makes no express finding as to what was said by Nadeau to the appellant. It is not suggested that he used any force or threat of force or that he touched the appellant; and up to the point when the appellant arrived at the door of the automobile in which Benoit was seated the findings made by Pratte J. in the following passage appear to me to be in accordance with the evidence':
prs However, the appellant testified that when she arrived at the automobile Nadeau not merely requested but ordered her to get into it. I will proceed on the assumption that if this evidence be accepted it would warrant a finding that Nadeau arrested the appellant. Miss Best, who was present and was called as a witness by the appellant was not questioned on this point. Nadeau denied having asked the appellant to get into the automobile. Benoit testified that it was he (Benoit) who asked the appellant and the other young women to get in. Every witness other than the appellant who was questioned on the point said that Benoit and Pelland were the only two police officers who were in the automobile in which the appellant was driven to police headquarters and that Nadeau went back in the other automobile. The appellant testified that the officer who told her to get into the automobile was one of those who rode in the front seat of the automobile in which she was taken to headquarters. On this state of the record, and remembering that the onus of proving that Nadeau took part in her arrest lay upon the appellant, I do not think it would be safe to make a positive finding that it was Nadeau who ordered the appellant to get into the automobile; it seems to me more probable that it was Benoit. This distinguishes the case from Beatty v. Kozak', relied upon by the appellant, in which it was held that three officers, of whom
Beatty was one, acted together in arresting the plaintiff and held her in their joint custody.
The view which I think should be taken as to the facts makes it unnecessary for me to consider the other grounds of defence put forward on behalf of Nadeau on the assumption that he did order the appellant to get into the automobile.
As to Forget also, I agree that the appeal fails.
It is clear that he took no part in the arrest or imprisonment of the appellant, but there remains the question whether he is liable on the claim for malicious prosecution.
I was at first of the opinion that he had a good defence to that claim on the ground that in laying the information against the appellant he acted without malice. However, as is pointed out in the reasons of my brother Taschereau, the later decisions of the Court of Queen's Bench appear to hold that the law of the Province of Quebec differs from the English law as to the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that an action shall lie for malicious prosecution.
Under English law the four conditions are as follows:
(i) The criminal proceedings must have been instituted by the defendant;
(ii) He must have acted without reasonable and probable cause;
(iii) He must have acted maliciously;
(iv) The proceedings must have terminated in favour of the plaintiff.
The case of Fabyan v. Tremblay and the other cases cited on this point by my brother Taschereau appear to hold that in Quebec the third condition need not be fulfilled and an action may be maintained against a defendant who has acted without malice provided he has acted without reasonable and probable cause.
The decisions mentioned are contrary to a number of earlier decisions in the Quebec Courts the result of which is accurately summarized in the following passage in Wal- ~ton-The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code Lower Canada, 1907, at p. 42:
In the case at bar, I do not propose to choose between the two conflicting views set out above as I wish to reserve my opinion on the question until a case arises in which it is necessary to decide it. Its importance is obvious, and the answer to it may well depend on whether the law governing an action for malicious prosecution is considered as a part of the criminal law defining the privilege, or the conditions of immunity, of a citizen who sets that law in motion, in which case it would seem that the law upon the subject should be uniform throughout Canada, or whether it is regarded simply as a branch of the law of torts. Assuming for the purposes of this branch of the matter that the law to be applied is that laid down in Fabyan v. Tremblay, supra, I have with some hesitation, reached the conclusion that, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, we ought not to interfere with the view of the judges in the Courts below that Forget did not act without reasonable and probable cause, when he relied on the statement made to him by Benoit that, after he had consulted with the Crown prosecutor, the latter had directed the laying of the information. The learned trial judge has indicated in his reasons a doubt as to the desirability of the practice said to exist by which a "liaison officer" swears to an information on the advice or instructions of the officer who has investigated the case. I share that doubt. However in the case at bar, where the charges laid were those of publishing a seditious libel and of conspiracy, the officer would of necessity have to be guided by the opinion of the Crown prosecutor.
This conclusion that Forget is free from liability does not leave the appellant without a remedy, for the criminal proceedings against her were instituted by Benoit through the agency of Forget; and, for reasons fully stated by other Cartight J. members of the Court, it is clear that Benoit acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause in directing that the information be laid.
As to Benoit, I agree with the reasons and conclusions of my brother Rand and have nothing to add.
I would dispose of the appeal as proposed by my brother
Rand.
J. (dissenting in part): L'appelante a institu6 une action en dommages contre les trois intimbs et leur a r6clam6, conjointement et solidairement, la somme de
$5,000. Elle allbgue qu'elle fait partie de la secte religieuse connue sous le nom de "T6moins de Jehovah", et qu'alors qu'elle se tenait au coin des rues Church et Wellington a
Verdun, le 7 d6cembre 1946, elle fut illigalement arr~t6e, et conduite au bureau de la Sfiret6 provinciale a Montreal, elle fut d~tenue jusqu'au 9 d~cembre suivant. A cette m~me date, une plainte fut log~e contre elle pour avoir distribu6 un libelle siditieux intitul6 "Quebec's Burning
Hate for God and Christ and Freedom", et pour avoir conspir6 avec d'autres pour publier et diffuser dans le public le mgme libelle sditieux. Le 10 janvier 1947, elle subit une enqu~te pr6liminaire, et fut lib6r6e sur le champ par M. le Juge Omer Legrand de la Cour des Sessions de la Paix. Elle a subsiquemment poursuivi quatre membres de la Sfiret6 provinciale qui auraient particip6 ' son arrestation, et A une d6nonciation devant les tribunaux correctionnels.
Les d6fendeurs sont l'officier Charles Nadeau qui a requis l'appelante de venir a la voiture de la Force constabulaire, stationn6e non loin; Pierre Pelland qui conduisait la voiture; Paul Benoit qui se trouvait aussi dans la voiture, qui a fouillI sa bourse, qui a ordonn6 sa d6tention dans une cellule de la Sfiret6; et enfin, Charles Forget qui a sign6 et asserment6 la plainte.
L'honorable Juge Montpetit de la Cour superieure a d6bout6 la demanderesse de son action pour le motif qu'elle n'avait pas th institude dans les dilais 16gaux privus par Ta-eeau Jla loi. L'appelante a inscrit un appel devant la Cour du banc de la reine' contre trois d6fendeurs seulement, omettant d'inclure dans son avis d'appel, Pierre Pelland le conducteur de la voiture. La Cour du bane de la reine a unanimement confirm6 le jugement, et c'est de ce dernier qu'il y a appel devant cette Cour.
II ne fait aucun doute que 1'appelante a etd l'objet de traitements fort repr~hensibles. Apres son arrestation, sur 'ordre de Benoit, elle fut 6croude dans une cellule de la Sfiret et y a v6cu dans des conditions qu'il me rdpugne de d6crire. Je n'h6site pas a croire qu'elle a dfi 6tre profond6ment humilide par le traitement dont elle a t la victime. En outre, au cours de cette d6tention, on lui a offert le compromis de ne pas loger de plainte contre elle et de la lib~rer, si elle consentait a signer une renonciation A toute r6clamation en dommages qu'elle pourrait avoir contre les agents de la Sftret6 provinciale. Avidemment, elle a refus6 avec raison cette proposition qui riv6lait de la part des agents la r~alisation d'une erreur commise. L'un des intim6s, Benoit, dit dans son t6moignage que c'est la routine habituelle d'obtenir de semblables renonciations de la part des suspects que l'on reliche sans procds.
Comme d6fense A l'action institude contre eux, les intim6s ont plaid6 que les d6fendeurs ont agi de bonne foi, et n'ont fait que leur devoir en arratant la demanderesse, et en portant contre elle une accusation de conspiration pour distribuer un libelle siditieux, et qu'en consequence ils n'ont encouru aucune responsabilit6 civile a 1'occasion des actes poses par eux dans 1'exercice de leurs fonctions. Ils allguent en outre que les avis donnis aux d6fendeurs par la demanderesse 6taient insuffisants, et ne r6pondaient pas aux exigences de la loi. Enfin, ils plaident que 1'action de la demanderesse a ti intent6e tardivement, et qu'au moment de son institution elle 6tait prescrite en vertu de la Loi concernant les privileges des juges de paix, des magistrats et autres officiers remplissant des devoirs publics, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 18, et de la Loi de la Siret4 provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, S.R.Q. 1941, c. 47.
Je d6sire en premier lieu disposer des cas de deux des officiers, intim6s dans la pr6sente cause, soit Charles Nadeau et Charles Forget. Le premier, agissant sous les ordres de son sup6rieur Benoit, est all, en faisant usage de toute laanea discr6tion possible, demander A l'appelante de le suivre a la voiture oit se trouvait Benoit, et l'a pride de monter dans la voiture. C'est son unique participation a cet incident. Comme M. le Juge Pratte de la Cour du banc de la reine, je suis clairement d'opinion qu'il n'a commis aucune faute, et qu'il ne peut 6tre tenu responsable des dommages que l'appelante a pu subir.
Quant ' Forget qui a asserment6 la plainte, je crois qu'il a agi avec cause raisonnable et probable, en se basant sur des informations reques d'autres personnes, en qui il avait justement raison de mettre sa confiance. On ne peut exiger de cet officier de liaison entre la force constabulaire et les tribunaux, de faire une enqu~te personnelle chaque fois qu'il doit assermenter une plainte, pour se rendre compte de la viracit6 des faits qu'on lui rapporte. Cet officier sera
A l'abri de toute responsabilit6, s'il ne commet aucune imprudence ou n6gligence dans 1'exercice de ses fonctions.
