Majority — Reed J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal requires determination of the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, to establish reasonable requirements with respect to the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of motor carriers, other than employees whose duties affect safety of operation.
After detailed consideration, the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, was passed.[1] It followed generally the suggestion of form made by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation.[2] The difficulty and wide scope of the problems raised by the growth of the motor carrier industry were obvious. Congress sought to set out its purpose and the range of its action in a declaration of policy which covered the preservation and fostering of motor transportation in the public interest, tariffs, the coordination of motor carriage with other forms of transportation and cooperation with the several states in their efforts to systematize ■ the industry.[3]
While efficient and economical movement in interstate commerce is obviously a major objective of the Act,[4] there are numerous provisions which make it clear that Congress intended to exercise its powers in the non-transpor
1 49 Stat. 543 .
2 S. Doc. No. 152, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., Regulation of Transportation Agencies, p. 350. See p. 25, for discussion of the preliminary steps of motor carrier regulation. Hearings on Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers, H. R. 5262 and H. R. 6016, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, • 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings on S. 1629, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, ,74th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 § 202; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 .
4 §§ 202, 216, 217, 218.
The pertinent portions of the section of the Act immediately under discussion read as follows:
“Sec. 204 (a). It shall be the duty of the Commission—
“(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.
“(2) To regulate contract carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.
“(3) To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation, and to that end prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of equipment . . .” Shortly after the approval of the Act, the Commission on its own motion undertook to and did fix maximum hours
5 Services, § 203 (a) (19); brokers, § 203 (a) (18), § 204 (a) (4); security issues, § 214; insurance, § 215; accounts, records and reports, § 220.
6 Maurer v. Hamilton, supra; Regulation of Transportation Agencies, supra, Highway and Safety Regulations, p. 32; Hearings on S. 1629, supra, pp. 122-123, 184.
of service for “employees whose functions in the operation of motor vehicles make such regulations desirable because of safety considerations.”[7] A few months after this determination, the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted.[8] Section 7 of this act limits the work-week at the normal rate of pay of all employees subject to its terms and § 18 makes the maximum hours of the Fair Labor Standards Act subject to further reduction by applicable federal or state law or municipal ordinances. There were certain employees excepted, however, from these regulations by | 13 (b). It reads as follows:
“Sec. 13 (b). The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935; . . .”
This exemption brought sharply into focus the coverage of employees by Motor Carrier Act, § 204 (a). Clerical, storage and other non-transportation workers are under this or the Fair Labor Standards Act, depéndent upon the sweep of the word employee in this act. The Commission again examined the question of its jurisdiction and in Ex parte No. MC-28[9] again reached the conclusion that its power under “section 204 (a) (1) and (2) is limited to prescribing qualifications and maximum hours of service for those employees . . . whose activities affect the safety of operation.” It added: “The provisions of section 202 evince a clear intent of Congress to limit our jurisdiction to regulating the motor-carrier industry as a part of the transportation system of the nation. To extend that regulation to features which are not char
7 Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M. C. C. 665, 667.
8 52 Stat. 1060 .
9 13 M. C. C. 481, 488.
Shortly thereafter appellees, an association of truckmen and various common carriers by motor, filed a petition with the Commission in the present case seeking an exercise of the Commission’s jurisdiction under § 204 (a) to fix reasonable requirements “with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of all employees of common and contract carriers, except employees whose duties are related to safety of operations; (3) to disregard its report and order in Ex parte MC-28.”[12] The Commission reaffirmed its position and denied the petition. The appellees petitioned a three-judge district court to compel the Commission to take jurisdiction and consider the establishment of qualifications and hours of service of all employees of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle.[13] The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division was permitted to intervene.[14] The district court reversed the Commission, set aside its order and directed it to take jurisdiction of the appellees’ petition. 31 F. Supp. 35 . A direct appeal to this Court was granted.[15]
In the broad domain of social legislation few problems are enmeshed with the difficulties that surround a de
10 13 M. C. C. 481, 489.
11 Interpretative-Bulletin No. 9, Wage & Hour Manual (1940) 168.
12 § 204 (a) (1), (6) and (7) (e); Rules of Practice I. C. C., April 1, 1936, Rule XV.
13 § 205 (h), Motor Carrier Act; Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 220 , 28 U. S. C. §§ 47 , 47a.
