Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought by the Merchants Elevator Company in a state court of Minnesota against the Great Northern Railway Company and the Director General to recover $80 alleged to have been exacted in violation of the carrier’s tariff. That sum had been demanded by the carrier, under Rule 10 of its .tariff, as a reconsignment charge, at the rate of $5 a car, for sixteen cars of corn shipped from points in Iowa and Nebraska to Willmar, Minnesota, and after inspection there rebilled to Anoka, a station beyond. The tariff rate from, the points of origin via Willmar to Anoka was the same as to Willmar. Will-mar had been named as destination in the original bill of lading, only because it is the place at which grain coming into the State by this route is inspected and graded under the laws of Minnesota and of the United States; and the carrier knew, or should have known, that fact. • Immediately after inspection disposition orders were given and the original bills of lading were surrendered in exchange for billing to Anoka. Rule 10 read:

“ Diversion or re'consignment to points outside switching limits before placement: If a car is diverted, recohsigned or reforwarded on orders placed with the local freight agent or other designated officer after arrival of car at original destination, but before placement for unloading, ... a charge of $5.00 per car will be made if car is diverted, reconsigned or reforwarded to a point outside of switching limits of original destination.”

The shipper contended that the case was within the exception known as Exception (a), as amended by Supplement One, which provided that rules (including Rule 10) shall not apply to:

• “(a) Grain, seed (field), seed (grass), hay or straw, carloads, held in cars on track for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto at billed destination or at point intermediate thereto.”

Whether the charge was payable depended solely upon a question of construction; that is, whether the body of the ruló or the exception to it applied. On this question, there was room for reasonable difference of opinion. The carrier, relying particularly upon Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U. S. 138 , and Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 43 , claimed seasonably that until the true, construction of the tariff had been determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the trial court was without jurisdiction. That court overruled the objection; construed the exception to mean that cars of grain are exempted from Rule 10 if held on track at billed destination for inspection and for “ disposition orders ” incident to such inspection; held that the disposition order may be .an order to make disposition by way of reconsignment to another destination and that forwarding to Anoka was such disposition; and entered judgment for •the shipper. That judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Cóurt of the State on the authority of Reliance Elevator Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 139 Minn.

The contention that courts are without jurisdiction of cases involving a disputed question of construction of an interstate tariff, unless there has been a preliminary resort to the Commission for its decision, rests, in the main, upon the following argument. The purpose of the Act to Regulate Commerce is to secure and preserve uniformity. Hence, the carrier is required to file tariffs establishing uniform rates and charges, and is prohibited from exacting or accepting any payment not set forth in the tariff. Uniformity is impossible, if the several courts, state or federal, are permitted, in case of disputed construction, to determine what the rate or charge is which the tariff prescribes.' To ensure uniformity the true construction must, in case of dispute, be determined by the Commission.

This argument is unsound. It is true, that uniformity is the paramount purpose of the Commerce Act. But it is not true that uniformity in construction of a tariff can be attained only through a preliminary resort to the Commission to settle the construction in dispute. Every' question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question of law; and where the question-concerns an interstate tariff it is one of fedéral law. If the parties properly preserve their rights, a construction given by any court, whether it be federal or state, may ultimately be reviewed by this court either on writ of error or on writ of certiorari; and

Whenever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable or as unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Commission. Sometimes this is required because the function being exercised is in its nature administrative in contradistinction to judicial. But ordinarily the determining factor is not the character of the function, but the character of the controverted question and the nature of the enquiry necessary for its solution. To determine what rate, rule or practice shall be deemed reasonable for the future is a legislative or administrative function. To determine whether a shipper has in the past been wronged by the exaction of an unreasonable or discriminatory rate is a judicial function. Preliminary resort to the Commission is required alike in the two classes of cases. It is required because the enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a body of experts. But what construction shall be given to a railroad tariff presents* ordinarily a question of law which does not differ in character from those presented when the construction of any other document is in dispute.

When, the words of a written instrument are used in their ordinary meaning, their construction presents a question solely of law. But words are used sometimes in a peculiar meaning. Then extrinsic evidence may be neces

In the case at bar the situation is entirely different from that presented in the American Tie & Timber Co. Case, or in the Loomis Case. Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in controversy; and there is no occasion for the exercise of administrative discretion. The task to be performed is to ‘determine the meaning of words of the tariff which were used in their ordinary sense and to apply that ■meaning to the undisputed facts. That operation was solely one of construction; and preliminary resort to the Commission was, therefore, unnecessary. The petition for certiorari was asked for on the ground that the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in this cáse was in conflict' with the above decisions of this court and also that the decisions in several state courts and in the lower federal courts were in serious conflict on the question involved. In the brief and argument on the merits, it was also asserted that some recent decisions of this court are in conflict with the rule declared and applied in the American Tie & Timber Co. Case, supra, and the Loomis

Affirmed.