Il ne devra aucune reparation civile s'il n'agit pas timirairement. C'est la regle 6noncie A l'art. 1053 C.C. qui rigit les r~clamations de ce genre, et qui doit n~cessairement nous guider. Comme le disait Sir Horace Archambeault en pronongant le jugement unanime de la Cour du bane du roi dans Fabyan v. Tremblay':
Vide 6galement C6td v. C6t et Prime v. Keiller et a1.
8.C.R.
Dans le cas qui nous occupe, Forget a pris ses informations de Benoit qui avait consulti 1'avocat de la Couronne, et il a log6 la plainte dans un temps oii 1'on considdrait les actes reprochis aux "T6moins de J6hovah" comme siditieux. 'C'itait avant la d6cision de cette Cour dans Boucher v. Le Roil.
Ce qui a ti d~cid6 dans Gaston v. Jasmin s'applique au cas de Forget:
Vide 6galement dans le mgme sens: Lalonde v. Ville de Lachine*, Dupuis v. City of Montreal et all et Gauthier v. Brodeur.
Je suis clairement d'opinion que Forget ne peut 6tre recherch6 en dommages comme consequence de l'acte qu'on lui reproche.
Le cas de Benoit qui a op~r6 1'arrestation et ordonn6 l'incarc6ration de 1'appelante dans une cellule de la Sfireti, peut se presenter sous un aspect diff6rent. Je me dispenserai cependant d analyser la preuve qui concerne cet intim6, et de tirer les conclusions l6gales qui pourraient d~couler de ce qu'elle a riv616, vu que je crois que laction lui a t signifide tardivement.
En vertu du c. 18 des Statuts Refondus de Qu6bec 1941, qui est la Loi concernant les privileges des juges de paix et al, une certaine protection contre les r6clamations en dommages est accordie a ces officiers, et l'art. 7 stipule qu'ils peuvent b6n6ficier des dispositions du statut, s'ils ont agi de bonne foi. L'une de ces dispositions qui se trouve a ' Part. 5, et dont peut consiquemment b6ndficier un d6fendeur de bonne foi, veut que faction soit institude dans les six mois qui suivent la commission de l'infraction. Ces deux articles se lisent ainsi:
Une autre loi qui est contenue au c. 47 des Statuts Refondus de Qu6bec 1941, intitul6e Loi de la Siretg provinciale, qui s'applique aux membres de la police judiciaire, charg6s de la recherche des offenses et infractions criminelles, et des contraventions aux lois de la province; A la gendarmerie charg6e du maintien de la paix; i la police de la route, ainsi qu'A la police des liqueurs, est, en vertu de l'art. 36 du m~me chapitre, une loi qui privaut sur toute autre loi. Cet article qui est du droit nouveau et qui fait partie du c. 47 en vertu d'un amendement pass6 en 1938, 2 Geo. VI, c. 76, est ainsi ridig6:
Il s'ensuit done que la Sfiret provinciale est r~gie par une loi sp~ciale, qui doit n6cessairement pr6valoir sur les dispositions du c. 18. C'est la conclusion A laquelle en est unanimement arriv6e la Cour du banc de la reine, et je m'accorde avec celle-ci sur ce point qui pr~sente une importance capitale pour la determination du present litige. L'article 24 en effet contient une disposition qui r6git le recours en dommages-int6r~ts contre les officiers de la Sfiret6, pour les actes qu'ils ont pos6s en cette qualit. Cet article ne dit pas qu'ils sont exempts de responsabilit6, mais il stipule clairement que l'action doit 6tre institude dans un dMlai rigoureux de six mois. Si ce n'6tait de cet article, la demanderesse ne serait d6chue de son droit d'action qu'apris l'expiration d'un d6lai de deux ans, en vertu des dispositions de l'art. 2261, para. 2, C.C. L'article 24 se lit ainsi: Comme on peut le constater, & la lecture de 1'article cidessus du c. 47, et des arts. 5 et 7 du c. 18, il y a de substantielles differences. Ainsi, en vertu des art. 5 et 7 du c. 18, on exige des officiers, pour qu'ils obtiennent la protection de la loi, qu'ils aient agi de bonne foi dans l'ex6cution de leurs fonctions, tandis qu'en vertu de l'art. 24 du c. 47, Tascheau J.tout officier de la Stret6 bdnificie de la prescription de six mois, s'il a accompli un acte ou a port6 une plainte en cette qualitg d'oflicier.
Dans la cause de Chaput v. Romain , la question de dichiance ne se pr~sentait que quant A un d~fendeur seulement. Deux des d6fendeurs avaient t poursuivis dans les dilais lgaux, et quant au troisibme, Chartrand, cette Cour en est venue A la conclusion qu'il ne pouvait binificier des dispositions du c. 18, parce qu'il avait agi de mauvaise foi. Ceci 6tait strictement conforme au texte clair et pr~cis de la loi. II a t de plus d6cid6 par certains membres de cette Cour, que la signification de l'action faite A deux des d6fendeurs en temps utile, ne pouvait s'appliquer au troisibme parce que la forclusion ne peut 6tre interrompue ni suspendue.
Mais dans la cause de Chaput v. Romain, la prescription inonc6e A l'art. 24 du c. 47 n'a pas t6 examinee parce que, pour une raison que j'ignore, les d~fendeurs y ont sp6cifiquement renonc6, et ont refus6 d'invoquer les bin6fices. Dans cette mime cause, M. le Juge Kellock a retrace 1'origine du statut (c. 18), et un examen des diverses 16gislations 1'a conduit 'a la conclusion que ce chapitre remontait a un statut de 1848 (11 et 12 Vict., c. 44) pass6 sous l'Union, et qui concernait la protection accord6e a certains magistrats. Ce statut s'appliquait au Haut et au Bas Canada, et s'inspirait d'une loi du Parlement anglais de 1750 (The Constables Protection Act, 24 Geo. II, c. 44). M. le Juge Kellock a conclu, en consequence, que c'est ce statut anglais de 1750 qui a servi de fondement au statut canadien, pass6 sous 'Union, et subsiquemment, pratiquement accept6 par la Province. II a done jug6 que le c. 18, s'inspirant du droit anglais, n'accordait aucune protection au d~fendeur Chartrand parce que ce dernier avait agi sans autorit6, avait pos6 un acte prohib6 par le Code Criminel, et que la protection en vertu du droit anglais n'est accord6e a un magistrat que s'il a agi de bonne foi dans 1'ex6cution de ses fonctions. Le c. 18, s'inspirant 6videmment de cette 16gislation, mentionne en toutes lettres que la bonne foi est un 6l6ment essentiel, pour qu'un magistrat ou un officier public puisse se privaloir du bindfice du statut.
Mais le cas qui se prdsente actuellement n'est pas le mgme. Il ne s'agit plus du c. 18, mais bien du c. 47, dont les origines sont entibrement de sources diffrentes. Le premier remonte en effet A 1750, mais le second ne date que de 1870, soit trois ans aprbs la Conf6d~ration et quatre ans aprbs 1'entrie en vigueur du Code Civil, qui est l'autorit6 supreme en semblable matibre.
Il s'ensuit n6cessairement que la responsabilit6 civile de Benoit ne peut reposer que sur 'art. 1053 du Code Civil, comme consequence d'un ddlit ou d'un quasi-ddlit, si un dommage r6sulte A autrui, par la faute de l'auteur, soit par son fait, son imprudence, sa n6gligence ou son inhabilit6. C'est ce qui a 6t d~cid6 dans Fabyan v. Tremblay, supra, et maintes fois confirm4 par des d6cisions subs6quentes. Le c. 47 suppose nicessairement une faute d6coulant de 1'art. 1053 de la part du constable. II faut que ce dernier ait commis un dilit, c'est-a-dire qu'il ait agi avec intention de nuire, ou qu'il se soit rendu coupable d'un quasi-ddlit qui ne suppose pas d'intention, mais simplement un acte pos6 timirairement sans cause raisonnable ou probable; autrement, le b6nifice de la prescription serait inutile, car l'action sans 1'existence d'une faute ne pourrait rbussir. Qu'il s'agisse done d'un d6lit ou d'un quasi-d6lit, 'action normalement se prescrit par deux ans (2261 C.C.). Cet article dit:
L'action se prescrit par deux ans dans les cas suivants: La dernidre partie de cet article a d4faut d'autres dispositions applicables est d'une grande importance, car il y a ici d'autres dispositions qui s'appliquent au present cas. Le l6gislateur a voulu en effet, en plagant dans nos statuts le c. 47, art. 24, qui encore une fois est une loi sp6ciale, que si un constable a .agi en cette qualitg d'officier, cette d6chiance soit r~duite A six mois. Pour que cc statut trouve son application, il n'est exig6 qu'une seule condition, c'est que 1'officier ait agi en cette qualit6 d'officier. Il n'est nullement question de bonne foi comme dans le c. 18. Dans cc dernier chapitre, les auteurs de quasi-ddlits seulement bindficient de la dich6ance de six mois, tandis que dans le cas prevu au 47, les constables jouissent de la protection du Taheu statut, qu'ils aient commis un dilit ou un quasi-ddlit. La bonne foi ou l'intention n'est pas un 6liment n6cessaire A l'application de la forclusion de six mois, pas plus que s'il s'agissait de 1'application de l'art. 2261 C.C., qui limite A deux ans le droit d'action, ou de 1'application du droit anglais, qui limiterait A six ans le recours d'une victime dans un cas identique. Dans ces cas, il est indiscutable que la bonne foi est immat6rielle, & moins qu'elle soit un ment exig6 par la loi, ce qui n'existe pas ici.
