Majority — Van J.
Syllabus
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts out of which this suit arose are fully set forth in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, ante, p. 100, and need
Our jurisdiction is challenged, by a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final. The motion is well taken if the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was invoked solely on the ground of diverse citizenship. Act of- March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826 ,-c. 517, §6; Judicial Code, § 128. That it was invoked on that ground is conceded, so it is necessary to inquire whether,. as is asserted in opposition to the motion, it was also invoked upon the ground that the suit was one arising under the Constitution of the United States. This must be determined from the plaintiff’s statement of its own cause of action as set forth in the bill, regardless of questions that may have been subsequently brought into the suit. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561 , 569; Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123 .
Briefly described, the bill set forth the .adoption by the city council of the franchise ordinance of 1884, its acceptance by the Thompson Company, the construction and installation of the electric plant, the transfer of the plant and franchise to the Electric Company in 1903, the business done by the .two companies in supplying current for power and heating, as well as for lighting, purposes, the enlargement and improvement of the plant from time to time to meet the increasing demand for current. for those purposes, the city’s acquiescence in and encouragement and sanction of all this with knowledge
The relief sought was a perpetual injunction restraining th.e defendants from disconnecting the plaintiff’s wires or interfering with or impeding its business as theretofore conducted. There was no prayer that the resolution be pronounced void, nor any allegation that it impaired the franchise contract or- would operate to deprive the plaintiff of' its' property without due process of law, nor any reference to the Constitution of the United States, or any of its provisions, nor even a general statement that a constitutional right was being or about to be infringed. •
Tested by the recognized standard, we think the bill did not state a case arising under the Constitution. It did not show, either in terms or by necessary intendment, that the plaintiff was asserting a right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution or was in anywise invoking its’protection.. For anything that appeared the plaintiff was planting its right to relief entirely upon the doctrine of estoppel. As a basis of jurisdiction, it is not enough that recovery might be sought • upon ' a constitutional
It being thus apparent that diverse citizenship, was the sole ground upon which the jurisdiction of the Circuit •Court was invoked, it follows that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was final. Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 191 U. S. 526 ; Bankers Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis &c. Railway Co., 192 U. S. 371 ; Shulthis v. McDougal, supra; Lovell v. Newman, 227 U. S. 412 ; Denver v. New York Trust Co., supra.
Appeal dismissed.
Mr. Justice Holmes took no part in the consideration and. decision of this case.
Cases cited
- Shulthis v. McDougal 225 U. S. 561 p. 124, p. 126
- City & County of Denver v. New York Trust Co. 229 U. S. 123 p. 124, p. 126
- Crowell v. Randell 10 Pet. 368 p. 126
- Hanford v. Davies 163 U. S. 273 p. 126
- Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co. 191 U. S. 526 p. 126
- Bankers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Railway Co. 192 U. S. 371 p. 126
- Lovell v. Newman 227 U. S. 412 p. 126