14 Cf. Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., ante, p. 434.
15 Judicial Code § 238; 38 Stat. 208 , 219-20; 49 Stat. 543 , § 205 (h).
In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.[16] There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. To ■ take a few words from their context and with them thus isolated to attempt to- determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly in
16 Story, J., in Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank, 1 Peters 46 , 64: “But no general rule can be laid down upon this subject, further than that that exposition ought to be adopted in this, as in other cases, which carries into effect the true intent and object of the legislature in the enactment.” Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch 33 , 59; James v. Milwaukee, 16 Wall. 159 , 161; Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272 , 301; White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545 , 551; Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178 , 194; United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U. S. 225 , 239; Gulf States Steel Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 32 , 45; Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & M. Co., 289 U. S. 165 , 169; Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U. S. 373 , 376; Foster v. United States, 303 U. S. 118 , 120.
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.[18] When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.[19] Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one “plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole”[20] this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.[21] When aid to construction of
17 Cf. Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of their Policy by the English Courts, 35 Columbia Law Review 519; Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harvard Law Review 863; Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 Harvard Law Review 886; R. Powell, Construction of Written Instruments, 14 Indiana Law Journal 199, 309, 324; Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule, 25 Washington University Law Quarterly 2.
18 Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 351 , 359; Helvering v. City Bank Co., 296 U. S. 85 , 89; Wilbur v. United States, 284 U. S. 231 , 237; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 , 60; United States v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 278 U. S. 269 , 278; Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 , 253; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 , 490; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184 , 199.
19 Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315 , 332; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435 , 446; United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167 , 176.
20 Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178 , 194.
21 Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U. S. 121 , 126; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1 , 14; Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379 ; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 ; Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 ; Maurer v. Hamilton, supra, pp. 612, 615 .
The language here under consideration, if construed as appellees contend, gives to the Commission a power of regulation as to qualifications and hours of employees quite distinct from the settled practice of Congress. That policy has been consistent in legislating for such regulation of transportation employees in matters of movement
22 Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41 , 48.
23 Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 , 465.
24 Cf. Committee on Ministers’ Powers Report (Cmd. 4060, 1932), p. 135.
25 United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U. S. 386 , 396; United States v. Arizona, 295 U. S. 174 , 188, 191; Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381 , 394; Ozawa v. United States, supra.
26 34 Stat. 1415 .
27 38 Stat. 1164 , 1169, 1170-84.
28 52 Stat. 1007 , § 601 (a) (5). This authority has apparently been exercised only as to pilots and copilots. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Air Commerce, Civil Air Regulations, No. 61, ■ Scheduled. Airline Rules (Interstate), as amended to May 31, 1938, §§ 61.518— 61.5185.
29 That the word “employees” is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning is apparent from an examination of recent legislation. Thus- the Social Security Act specifically provides that “The term 'employee’ includes an officer of a corporation,” ( 42 U. S. C. § 1301 (a) (6)) while the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically exempts “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity. . . .” *546 ( 29 U. S. C. § 213 (a) (1)). In the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, Congress expressly recognized the variable meaning of employee even when defined at length and used only in a single act: . . 'employee’ (except when used in phrases establishing a different meaning) means . . ( 45 U. S. C. § 351 (d)). In a statute permitting heads of departments to settle claims up to $1,000 arising from the negligence of “employees of the Government,” Congress gives recognition to the fact that the term is not on its face all-inclusive by providing: “‘Employee’ shall include enlisted men in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.” ( 31 U. S. C. §§ 215 , 216.) See also the varying definitions of “employees” in the following statutes: Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U. S. C. § 228a (b) (c); Interstate Com-, meree Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (7); Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 49 U. S. C. § 251 (f); Communications Act, 47 U. S. C. § 210 ; National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3); Maritime Labor Relations Act, 46 U. S. C. § 1253 (c); Classification Act of 1923 (Civil Service), 5 U. S. C. § 662 ; U. S. Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U. S. C. § 790 ; Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 902 ; Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U. S. C. § 22 ; Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 (5). Where the term “employee” has been used in statutes without particularized definition it has not been treated by the courts as a word of definite content. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 , 520 (consulting engineers performing services for states, municipalities, and water districts held not to be “employees” under statute exempting “officers and employees under . . . any State, ... or any local subdivision thereof” from the income tax); Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U. S. 85 (mineral surveyor, appointed by the surveyor but paid by private persons, is within prohibition of statute prohibiting “em-ployés in the General Land Office” from purchasing public land); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railway Employees’ Dept., 93 F. 2d 340 (furloughed railroad workers entitled to priority in rehiring held “employees” within meaning of Railway Labor Act), discussed in 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1299 ; Latta v. Lonsdale, 107 F. 585 (attorney not “employee” within meaning of statute giving “employees” preference against assets of insolvent corporations); Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220 (contractor who built lines for telegraph company not “em *547 ployee” within statute giving employees liens against corporate property); Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 86 F. 192 (same); cf. United States v. Griffith, 55 App. D. C. 123 ; 2 F. 2d 925 (War Department clerk receiving disability compensation held employee of government within common law rule of the District of Columbia that employee of a litigant cannot be a member of jury); see also, Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 252 U. S. 475 ; Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501 ; Campbell v. Commissioner, 87 F. 2d 128 ; Burnet v. Jones, 50 F. 2d 14 ; Burnet v. McDonough, 46 F. 2d 944 .