Si Benoit a commis une faute en agissant tim6rairement, sans cause raisonnable et probable, il agissait tout de mme en sa qualitg de constable. C'est 6videmment comme constable qu'il a arrtd I'appelante et qu'il a ordonn6 son incarceration. Son acte imprudent ne fait nullement disparaitre cette qualit6, et ce n'est pas parce qu'il aurait commis une erreur ou une negligence qui entrainerait sa responsabilit4 civile, qu'il aurait agi en une autre qualit6. C'est pricis6ment & cause de cette faute qu'il aurait commise qu'il est responsable, mais la loi exige que laction en reparation du dommage qui lui est imputable, soit institu6e par la victime dans un dilai de six mois, et ce ddlai est rigoureusement fatal.
L'arrestation en effet a eu lieu le 7 dicembre 1946, et la plainte a 6t6 asserment6e le 9 du m~me mois. L'action a 6t6 signifi~e A Benoit le 12 juillet 1947, c'est-4-dire plus de sept mois aprbs la commission des actes ddlictuels dont on se plaint.
Je ne me propose nullement de donner au texte de la loi, qui est claire et precise, une extension qui serait contraire A la volont6 du ligislateur. Je ne crois pas que l'on puisse importer certaines conditions qui existent dans le c. 18 pour les incorporer dans le c. 47. Sans vouloir professer une exegese excessive, je crois que les d6chdances, ou plut~t les forclusions du genre de celles que l'on trouve i l'art. 24 du c. 47, sont imp6ratives, et ne souffrent aucune suspension ni interruption. C'est 1'impirieux devoir des tribunaux de les appliquer dans toute leur rigueur.
On est port6 trop souvent a confondre la prescription libiratoire d'une obligation civile, avec la forclusion impos6e par la Legislature. Cette prescription libiratoire, par BENOr et al. opposition aux d6lais prefix, est parfaitement distingu6e Taschereau J. par les auteurs et la jurisprudence. Planiol et Ripert, Droit - Civil, vol. 7, 2' 6d., p. 818, s'expriment de la fagon suivante: II faut opposer lea ddlais pr6fix ou ddlais emportant d6chdance aux prescriptions proprement dites.
L'int6r6t de cette distinction concerne d'abord les causes de suspension. Les d6lais emportant dichdance ne cessent pas de courir contre les mineurs ou les interdits, entre 6poux pendant le mariage et malgr6 limpossibilit4 matirielle d'agir. Ils ne sont pas non plus susceptibles d'interruption. Par ailleurs, contrairement A la maxime Quae temporalia sunt ad agendum, perpetua sunt ad excipiendum, une fois le dilai expird, l'exception ellem~me ne pourrait plus 6tre oppos~e. La d6chiance apparaft done comme une mesure jouant automatiquement et in~vitablement au bout d'un certain temps, quelles qu'aient 6t6 les circonstances intermidiaires. Dans Dalloz, Jurisprudence
G~ndrale
1934, recueil p6riodique, p. 33, on lit ce qui suit:
Le d6lai de trois ans pendant lequel est ouverte Faction en rdvision de l'indemnit6, en matibre d'accidents du travail, a le caractbre, non d'un d6lai de prescription, mais d'un dilai de forclusion et de d6ch6ance. Par suite, les causes d'interruption et de suspension de la prescription pr~vues par le code civil ne o'appliquent pas A ce d4lai pr6fixe; Sp6cialement, il n'est pas interrompu par une demande de rdvision form6e devant un tribunal incomptent.
Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil, vol. 2, p. 529:
Les d6lais prefix sont rigis par un tout autre statut que celui de Ia prescription.
Ils ne comportent ni suspension, ni interruption; par d6finition mime, ils sont pr~constitu6s et ils s'accomplissent au jour dit, fit-ce an jour firid (Rennes, 27 d6c. 1930, S. 1931, 2, 69), sans que cette dichiance puisse 8tre conjur6e ou diffrie, m6me & raison d'un cas de force majeure (Req. 28 mars 1928, S. 1928, 1, 308); la rbgle contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio est done sans application en ce qui les concerne; 2'. A plus forte raison, ces d6lais ne peuvent-ils 6tre modifies par la volont6 des int6ressis, pas plus dans un sens que dans l'autre: leur abr~viation n'est pas davantage concevable que leur allongement; Dans Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 1950, vol. 48, a la page 205, M. Henry Solus 6crit ce qui suit:
Aussi comprend-on que poussant jusqu' son terme la tendance qu'avaient manifestie MM. Ripert et Boulanger en 6crivant que la rigueur de la prescription extinctive-telle qu'admise par eux-"l'apparente 'A un d6lai prdfix", la plupart des auteurs aient 6cart4 cat6goriquement la notion de prescription extinctive et aient vu purement et simplement dans le d6lai de trois ans de 'art. 2279, al. 2, un simple dilai prdfix, i qui ne peuvent et ne doivent point 6tre appliqudes les rfgles ordinaires de la Au mime volume, aux pages 456 et 457, M. Michel Vasseur s'exprime ainsi:
Vide 6galement Beudant, Droit Civil Frangais, vol. 9, p. 151; Baudry-Lacantinerie, Droit Civil, vol. 28, p. 32; Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais, vol. 12, p. 534. D'ailleurs, dans cette cause de Chaput v. Romain, supra, plusieurs membres de cette Cour, appliquant les principes 6nonc6s par les auteurs ci-dessus, ont signal6 la profonde distinction qui existe entre la dich6ance d'action, qualifide de dilais prefix, et la prescription proprement dite. Ces ddlais prefix sont regis par un tout autre statut que celui de la prescription. Ils ne comportent ni suspension ni interruption; par d6finition meme, ils doivent s'appliquer au jour dit, sans que la dichiance puisse 6tre diff6r~e. Celle-ci est attach6e au droit mame d'instituer l'action.
Il r6sulte nicessairement que l'appelante ne peut pas pr6tendre que faction, m~me si elle avait 6t6 signifide aux autres d6fendeurs en temps utile, constituerait une interruption quant A Benoit. De plus, pour que 1'interruption, si elle r~sultait de la signification de laction aux autres, pfit profiter A l'appelante, il eut fallu en vertu des dispositions de Part. 2226 C.C., que laction signifi6e A Nadeau et Forget dans les d6lais l6gaux ffit maintenue. En effet, une demande rejet~e contre certains des d~biteurs solidaires n'interrompt pas la prescription quant aux autres. Toute la pr~sente cause rel~ve exclusivement du droit civil de la province de Quebec, soit de 1'application de l'art. 1053 C.C., source de toute responsabilit6 dilictuelle et quasi-ddlictuelle, et de la forclusion de six mois 6dict6e par l'art. 24 du c. 47 des Statuts Refondus. Cette dernidre loi est une loi spdciale, d'origine provinciale, et doit 6tre interpr6t6e restrictivement. Ce serait une erreur de lui donner une extension plus grande que celle que le 14gislateur a voulu lui donner.
J. S'il est vrai que le c. 18 remonte A un statut imp6rial de 1750, il n'en est pas ainsi du c. 47 qui, datant de 1870, n'a pas de semblables origines. C'est pour cela que, pour la d6termination de cette cause, je ne desire pas m'inspirer des pricidents du common law, qui A mon sens, n'ont aucune application, et ne peuvent nous aider A la solution de ce litige.
Dans la cause de Beattie v. Kozak', cette Cour, interpritant un statut de la province de Saskatchewan, a d6cid6 que quelqu'un qui proc6dait & l'arrestation d'une autre personne en vertu des dispositions du Mental Hygiene Act, devait agir "de bonne foi", s'il voulait binificier de la prescription de six mois mentionn6e A I'art. 64. Mais cette loi contient une disposition (art. 61), que la protection n'est accordie que si la personne qui prochde & 1'arrestation a agi "de bonne foi". C'est pricis6ment cette absence de "bonne foi" et de cause raisonnable qui a td la ratio decidendi de la majorit6 de la Cour. Ce statut de la Saskatchewan est, comme on le voit, diffirent de celui qui est actuellement sous 6tude.
Pour r6sumer, je suis d'opinion que l'appel log6 contre Nadeau et Forget doit 6tre rejet6, parce que ces derniers n'ont pas commis de faute qui aurait pu engendrer leur responsabilit6 sous l'empire de lart. 1053 C.C. Quant A Benoit, s'il a commis un d6lit en agissant intentionnellement, ou un quasi-dilit comme cons6quence de n6gligence, d'inhabilit4 ou d'imprudence dans 1'exercice de sa qualiti d'officier, I'action lui a t6 signifide tardivement, et l'appel doit 6tre 6galement rejet6 quant A lui.
On ne peut certainement pas faire revivre une dich6ance que prononce la loi civile, en s'inspirant de principes emprunt6s A une conception l6gale d'un droit diff6rent qui n'a pas d'application dans la province de Qu6bec. Il n'est pas inopportun de rappeler ici ce qui a t dit par cette Cour dans Desrosiers v. Le Roil, oit les droits d'un tiers vis-&-vis le mandataire et le mandant ont 6t6 discutis. On a refus6 d'y appliquer les principes du common law qui Bsdor et al. veut que Faction par le tiers contre l'un empache le recours e contre 1'autre, et M. le Juge Anglin, tel qu'il 6tait alors, dit Taschereau J.
ce qui suit i la page 119:
This case affords an excellent illustration of the danger of treating English decisions as authorities in Quebec cases which do not depend upon doctrines derived from the English law.
