Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart

delivered the opinion of the court.

While employed by Knickerbocker Ice Company as bargeman and doing work of a maritime nature, William M. Stewart fell into the Hudson River and drowned— August 3, 1918. His widow, defendant in error, claimed under the Workmen’s Compensation Law of New York; the Industrial Commission granted an award against the Company for her and the minor children; arid both Ap

We also pointed out that the saving clause taken from the original Judiciary Act had no application, since, at most, it only specified common-law remedies, whereas the remedy prescribed by the compensation law was unknown to the common law and incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court. Moreover, if applied to maritime affairs, the statute would obstruct the policy of Congress to encourage investments in ships.

In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co. (June, 1918), 247 U. S. 372 , an action at law seeking full indemnity for injuries received by a sailor while on shipboard, we said: “Under the doctrine approved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, no State has power to abolish the well recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute therefor the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such substitution .would distinctly and definitely

In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 308 , an admiralty cause, a master sought to recover damages for breach of an oral contract with the owner of a vessel for services to be performed principally upon the sea. The latter claimed invalidity of the contract under a statute of California, where made, because not in writing and not to be performed within a year. We ruled: “The Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that this contract was maritime in its nature and an action in admiralty thereon for its breach could not be defeated by the statute of

As the plain result of these recent opinions and the earlier cases upon which they are based, we accept the following doctrine: The Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of the laws of the United States, approved rules of the general maritime law and empowered Congress to legislate in respect of them and other matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, it took from the States all power, by legislation or judicial decision, to contravene the essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, characteristic features of such law or to interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations. To preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime matters and bring’ them within control of the Federal Government was the fundamental purpose; and to such definite end Congress was empowered to legislate within that sphere.

Since the beginning, federal courts have recognized and applied the rules and principles of maritime law as something distinct from laws of the several States — not derived from or dependent on their will. The foundation of the right to do this, the purpose for which it was granted, and •the nature of the system so administered, were distinctly pointed out long ago. “That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot

The distinction between the indicated situation created by the Constitution relative to maritime affairs and the one resulting from the mere grant of power to regulate commerce without more, should not be forgotten. Also, it should be noted that federal laws are constantly applied in state courts — unless inhibited their duty so requires. Constitution, Article VI, clause 2; Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 55; Consequently mere reservation of partially concurrent cognizance to such courts by an act of Congress conferring an otherwise exclusive jurisdiction upon national courts, could not create substantive rights or obligations or indicate assent to their creation by the States.

When considered with former decisions of this court, a satisfactory interpretation of the Act of October 6, 1917, is difficult, perhaps impossible. The Howell, 257 Fed. Rep. 578 , and Rhode v. Grant Smith Porter Co., 259 Fed. Rep. 304 , illustrate some of the uncertainties. In the.

Having regard to all these things, we conclude that Congress undertook .to permit application of Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the several States to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and to save such statutes from the objections pointed out by Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen. It sought to authorize and sanction action by the States in prescribing and enforcing, as to all parties concerned, rights, obligations, liabilities.

And so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their enforcement, arises from the Constitution, as above indicated. The definite object of the grant was,to commit direct control to the Federal Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union.

Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite end for which such rules were accepted, we must conclude that in their characteristic features and essential international and interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended or changed except by legislation which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress. The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to it's discretion — not for delegation to others. To say that because Congress could have enacted a compensation act applicable to maritime injuries, it could authorize the States to do so as they might desire, is false reasoning. Moreover, such an authorization would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated but actually established — it would defeat the very purpose of the grant. See Sudden & Christenson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 188 Pac. Rep. 803 .

Congress cannot transfer its legislative power to the States — by nature this is non-delegable. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 , 560; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 692; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 , 496; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 119 , 126; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 , 214.

In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.

The reasoning of that opinion proceeded upon the postulate that because of the.peculiar nature of intoxicants which gives enlarged power concerning them, Congress might go so far as entirely to prohibit their, transportation in interstate commerce.. The statute did less. “We can see no reason for saying that although Congress in. view of the nature and character of intoxicants had a power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the authority to so deal with the subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by the Webb-Kenyon Law) making it impossible for one State to violate the prohibitions of the laws of another through the channels of interstate commerce. Indeed, we can see' no escape from the conclusion that if we accepted the proposition urged, we would be obliged to announce the contradiction in terms that because Congress had exerted a regulation lesser'in power than it was authorized to exert, therefore its action was void for excess of power.” See Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93 , 97.

In The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , an admiralty proceeding, effect was given, as against a ship registered in Delaware, to a statute of that State which permitted recovery by an ordinary action for fatal injuries, and the power of a State to supplement the maritime law to that extent was recognized. But here the state enactment prescribes exclusive rights and liabilities, undertakes .to secure their observance by heavy penalties and onerous conditions, and provides novel remedies incapable of enforcement by an admiralty court. See New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 ; New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra. The doctrine of The Hamilton may not be extended to such a situation.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to take further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

dissenting.

In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 , the question was whether there was anything in the Constitution or laws of the United States to prevent a State from imposing upon an employer a limited but absolute liability for the death of an employee upon a gang-plank between a vessel and a -wharf, which the Staté unques

I do not suppose that anyone would say that the words, “The judicial power shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” Const. Art. Ill, § 3, by implication enacted a whole code for master and servant at sea, that could be modified only by a constitutional amendment. But somehow or other the ordinary common-law rules of liability as between master and servant have come to be applied to a considerable extent in the admiralty. If my explanation, that the source is the common law of the several States, is not accepted, I can only say, I do not know how, unless by the fiat of the judges. But surely the power that imposed the liability can change it, and I suppose that Congress can do as much as the judges who introduced the rules. For we know that they were introduced and cannot have been elicited by logic alone from the mediaeval sea laws.

But if Congress can legislate it has done so. It has adopted statutes that were in force when the Act of October 6, 1917, was passed, and to that extent has acted as definitely as if it had repeated the words used by the

I thought that Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 , went pretty far in justifying the adoption of state legislation in advance, as I cannot for a moment believe that apart from the Eighteenth Amendment special constitutional principles exist against strong drink. The fathers of the Constitution so far as I know approved it. But I can see no constitutional objection to such an adoption in this case if the act of Congress be given that effect. I assume that Congress could not delegate to state legislatures the simple power to decide what the law of the United States should be in that district. But when institutions are established for ends within the power of the States and not for any purpose of affecting the law of the United States, I take it to be an admitted power of Congress to provide that the law of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be to what for the time being exists. A familiar example is the law directing the common-law practice, &c., in the District Courts to “conform, as near as may be, to the practice,” &c;, “existing at the time” in the State Courts. Rev. Stats., § 914. This was held by the unanimous Court to be binding in Amy v. Watertown, No. 1, 130 U. S. 301 . See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 , 207, 208; Cooley v. Board, of Wardens, 12 How. 299 , 317, 318. I have mentioned the scope given to the saving of a common-law remedy and 'have referred to cases on the statutes adopting state pilotage laws. Other instances are to be found in the acts of Congress, but these are enough. I think that the same principle applies here. It should be observed that the objection now dealt with is the only one peculiar to the adoption of local law in advance. That of

Mr. Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Bbandeis and Mr. Justice Claeke concur in this opinion.