A la page 125, M. le Juge Brodeur exprime les memes vues, et h la page 126, voici ce que dit M. le Juge Mignault: Avec toute dif6rence possible, qu'il me soit permis de dire que je ne partage pas I'opinion du savant juge. Si les articles 1716 et 1717 du code civil 6taient emprunt~s I la fois de Pothier et du droit anglais, ce ne serait pas une raison de dire que les principes g~ndraux du droit anglais doivent Stre adoptis pour r4soudre les questions auxquelles ces articles donnent lieu. Je ferais plut~t pr~valoir la doctrine de Pothier et de l'ancien droit frangais, d'autant plus que les codificateurs ne disent pas que ces articles sont empruntis au droit anglais, mais, au sujet de Particle 1727 C.C., ils font remarquer que cet article est bas sur 1'expos6 de la doctrine de Pothier, laquelle, ajoutent-ils, est d'accord avec les lois anglaise, 6cossaise et ambricaine. Il me semble respectueusement qu'il est temps de r6agir contre l'habitude de recourir, dans les causes de la province de Qu6bec, aux pricdents du droit commun anglais, pour le motif que le code civil contiendrait une rigle qui serait d'accord avec un principe du droit anglais. Sur bien des points, et surtout en matibre de mandat, le code civil et le common law contiennent des r~gles semblables. Cependant, le droit civil constitue un syst~me complet par lui-mame et doit s'interpr6ter d'aprls ses propres r~gles. Si pour cause d'identitd de principes juridiques on peut recourir au droit anglais pour interprdter le droit civil frangais, on pourrait avec autant de raison citer les monuments de la jurisprudence frangaise pour mettre en lumiare les ragles du droit anglais. Chaque syst~me, je le r~pite, est complet par lui-mgme, et sauf le cas oji un systime prend dans l'autre un principe qui lui 4tait auparavant 4tranger, on n'a pas besoin d'en sortir pour chercher la r~gle qu'il convient d'appliquer aux espbces bien diverses qui se pr6sentent dans la pratique journalinre.
Dans une cause de Curley v. Latreille, il a 6t6 dicid6 par M.M. les Juges Anglin, Brodeur et Mignault qui composaient la majorit6 de la Cour, ce qui suit:
English decisions can be of value in Quebec cases involving questions of civil law only when it has been first ascertained that in the law of England and that of Quebec the principles upon which the particular subject matter is dealt with are the same and are given the like scope in their application, and even then not as binding authorities but rather as rationes scriptae.
Je partage ces vues sans aucune restriction ni qualification.
1(1920), 60 S.C.R. 131, 55 D.L.R. 461.
Je suis en consequence d'opinion que l'appel contre les trois intim6s doit 6tre rejet6 avec d~pens.
LAMB BENOret al. RAND J.:-The facts here are not in dispute. The onlyTaschereauJ. material inference urged attempts to charge the appellant through association with three other persons with the distribution of the issue of a publication containing an article headed "Quebec's Burning Hate" alleged at the time to be seditious libel. It is sufficient to say that the inference is quite unwarranted; all four persons were acting individually in distributing such numbers of "The Watch
Tower" and "Awake" as might be furnished them. The arrest and prosecution, as the Court of Queen's Bench' found, were quite without justification or excuse and the detention of the appellant over the weekend was carried out in a manner and in conditions little short of disgraceful.
The real defence is procedural, that the action was not begun-by service of the writ-within six months as prescribed by two statutes, the Provincial Police Act, R.S.Q.
1941, c. 47, s. 24, and the Magistrate's Privilege Act, R.S.Q.
24. Every action against an officer of the Police Force by reason of an act done by him or a complaint lodged by him in his official capacity, must be preceded by at least thirty days' notice to the defendant, in writing, and be brought in the district wherein the said act was done or the said complaint lodged.
Such action shall be prescribed by six months. 4 Geo. VI, c. 56, s. 24.
The latter:
5. No such action or suit shall be brought against any justice of the peace, officer or other person acting as aforesaid, for anything done by him in the performance of his public duty, unless commenced within six months after the act committed. R.S. 1925, c. 146, a. 5.
7. Any such justice of the peace, officer or other person, shall be entitled to the protection and privileges granted by this Act in all cases where he has acted in good faith in the execution of his duty, although, in doing an act, he has exceeded his powers or jurisdiction, and has acted clearly contrary to law. R.S.
1925, c. 146, e. 7.
1 [1958] Que. Q.B. 237.
67295-6-7
Section 2 of c. 18 enumerates the persons embraced within its provisions: "Any justice of the peace, officer or other person fulfilling any public and it was not seriously contested that both statutes apply to police officers subject to the effect of s. 36 of c. 47 by which provisions of the Magistrate's Privilege Act incompatible with those of the Provincial Police Act are overridden; and it is the submission of Mr. Monette that there is such an incompatibility.
Section 24 is said to fix an absolute period of six months for bringing action against a police officer for any act done "in his capacity" as an officer regardless of malice, lack of belief in facts or any other objectionable element or circumstance; that is to say, so long as the act is the kind of act authorized to be done, in this case, arrest, in which the officer objectively purports to exercise his authority and to act as such, the civil proceeding for any wrong done must be brought within six months. This means that "good faith" as found in s. 7 is not a condition of the limitation under s. 24.
These words, "good faith", were examined by this Court in the case of Chaput v. Romain et all, and the interpretation there given in the factual aspect was this: unless the facts or those honestly believed to be the facts are such as to justify arrest, the officer cannot be said to be acting in good faith. By the judgment of this Court in Beatty and Mackie v. Kozak , an action commenced after 1949, that interpretation had been made definitive and is now the governing rule for similar language throughout Canada. Is that "good faith" required of police officers in Quebec under s. 24?
What is the meaning in 24 of "an act done . . . in his official capacity"? Is it different from "anything done by him in the performance of his public duty" in s. 5 or "of his duty" as in s. 7? An act done in his "official capacity" is surely identical with an act"in performance of his public duty" or his "duty"; if the act is beyond his authority, it cannot be said to have been done in his "official capacity". I am unable to make any distinction between them; they deal with the same thing, the objective act with its required subjective accompaniments.
Section 5, in prescribing a period of six months for J. bringing action, is in party with s. 24. Is the effect of s. 7 in specifying good faith to qualify s. 5 by adding that element to it, or does "anything done by him in the performance of his public duty" necessarily imply "good faith"? If an officer maliciously or with no belief in facts justifying arrest proceeds without warrant, can be said to be acting "in performance of his public duty" or in his "official capacity"? I should think that an honest mind, intent on enforcing law, and belief in facts justifying arrest are essential elements in the performance by an officer of his public duty and of any act done "in his official capacity". The words of s. 7, "in good faith", are, in relation to s. 5, words of amplification, not limitation, explicative not qualifying; so interpreted, that state of mind is as applicable to police officers under s. 24 as under s. 7.
Even were that question doubtful, I should come to the same conclusion. Section 5 and s. 24 are procedural benefits which assume a liability for a trespass and which are exceptions from the general limitation of proceedings. Inconsistency between s. 24 and s. 7 in this respect should be clear before such a wide and absolute scope is attributed to s. 24. That was the view taken by the Court of Queen's Bench in Trudeau v. Kennedy', and with it I am in agreement.
To Benoit it was patent that the appellant was not distributing the issue of the paper containing the alleged libel, nor was there a scrap of evidence on which he could have acted to connect her with the acts of the other three distributors. All this is concluded by what took place at the police station when, in what is said to be the routine practice, Miss Lamb was offered her- liberty in exchange for a release of 6laims, a proposal which she spurned. There was lacking that state of mind necessary to the benefit of the limitation under either s. 7 or s. 24 and his defence must be rejected.
In the case of Nadeau I agree that it has not been shown that he was a party to the arrest. In that of Forget, for the reasons given by my brother Cartwright, I would RandJ. dismiss the appeal on the ground that reasonable and probable cause was present: but I desire to make it clear that the question of malice has not been considered by me and remains unaffected by these reasons.
In view of all the circumstances, the case is one for substantial damages which I would fix at $2,500.
The appeal against Benoit should be allowed and judgment directed for the appellant in the sum of $2,500 with costs in all courts; the appeal against Nadeau and Forget should be dismissed without costs.
LocKE J.:-The appellant, Louise Lamb, was on December 7, 1946, a Minister of the Witnesses of Jehovah and resident at the City of Verdun in Quebec. On that date she was standing at the corner of Church and Wellington Streets in that city, holding in her hands pamphlets called "The Watchtower" and "Awake", publications of the religious body of which she was a member. Her activities apparently consisted of giving copies of these publications to any interested persons passing upon the street. They were described by her as being biblical magazines and their distribution part of the missionary work of the organization. On the other three corners of the intersection three other young women, who were members of the same religious denomination, were standing holding in a similar manner some other publications of the Jehovah Witnesses, making them available to persons passing on the street. Among the publications in the possession of the latter three persons was a copy of the publication "The Watchtower" issued under the date December 8, 1946, which contained an article designated "Quebec's Burning Hate for God and Christ and Freedom" which, as the result proved, was highly obnoxious to large numbers of other residents of the Province of Quebec.
The appellant was not in possession of this latter publication and there is no evidence that she knew of its existence and it is not suggested that the contents of the publications 4 which were in her possession were objectionable in any way. Lke If there was any by-law of the City of Verdun or any other regulation which prohibited the appellant from conducting herself in this manner, we have not been referred to it and it was not proven. The appellant had not gone to the place in question by arrangement with the other three young women and there is no evidence that she was a party to their actions.
While the appellant was thus standing on the street she was approached by the respondent Nadeau, a constable of the provincial police force, who told her that he wanted her to come with him and that there was someone in a motor car nearby who wanted to question her. The same request had apparently been made before this to the other three women and they had complied with it. The appellant followed Nadeau to this car and was instructed by him to get into it. In the car the respondent Benoit was seated, together with another policeman named Pelland, acting as chauffeur.
Benoit is described in the evidence as a special officer of the provincial police and, according to his own evidence, he was in charge of the small party of police officers who went with him to the place in question. According to the appellant, Benoit examined a small hand bag which was in her possession which contained copies of "The Watchtower" and "Awake" and said: "There is nothing here" and that they could let her go. As she was about to step out of the car, however, he asked her to show him her purse and, looking through it, found what was said to be a letter from The Watchtower, Bible and Tract Society to the appellant and, after reading this, he instructed her to stay with them. There is no evidence as to the contents of this document. The party were then driven to the provincial police headquarters in Montreal, where all four were left in charge of the matron. A few minutes later, Benoit, who had left them, returned and informed them that they were to remain in custody over the weekend and they were accordingly placed in a cell, where they were Law kept until Monday morning, December 9. Benoit signed an order for their detention.
No information had been laid either against the appellant or the others and no warrant had been issued for their arrest. Their fingerprints were, however, taken on the Saturday evening and they were photographed. They were not permitted to telephone, either to a lawyer or to their friends.
On Monday morning, according to the appellant, she was informed that she was to be taken to Court. Before she appeared, however, Benoit told her that he had good news for her, that he had made arrangements to have her released and she was then taken by him to his office in police headquarters. Benoit then informed her that there were "certain formalities" to be complied with in order that she might be released and asked her to sign several slips of paper, three of which were statements to the effect that she would take no action against the provincial police for having detained her. The appellant refused to do this, whereupon he said that if she did not want to sign the releases he would have to charge her with sedition and that it would cost her a lot of money to get out of gaol. Benoit then left her, returning shortly thereafter to enquire if she had changed her mind and would sign the releases and, upon her again refusing, said that he would have to charge her and took her before a judge in his chambers and read the charge which had been laid against her in the meantime by the respondent Forget. Later during the afternoon of the same day she was released on bail. The information laid by Forget, sworn on December 9, 1946, before a judge of the Sessions of the Peace, stated that the informant had reason to believe and did believe that the present appellant and the three young women referred to had on December 7, 1946, published a seditious libel entitled "Quebec's Burning Hate for God and Christ and Freedom"
A second charge contained in the information stated that the appellant and the three other women had conspired together and with other persons unknown to publish ,I, without legal justification or excuse the seditious libel, to exhibit it in public and to deliver it from door to door, the said writing being likely to raise discontent or disaffection among His Majesty's subjects.
The information, according to the evidence of Forget, was in a form which had been drafted at the City of Quebec for use apparently in proceedings against those distributing literature of Jehovah's Witnesses considered to be objectionable in law as being seditious. Forget, who laid the information at the request and on the direction of Benoit, had not been informed by the latter either that the appellant was exhibiting the publication mentioned or was delivering it from door to door. There is no evidence that the appellant did either and, according to her own evidence, on December 7, 1946, she had done nothing other than to stand offering the unobjectionable publications above mentioned. Benoit had not informed Forget of any facts which could possibly support the charge of conspiracy, which was the second of the two charges made in the complaint. It is sought to support Forget's conduct in this matter by saying that it was the practice of the police authorities concerned to have charges laid in this manner. On January 10, 1947, the appellant and the three other women appeared before a judge of the Sessions of the Peace and Nadeau and Benoit gave evidence. At the conclusion of the proceedings the complaint was dismissed. Benoit said that he had not found the offending publication in the possession of the present appellant and no evidence was offered in support of the charge of conspiracy. By a notice dated January 28, 1947, the appellant, through her solicitors, informed Nadeau and Benoit of her intention to bring an action against them for false arrest and for damages, and a like notice was given to Forget by a letter dated February 10, 1947.
The action was commenced on July 10, 1947. The declaration stated the facts in connection with the arrest and detention of the appellant and the information laid against her by Forget which, it was claimed, was done upon the instructions of Benoit, Nadeau and Pelland, the latter being also named as a defendant, and asserted that the arrest Basor et al. was unlawful and the charges laid and the prosecution conducted without reasonable or probable cause. All of the 'facts complained of were alleged to have ben done maliciously and in bad faith by the defendants.
The defence filed may be summarized as being that the appellant was one of a group of what were designated in the pleading as "z6lateurs" known under the name of the Witnesses of Jehovah, who were engaged in concert in distributing seditious literature of a character calculated to create animosity and discontent among the population. As to Benoit, it was said that he had acted on the instructions given to him by the representatives of the Crown and all of the defendants asserted that they had acted in good faith in the discharge of their duties as police officers. A further defence pleaded was that all of the defendants having done the acts complained of in the execution of their public duties, the action was barred since it had not been commenced within six months following the commission of the alleged offences.
The defence that the action had not been brought in time is based upon the provisions of chapters 18 and 47, R.S.Q.
The first of these statutes called the Magistrate's Privilege Act provides that any officer or other person fulfilling any public duty sued for damages by reason of any act committed by him in the execution thereof may, within one month after the service of the notice mentioned in art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, offer to pay a compensation to the party complaining and, if the sum be not accepted, may plead such offer in bar to the action brought against him and deposit the amount offered. Section 5 provides that no such action shall be brought against any such officer "for anything done by him in the performance of his public duty" unless commenced within six months after the act committed. Section 7 provides that such officer shall be entitled to the protection and privileges granted by the Act in all cases where he has acted in good faith in the execution of his duty, although in doing an act he has exceeded his powers or jurisdiction and acted clearly contrary to the law. The second statute referred to is an Act relating to the Quebec Provincial Police Force and, by s. 24, provides that every action against any officer of the police force by reason l. of an act done by him or a complaint lodged by him in his official capacity must be preceded by at least thirty days' notice in writing to the defendant, and that such action shall "be prescribed by six months". This Act does not contain any provision similar to that contained in s. 7 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act, a fact which appears to have been considered as of some significance.
Montpetit J., by whom the action was tried, dismissed it with costs, and that judgment has been upheld by a unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal'.
As to the respondent Nadeau, the learned trial judge, while considering that in any event the action should fail as not having been brought within the period of six months following December 7, 1946, was of the opinion that no cause of action was disclosed by the evidence, since he had merely complied with the order of his superior Benoit in approaching the appellant and asking her to come over to the car in which Benoit was seated. The fact that he had told her to get into the car was not mentioned. It had not been shown that Nadeau had taken any part in what occurred thereafter, other than to give evidence at the preliminary hearing on January 10, 1947.
The action against the defendant Pelland was dismissed for the reason that it had not been shown that he had done more than drive the automobile in which the appellant was conveyed to the police headquarters. As the appellant did not appeal against that portion of the judgment dismissing the claim as against Pelland, it does not require further consideration.
As to Forget, the learned judge said:
au dfendeur Forget a 6t commise le 9 dcembre 1946. Incidemment, la Cour croit devoir signaler ici que, mAme en admettant, pour fins de discussion, que cette fagon de procdder ne soit pas la plus recommandable, et al. surtout pour l'officier de liaison concern6 qui s'expose i des ennuis, celui-ci Locke j.
n'a pas agi malicieusement on de mauvaise foi, mais simplement dans l'exercice normal de ses fonctions.
As to the claim against Benoit, no finding was made in regard to the claim that in arresting the appellant, in bringing about the laying of the charge which contained statements known by him to be false, and in assisting in the prosecution of that charge he had acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, but the learned judge held that the action failed as not having been brought within six months from December 7, 1946, in respect of the claim for false arrest, or within six months of January 10, 1947, in respect of the claim for malicious prosecution, even had Benoit acted in bad faith and maliciously.
The principal judgment in the Court of Appeal' was written by Mr. Justice Pratte. As to Nadeau, that learned judge agreed with the judgment at the trial that he had merely executed a legal order of his superior and, in doing so in the manner disclosed by the evidence, had committed no fault. In referring to the evidence, again no mention is made of the fact that, in addition to asking the appellant to come to the motor car in which Benoit had remained, Nadeau had, according to the appellant, told her to get into the car.
Pratte J. further considered that no cause of action was disclosed against Forget. The reasons given for this conclusion are as follows:
Quant i Forget, sa fonction, au quartier-g~ndral de la Sftret, consistait A porter les d6nonciations d'aprbs les rapports faits par les autres officiers. Dans le cas qui nous int6resse, il a port6 la d~nonciation A la demande de Benoit, apris que celui-ci efit affirm6 que tel 6tait le d4sir du procureur de la Couronne. C'est tout ce qu'il a fait; il n'avait pas t mId . I'affaire auparavant, et il n'y a pas particip6 par la suite. Il est vrai qu'il ne 'est pas enquis de la preuve qu'on 4tait en mesure de pr4senter pour 4tablir I'accusation, mais il n'4tait pas tenu de le faire; il suffisait qu'il filt croyablement inform6 des faits imput6s A l'appelante. Or, sur ce point, on ne saurait sarement pas lui reprocher de s'Atre fi & la parole de son confrbre.
1 [19581 Que. Q.B. 237.
s No mention is made of the fact that Benoit had only told LoJ him the nature of the complaint that he wished to be made, that is, of a seditious libel, and had not given him the facts regarding the actions of the appellant, though he told him that it was the wish of the Crown prosecutor that a charge be laid. Forget had not consulted and did not consult the Crown prosecutor. Benoit, he said, had given him no special instructions but gave him the names of the persons to be charged, which Forget then caused to be filled in in the form already in his possession, and then signed and swore to the complaint. He knew none of the parties charged, nothing about the circumstances and made no enquiries. Admittedly, the statement in the complaint that he had been credibly informed that the appellant had published the pamphlet referred to in the complaint by exhibiting it in public and by delivering it from door to door was untrue and there were no facts given to him by Benoit or anyone else upon which to base the charge of conspiracy.
As to Benoit, after mentioning the fact that it was contended on behalf of the present appellant that he had not acted in good faith, the learned judge said:
& Having said this, however, it was pointed out that this did not prevent the application of the limitation imposed by the Quebec Provincial Police Force Act, which does not contain any provision similar to s. 7 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act which in terms requires that the act complained of be done in good faith. Considering that Benoit had caused the information to be laid in his capacity as an officer of the police force and that, as the action had not been commenced within six months of the date of the arrest complained of or of the dismissal of the criminal charge, he held that the action failed.
It is my opinion that the appeal against the judgment upholdling the dismissal of the charge against Nadeau should be dismissed. Nadeau, it is true, was one of the party who proceeded with Benoit to the place in question, but it was not shown that he was aware that the latter had any intention of arresting or detaining the appellant or that he had not a warrant for her arrest and while, in my view, his act in asking the appellant to come to the car where Benoit was seated and then instructing her to get into the car made him a party to the false arrest, it is not shown that he took any further part in the matter or that he was a party to any detention in the police station or in the laying of the criminal charge against her. As to the participation in the unlawful arrest, I think the position of Nadeau does not differ from that of the appellant Mackie in the case of Beatty v. Kozak' which was recently before this Court. As, however, the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence is that Nadeau believed in the existence of facts which would justify the arrest, and there is nothing to support the charge that he acted maliciously or in bad faith, I think the claim is prescribed by s. 24 of c. 47.
The case against Forget presents more difficulty. The limitation imposed by s. 5 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act is in respect of actions for anything done by an officer in the performance of his public duty and s. 7 declares that such officer shall be entitled to its protection in all cases where he has acted in good faith in the execution of his duty. Section 24 of the Quebec Provincial Police Force Act requires that every action against an officer of that force, by reason of any act done by him or a complaint lodged by him in his official capacity, must be preceded by at least thirty days' notice and that "such action shall be prescribed by six months". As the latter statute does not say in terms that it applies to acts done in good faith, it is apparently contended that good faith is not necessary. I am unable, with respect, to agree with this. To be entitled to the benefit of the statute it is necessary that the officer should have a bona fide belief in facts which would justify his conduct. In Lightwood on Time Limit of Actions, Lcke at p. 396, after reviewing the authorities upon such cases decided under the Public Authorities Protection Act 1898, it is said that:
This statement is, in my opinion, borne out by the authorities and is applicable to cases such as this where it is sought to invoke the section of the Provincial Police Act. In Selmes v. Judge", Lord Blackburn said in part: The statement in the information sworn to by Forget that he had been credibly informed that the appellant had published the pamphlet referred to by exhibiting it in public and by delivering it from door to door was entirely without foundation. As the evidence shows, the statement was false. As to the portion of it charging conspiracy with the other three, Forget had no information to support such a charge. He swore the information, apparently simply because these were the offences described in the forms he had received from Quebec, he merely filling in the appellant's name before taking his oath.
The claims against Forget are the same as those against Benoit, namely, for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. As to the first, he was not a party to the arrest: as to the second, I have come to the conclusion that the evidence does not show clearly that the imprisonment of the appellant up to the time when she appeared before the judge and was remanded resulted from the laying of the information. To prove this was an essential of the cause of action for false imprisonment. 33 Halsbury, 2nd ed., p. 38.
There remains the claim for damages for malicious prosecution. It is no part of the public duty of a police officer to swear to an information falsely stating that he has been credibly informed that the person to be charged had committed a criminal offence, in the complete absence of any such information and when enquiry would disclose that the charge was entirely without foundation. It has been said that it was the usual procedure for the police officer to lay informations in this way, but that contention is irrelevant in determining the question as to whether the act complained of was done in good faith, in performance or intended performance of his duty within the meaning of the statutes. It does, however, have some bearing upon the issue of malice. For reasons which I will state in more detail in dealing with the claim against Benoit, neither of the statutes relied upon apply to a claim for damages against a police officer for a malicious prosecution if malice in law be established in the action. The learned trial judge has, however, found that he did not act maliciously and, in my opinion, we are not justified upon the evidence in this case in reversing that finding. The claim against Benoit rests upon a different footing. He does not say that he was ordered to take the appellant or the others into custody and there were no circumstances entitling him to arrest the appellant without a warrant, and his conduct was from the outset unlawful. The appellant was not committing any offence at the time she was taken in charge and when, at police headquarters, she asked with what offence she was charged the information was refused to her.
As no warrant had been issued either for the arrest or detention of the appellant, the person in charge of the cells apparently required some written authority to detain her and this appears to have been given by Benoit in a form the nature of which is not disclosed by the evidence. According to Benoit, a Captain Quenneville told him to detain them until Monday for the purpose of laying charges. On Monday morning, he says that he consulted Mr. Oscar Gagnon, then counsel for the Crown, to whom he told what evidence there was against the four persons and says that Mr. Gagnon said that the evidence against the appellant was less strong and;
Asked to describe what this "routine" was, he said: He does not say that he told Mr. Gagnon that the appellant was not exhibiting the pamphlet to which exception was taken in public or delivering it from door to door or that there was any evidence that she had engaged in a conspiracy with others to do so, and does not suggest that Mr. Gagnon advised the laying of such a charge. He admits that thereafter he demanded that the appellant sign releases and told. her she would be liberated if she signed, and says that after she refused he was instructed, either by Quenneville or by Beauregard, as senior police officer, to have the information laid. He was not sure which of them had given these instructions and neither of these officers gave evidence at the hearing. He then went to Forget and told the latter that he had instructions from the Crown to lay a charge. It is admitted by Benoit that he instructed Forget to lay the information but he denies having told him that the appellant had been distributing the pamphlet mentioned in the complaint, saying that he had merely stated the facts to him.
In my opinion, neither of the statutes relied upon apply to the claim for damages against Benoit for false arrest, false imprisonment or for malicious prosecution.
It is to be remembered that Benoit had not been instructed to take the appellant into custody and it was only upon the discovery of a letter in the appellant's purse, the contents of which are not disclosed, that he decided to take her to the police headquarters. There were no circumstances justifying the police officer in arresting the appellant without a warrant. Sections 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 646, 647 and 648 of the Criminal Code then in force afford no justification for the arrest. The onus of proving facts justifying an arrest without warrant, in my opinion, lies upon the officer making the arrest. Lightwood, p. 396.
The appellant was detained in custody from the time of her apprehension on December 7 until the information was laid by Forget on the morning of December 9, at the instance of Benoit, and, again, the evidence does not disclose that he believed that she had committed any offence justifying this detention. Indeed, as his conduct showed, the fact that he offered to release the appellant if she would sign the document, which presumably released him as well as the others concerned from any claim for damages, appears to me to show that he was well aware that the arrest and detention had been unlawful.
In my opinion, the statutes relied upon are each to be construed in the same manner as the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, 56-57 Vict. (Imp.), c. 61. That statute refers to "actions commenced against 'any person for any act done in pursuance, or execution, or intended execution of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority". As was pointed out in the judgment of Kellock J. in Chaput v. Romain', where the authorities are reviewed, the Quebec statutes were based upon the earlier English statutes to the same effect as the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 which merely declared the law as stated in the numerous decisions upon the earlier statutes, and they are subject to the same rules of construction. What was said by Lord Blackburn in Selmes v. Judge is to the same effect as the judgment of Bayley J. in Cook v. Leonard and by Lopes J. in a later case: Agnew v. Jobson. As to the claim for malicious prosecution against Benoit, the matters necessary to be proved are the prosecution, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against the appellant on a criminal charge, that the prosecution was determined in her favour, that it was without reasonable and probable cause and that it was malicious. In the case of Benoit, while the trial judge did not deal with the matter, Pratte J. has found that he did not act in good faith in causing the charge to be laid, a finding clearly supported by the evidence. It is impossible to sustain a contention that there was any reasonable or probable cause for the arrest, imprisonment or the prosecution, a fact which the conduct of Benoit indicates he realized. As to malice, the term in this form of action is not to be considered in the sense of spite or hatred against an individual but of malus animus and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. !Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 11th ed., p. 870. In Abrath v. North Eastern Railway', Bowen L.J. said that the plaintiff in such an action must prove that the proceedings of which he complains were initiated in a malicious spirit, that is, from an indirect and improper motive and not in furtherance of justice. In the present matter as the evidence discloses, Benoit first attempted to obtain a release from the appellant by threatening her with prosecution for sedition and, upon her refusing to sign, caused the information to be laid and the appellant retained in custody until she was released upon bail, and it was upon the charges so laid that she was tried and acquitted. The bad faith of Benoit has been found by the Court of Appeal and, in my opinion, the indirect and improper motive for the prosecution was clearly the hope that in some way the bringing of the charge might relieve Benoit and the others from the legal consequences of the false arrest and imprisonment, he well knowing that the charges were false. The fact that before instituting a criminal proceeding the proposed prosecutor lays all of the facts before counsel and acts on his advice is evidence relevant to the issue of reasonable and probable cause, if a prosecution is advised. But the evidence in the present case is clearly quite insufficient to enable Benoit to rely upon the decision in Abrath's case.
In these circumstances, the statutes relied upon have, in my opinion, no application. In Halsbury, vol. 26, at p. 497, dealing with actions against public authorities and public officers, it is said:
The authorities support this statement. In Newell v. LAns
Starkie', an appeal from the Court of Appeal in Ireland, BNoI et al. where the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 was Locke J. invoked as a defence, Lord Finlay said in part (p. 6): The second observation which I have to make is that the Act necessarily will not apply if it is established that the defendant has abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. In that case he has not been acting within the terms of the statutory or other legal authority. He has not been bona fide endeavouring to carry it out. In such a state of facts he has abused his position for the purpose of doing a wrong, and the protection of this Act, of course, never could apply to such a case. Lord Atkinson agreed, saying in part (p. 7):
It is perfectly true that a public official, acting in the exercise of a statutory or other authority, cannot be protected under that Act if he acts maliciously.
It has been contended that the cases decided in England interpreting the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 and the earlier Acts to the same effect are not to be considered in deciding the interpretation which is to be given to s. 24 of the Quebec Provincial Police Force Act. In support of this, what was said by Anglin J. in delivering the judgment of the majority of this Court in Curley v. Latreille , has been relied upon. That passage reads:
English decisions can be of value in Quebec cases involving questions of civil law only when it has been first ascertained that in the law of England and that of Quebec the principles upon which the particular subject matter is dealt with are the same and are given the like scope in their application, and even then not as binding authorities but rather as rationes scriptae.
As to this, it is to be remembered that the question upon this aspect of the matter is simply one as to the construction of the language of a Quebec statute. Section 41 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 1, after saying that every provision of a statute, prohibitive or penal, shall be deemed to have for its object the remedying of some evil or the promotion of some good, reads:
Such statute shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will ensure the attainment of its objects and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit.
1(1919), 89 L.J.P.C. 1, 83 J.P. 113.
2(1920), 60 S.C.R. 131, 55 D.L.R. 461.
Section 2 provides that the Act shall apply to every statute of the Legislature of the Province, unless and in so far as such application be inconsistent with the object, the context, or any of the provisions of such statute. This language is indistinguishable in meaning from s. 15 of the Interpretation Act of Canada, R.S.C. 1952, c. 158, and appears in substantially this form in all of the other provinces in Canada, except Nova Scotia. In that province, s. 8(5) of R.S.N.S. 1954, c. 136, expresses the rule in a rather different form.
Section 41 of the Interpretation Act of Quebec apparently originated in s. 28 of c. 10 of the Statutes of the Province of Canada for 1849 which read:
That section and s. 15 of the Interpretation Act of Canada are simply restatements in statutory form of what was said in the judgment of the Barons in the Court of Exchequer in Heydon's case'.
The Interpretation Act of England does not contain this provision but the rule in Heydon's case is applied and has been for more than 300 years. It is the rule which was applied of necessity in the cases of Selmes v. Judge, Cook v. Leonard and Agnew v. Jobson, and by Lord Finlay and Lord Atkinson in the House of Lords in Newell v. Starkie. In Selmes v. Judge, above referred to, the judgment is that of the Court of Queen's Bench and the language to be construed was that of 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 50, s. 109, providing that no action should be commenced "against any person for any thing done in pursuance of or under the authority of this Act" unless the prescribed notice had been given and action brought within three months. It was as to the construction of this provision that Blackburn J., with whom Lush and Hannen J. agreed, made the statement which I have quoted.
In Cook v. Leonard, the provisions of the statute considered were expressed in similar terms.
In Agnew v. Jobson, the action was brought against a J. justice of the peace who had made an order for the examination of the plaintiffs person and against the police inspector who had taken her in custody for such purpose, it being contended that there was no authority, statutory or otherwise, authorizing the making of such order. The defence was that no notice of the action had been given under the provisions of 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44, described as an Act to protect justices from vexatious actions "for acts done by them in the execution of their office", unless a specified notice was given and the action brought within six months. Lopes J. held that the statute was inapplicable since:
It is quite true that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench delivered by Blackburn J. in the Selmes case, of the judges of the Queen's Bench Division in Cook v. Leonard, and of Lopes J. in Agnew v. Jobson are not binding upon this Court. Since what was said by Lord Finlay and Lord Atkinson in Newell v. Starkie were statements made in the House of Lords and upon a statute the language of which differs from s. 24 of c. 47, it is, of course, not decisive of the matter. However, that is not to say that when the interpretation of the rule of construction in the Interpretation Act of Quebec which owes its origin to the common law of England, as expressed in Heydon's case, is the question, the opinions of the learned judges who have applied the same rule of construction in England are not entitled to great weight. To apply part of the language of Anglin J. in Curley v. Latreille which I have quoted, "the principles upon which the particular subject matter is dealt with are the same".
If it is contended that in construing statutes of the Province of Quebec to which s. 41 of the Interpretation Act applies we are to ignore the decisions of the House of Lords and of Courts of appeal in England where the same rule of construction has been applied, the argument is illfounded and should be rejected. Nothing said by either Anglin J. or Mignault J. in the case referred to supports any such contention.
For these reasons, it is my opinion that the appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be allowed as against the respondent Benoit and dismissed as against the respondents Nadeau and Forget without costs.
As to Benoit, without any lawful justification, he caused the arrest and imprisonment of the appellant and was responsible for the laying of the information and the prosecution which followed. The appellant was subjected to the ignominy of arrest and prosecution for the offence of distributing a seditious libel, of which offence Benoit knew from the outset she was innocent. She incurred liability to counsel who appeared on her behalf at the trial in the amount of $150. I would award damages against Benoit of $2,500 and costs throughout.
J. (dissenting in part):-Le r6cit des faits invoqu6s contre chacun des officiers de la Sfiret6 provinciale poursuivis par l'appelante, soit les officiers Pelland, Nadeau, Forget et Benoit, apparait aux autres raisons de jugement donn6es en cette cause.
Il n'y a viritablement que le cas de l'officier Benoit qui doit faire l'objet de consid6rations particulibres. En effet, le jugement de la Cour supirieure rejetant faction contre Pelland, n'ayant pas td l'objet d'un appel, a force de chose jug6e. Quant b Nadeau et Forget, je suis d'avis qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'intervenir pour modifier le jugement unanime de la Cour d'AppelP d6cidant, pour les raisons y mentionn6es, qu'aucun des faits invoquis contre eux par l'appelante ne constitue une faute engendrant responsabilit6.
Du fait que Benoit fit loger la d6nonciation par Forget parce que I'appelante avait refus6 une offre de lib6ration conditionnie par la signature d'un document exondrant les officiers de toute responsabilit6, la Cour en a d6duit qu'il n'6tait pas raisonnable de penser que Benoit croyait en la culpabilit6 de l'appelante. Consid6rant, cependant, en droit, que les actions contre les officiers de la SfIret6 provinciale se prescrivent par six mois, aux termes de l'art. 24 du c. 47, S.R.Q. 1941, Loi de la Siretg provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, et, en fait, qu'en prenant, pour computer ce J. dlai,-en ce qui concerne tous les actes reprochis,-la date la plus favorable A l'appelante, soit celle de sa liberation a l'enquete pr6liminaire, le bref d'assignation avait t6 signifi6 A Benoit plus de six mois apres cette date, la Cour jugea que Faction contre Benoit 6tait prescrite.
II s'agit d'une action r6clamant des dommages-int6r~ts, en matibre dilictuelle, contre un officier de la Sfiret6 provinciale. Manifestement ce sont les dispositions du Code Civil de la province de Qu6bec qui doivent s'appliquer, sujet aux modifications y apporties par la loi sp6ciale r6gissant ces officiers.
On a pr6tendu qu'une action en dommages pour d6nonciation calomnieuse doit 6tre d6cidie suivant les principes r6gissant telles actions sous le r6gime de la Common Law. Ces principes sont concis~ment exposes comme suit dans Salmond On the Law of Torts, 10th ed., & la page 624: Telle n'est pas une expression exacte de la loi sous le Code Civil gouvernant dans la province de Qu6bec. L'action en dommages est une action de droit priv6. Suivant Part. 1053 C.C., le fait dommageable donnant droit au recours peut avoir 6t6 commis avec 1'intention de nuire et constituer alors le d6lit. Il est suffisant, cependant, qu'il constitue une faute d'imprudence, de n6gligence ou d'inhabilit6 pour constituer un quasi-d6lit et donner droit A reparation. En somme, il suffit pour donner ouverture A l'action en dommages, que le fait dommageable, imputable h la partie poursuivie, soit illicite. D'oa il suit que si la dinonciation a 6t6 log6e dans les conditions oi la loi p6nale autorise de ce faire, elle ne peut constituer un acte illicite. Ces conditions sont prescrites au Code Criminel & l'art. 654 (ancien)
et 439 (nouveau). Au temps de la d~nonciation log6e par Forget, sur les instructions et informations de Benoit, I'art. 654, alors en vigueur, se lisait comme suit:
II appert cependant de ce texte que si, d'une part, la croyance en la culpabilit6, bas6e sur des motifs raisonnables et plausibles, conditionne, sous le droit public, le droit de d~nonciation, les motifs, d'autre part, qui animent et poussent A agir le dinonciateur qui satisfait, par ailleurs, aux conditions de 1'article, sont 6trangers au droit qu'il a de loger une dinonciation. Ces motifs, empreints ou non de malice au sens donn6 au mot sous la Common Law pour juger des actions en dommages pour d~nonciation calomnieuse, n'ont aucune influence sur l'existence ou la nonexistence du droit de d6nonciation. Aussi bien, I'acte du d6nonciateur, acte qui de sa nature est fatalement dommageable, se justifie, sous le droit public, sur la croyance en la culpabilit6, bas6e sur des motifs raisonnables et plausibles, mais non sur I'absence de malice. Dans ces vues, il ne peut y avoir de conflit entre le droit civil de Quebec relatif A 1action en dommages pour d6nonciation calomnieuse et le droit public canadien fixant les conditions du droit de d6nonciation. L'incidence de la malice n'6tant pas retenue sous le droit public, le droit public ne peut 6tre invoqu6 comme modifiant le droit priv4, ou pour soutenir que le Parlement a consid6r6 essentiel h la poursuite efficace du crime, que 1'absence de malice soit per se un moyen absolu de d6fense dans une action au civil pour d6nonciation calomnieuse. Assumant qu'une telle immunit6 au civil puisse 6tre validement donn6e par le Parlement, elle ne l'a pas t6. On ne saurait davantage, par un d~sir d'uniformiser les lois en matibre civile alors que, depuis le statut impirial de 1774, I'Acte de Qubbec, la loi sanctionne impirativement le principe de la non-uniformit6 en cette matibre, appliquer des principes de la Common Law nettement en conflit avec ceux du Code Civil.
La prescription de six mois:-Le titre 19 du Code Civil traitant de la prescription des actions, indique en l'art. 2261(2)
que 1'action, pour dommages r6sultant des j. d4lits ou quasi-d6lits, se prescrit par deux ans, a d6faut d'autres dispositions applicables. De telles dispositions se trouvent dans la Loi de la Silretg provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, supra. Cette loi a pour objet de constituer la Sfiret4 provinciale du Quebec, d'en 6tablir les devoirs et fonctions, les divisions territoriales d'op6rations, les services, leur direction et composition, les conditions d'admission aux services, d'autoriser l'adoption de rbglements, et elle prescrit finalement que les dispositions y contenues pr6valent, en cas d'incompatibilit6, sur celles de toutes autres lois gindrales ou sp6ciales. L'article 24 se trouve au titre de "Dispositions diverses" et constitue l'unique disposition de la loi touchant le recours en justice contre un officier de la Sfiret6 provinciale et ce, dans les termes suivants:
On a donc, comme c'est le cas d'ailleurs sous la loi g~ndrale en matibre de procedure civile, suivant I'art. 88 C.P.C., prescrit un avis d'action. On a, de plus, modifi6 la prescription de deux ans g~n6ralement applicable, suivant I'art. 2261(2) du Code Civil, dans le cas des actions r~sultant de dilits ou quasi-d6lits, pour r6duire cette prescription A six mois. Que cette disposition de l'art. 24 ait pour but de sanctionner la n6gligence de l'int6ress6 A poursuivre, et qu'elle soit alors une simple prescription, ou qu'elle ait pour but de mettre fin rapidement en tout 6tat de cause A la possibilit6 d'une poursuite, et qu'elle constitue alors un dilai prdfixe, dans le cas de prescription lib6ratoire, aussi bien que dans le cas de d6lai pr6fixe, la bonne foi ne joue aucun r8le. Planiol et Ripert, Droit Civil, 2e 6d., vol. 7, p. 735, no 1326:
A Idem, p. 819, no 1403:
Cette Loi de la SiretM provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, supra, est d'origine d6finitivement provinciale. Elle a pour objet, comme indiqub, la constitution et le gouvernement de la Stret6 et non pas d'6tablir des privilges pour ces officiers. Contrairement A ce qui est le cas dans la Loi concernant les privilges des Juges de paix, des magistrats et autres officiers remplissant des devoirs publics, c. 18, S.R.Q. 1941, aucune mention n'est faite de la bonne foi et, ni express~ment, ni implicitement, peut-on y trouver 1'intention de la L6gislature d'assujettir I'op6ration de l'art. 24 A 1'existence de la bonne foi.
Appliquant le critbre formul6 dans Planiol et Ripert A I'article 1403, supra, je suis d'avis, comme mon coll6gue M. le Juge Taschereau, que 1'art. 24 6dicte un dilai pr~fixe. Ce dont il faut tenir compte, voit-on en cet article, pour distinguer le dlai pr6fixe d'avec la simple prescription, c'est le but et le r8le du d41ai. Cette reduction de d6lai, pour instituer une action en dommages contre un officier de la Sfiret6, constitue une exception A la loi g6ndrale. Cette exception ne se fonde aucunement sur les raisons caract~risant la simple prescription, mais, participant du caract~re mime de la loi oa elle est 6dictie, sur l'intention de la L6gislature d'6tablir, pour des raisons d'ordre administratif touchant la Sfiret6, un dilai pr6fixe.
La seule condition au jeu de i'art. 24 est done que Faction soit dirig6e contre un officier de la Sfiret4 par suite d'un acte qu'il a accompli ou d'une plainte qu'il a port~e en cette "qualit6 d'officier". La L6gislature n'est pas presum6e avoir dirog6 de la loi g6ndrale A moins de s'en 8tre exprim6e en des termes irr6sistiblement clairs. Utilisant le mot "prescription", elle est prisum6e donner A ce mot le sens dont il est susceptible dans le contexte de la loi od' il se trouve et tenir compte du fait qu'en cette matibre, qu'il s'agisse de prescription simple ou de d6lai pr6fixe, la bonne foi ne joue aucun r8le. Aussi bien serait-ce obliquement 6carter l'intention de la L6gislature que de faire entrer la bonne foi dans l'interpr~tation de 1'expression "en sa qualit6 d'officier". Au sens de la loi qui nous occupe, I'acte reprochi sera reput6 accompli par son auteur, "en sa qualit6 d'officier", s'il a 6t6 accompli en raison mme du fait qu'il est officier, et non pour des motifs qui lui sont autrement personnels. Concourant dans l'avis exprim6 par le Juge de premidre instance et tous les membres de la Cour d'Appel, je n'ai aucun doute que tous les actes reproch~s A Benoit ont 6t6 accomplis par lui en sa qualit6 d'officier.
On a enfin pr6tendu que la signification de l'action, dans le dilai de six mois, aux autres d6fendeurs, avait interrompu la prescription quant 'a Benoit. Qu'il s'agisse de simple prescription ou de d6lai pr~fixe, cette pritention ne peut 6tre retenue. Dans le premier cas, l'action n'6tant pas fond6e au mirite contre aucun des cod6fendeurs de Benoit, ces derniers ne peuvent 6tre consid~rds comme ses cod6biteurs; les conditions pour interrompre la prescription ne sont donc pas pr~sentes. Dans le second cas, la disposition n'admet pas d'interruption.
La d6cision de cette Cour dans Chaput v. Romain' n'est, pour les raisons indiquies par M. le Juge Taschereau, d'aucune application en cette cause. Quant A celle de Beatty v. Kozak , et les autres au mgme effet, elles ne sont 6galement, en raison de 1'absence du r6le de la bonne foi dans le statut applicable en la matibre, d'aucune port6e en 1'espice.
Je renverrais 1'appel avec d6pens.
J. (dissenting in part):-The facts and the relevant statutory provisions are set out in the reasons of other members of the Court and it is unnecessary for me to repeat them.
Of the three respondents, the Court below has held that two of them, Nadeau and Forget, committed no fault and are therefore not liable in damages to appellant. With that finding I am in agreement. The Court below has also held that although a valid cause of action existed against the respondent Benoit, that right of action had been extinguished by prescription under s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 47, before the present action was instituted. If the said section is applicable, it is clear that appellant's right of action was prescribed and in my view this question of prescription is the sole question at issue J. in this appeal.
A right of action in damages such as that asserted in the present action is a civil right and must, of course, be founded upon the law in force in Quebec where the acts causing the alleged damage were committed-in this case upon art. 1053 of the Civil Code.
Similarly the extinguishment of any such right of action by prescription is governed by the law of Quebec and unless s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act is applicable, appellant's right of action in damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution would have been extinguished by prescription on the expiry of two years under art. 2261 C.C. Extinctive prescription is one of the twelve modes of extinguishing an obligation mentioned in art. 1138 C.C. and in Quebec the short prescriptions (of which that provided for in art. 2261 C.C. is one) are something more than mere limitations of action which only bar the remedy without touching the obligation: art. 2267 C.C.
In my opinion the 'Court' below has properly held that the respondent Benoit was not entitled to avail himself of the special protections and the limitation of action provided for under the Magistrate's Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 18, since he was not acting in good faith as required by that statute and as held by this Court in Chaput v. Romain. In Beatty and Mackie v. Kozak , (an appeal from Saskatchewan where the interpretation and effect of certain sections in the Mental Hygiene Act of that Province, R.S.S. 1953, c. 309, were in issue) this Court decided that in order to benefit from the special protections and the limitation of action provided for under that statute, a person claiming such benefit must show that he acted in good faith. The test of good faith was held to be a bona fide belief in facts which if they existed, would have justified the action taken.
Both the Chaput case and the Beatty case are of assistance in the interpretation of statutory provisions of the kind referred to, but they are not conclusive as to the interpretation and effect of s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act. That section is framed in completely different language which is more specific and more absolute than that used in the sections of Mental Hygiene Act and the Magistrate's Privilege Act which were considered by this Court. Moreover, s. 36 of the Provincial Police Act provides that in case of incompatibility, the provisions of that Act shall prevail over those of every other general law or special Act. Section 24 provides that
The French text reads as follows:
In my view that language is clear and it has the effect of substituting a prescriptive period of six months for the period of two years provided for in art. 2261 C.C. That prescriptive period of two years applies whether or not the person against whom a claim in damages for false arrest is made, has acted in good faith and with reasonable and probable cause. I am unable to appreciate, therefore, upon what ground the prescriptive period of six months, provided for in s. 24, can be limited to those cases in which a police officer has acted in good faith and with reasonable and probable cause.
As to the effect to be given to the words "in his official capacity", it does not seem to me that it can be seriously suggested that in arresting the appellant and causing a complaint to be lodged against her, Benoit was acting in any other capacity than that of a provincial police officer.
As has been pointed out by the learned authors of Halsbury, 3rd ed., vol. 7, at p. 253, Crown servants may
Cases cited
- Fabyan v. Tremblay Fabyan v. Tremblay, supra
- Chaput v. Romain Chaput v. Romain, supra
- Curley v. Latreille scr-60-131
- Loi de la Silretg provinciale et de la police des liqueurs Loi de la Silretg provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, supra
- Cette Loi de la SiretM provinciale et de la police des liqueurs Cette Loi de la SiretM provinciale et de la police des liqueurs, supra
- Planiol et Ripert A I'article 1403 Planiol et Ripert A I'article 1403, supra
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- s. 7 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act
- s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act
- s. 5 of the Magistrate's Privilege Act
- s. 7
- s. 5
- s. 24
- Section 24 of the Provincial Police Act
- Section 24 of the Quebec Provincial Police Force Act
- s. 24 of the Quebec Provincial Police Force Act
- ss s. 24 of the Provincial Police Act
- s. 36 of the Provincial Police Act