30 S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 S. Doc. 152, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 352, § 304 (a) (1).
32 See the testimony of Mr. McManamy in Hearings on S. 1629 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 122, 123: “The regulation of the horns of service of bus and truck operators is far more important from a safety standpoint than the regulation of the hours of service of railroad employees because the danger is greater. . . . This could be accomplished by inserting in section 304 (a) (1) and (2), lines 9 and 15, page 8, following the word 'records’ in both lines, the words which appear in S. 394, as follows: 'qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees.’ ” The clause in question came from § 2 (a) (1) of S. 394, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., a subsection otherwise substantially like the corresponding subsection in S. 1629. Senator Wheeler, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce and sponsor of the bill, explained the provision on the floor of the Senate: “. . . the committee amended paragraphs (1) and (2) [of § 204] to confer power on the Commission to establish reasonable requirements with respect to the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of common and contract carriers, . . . *548 This suggestion came to us, I tbink, from the chairman of the legislative committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission. . . . “In order to make the highways more safe, and so that common and contract carriers may not be unduly prejudiced in their competition with peddler trucks and other private operators of motor trucks, a provision was added in subparagraph 3 giving the Commission authority to establish similar requirements with respect to the qualifications and hours of service of the employees of such operators. . . .” 79 Cong. Ree. 5652.
33 S. Rep. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. The report stated: “No regulation is proposed for private carriers except that an- amendment adopted in committee authorizes the Commission to regulate the ‘qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment’ of private carriers of property by. motor vehicle in the event that • the Commission determines. there is need for such regulation. Other amendments adopted by the committee confer like authority upon the Commission with respect to common and contract carriers.” Safety of operation and equipment was in the original bill.
34 See last paragraph of remarks of Senator Wheeler, note 32 supra.
35 Hearings, note 32 supra.
The Commission and the Wage and Hour Division, as we have said, have both interpreted § 204 (a) as relating solely to safety of operation. In any case such interpretations are entitled to great weight. This is peculiarly. true here 'where the interpretations involve “contemporaneous contraction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”[38] Furthermore, the Commission’s interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission which suggested the provisions’ enactment to Congress.[39]
It is important to remember that the Commission has three times concluded that its authority was limited to securing safety of operation. The first interpretation was made on "December 29,1937, when the Commission stated: “ . . . until the Congress shall have given us a more particular and definite command in the premises, we shall limit our regulations concerning maximum hours of service to those employees whose functions in the operation of motor vehicles make such regulations desirable because of safety considerations.”[40] This expression was half a year old when Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act with the exemption of § 13 (b) (1). Seemingly the
36 79 Cong. Rec. 12206.
37 H. R. Rep. No. 1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
38 Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 , 315.
39 Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 , 310.
40 Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M. C. C. 665, 667.
It is contended by appellees that the difference in language between subsections (1) and (2) and subsection (3) is indicative of a congressional purpose to restrict the regulation of employees of private carriers to “safety of operation” while inserting broader authority in (1) and (2) for employees of common and contract carriers. Appellants answer that the difference in language is explained by the difference in the powers. As (1) and (2) give powers beyond safety for service, goods, accounts and records, language limiting those subsections to safety would be inapt.
Appellees call our attention to certain pending legislation as sustaining their view of the congressional purpose in enacting the Motor Carrier Act. We do not think it can be said that the action of the Senate and House of Representatives on this pending transportation legislation throws much light on the policy of Congress or the meaning attributed by that body to § 204 (a). Aside from the very pertinent fact that the legislation is still unadopted, the legislative history up to now points only to a hesitation to determine a controversy as to the meaning of the present Motor Carrier Act, pending a judicial determination.[42]
41 81 Cong. Rec. 7875.
42 The pending legislation is S. 2009, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong. Rec. 3509. As to the point here under discussion, the report of the Senate Committee said: “Paragraph (1) of section 34 of the bill is based on the provisions of subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 204 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act. In the original draft, there was inserted at the beginning of the paragraph the clause ‘in order to promote safety of operations/ thus making clear that the Commis *551 sion’s power to regulate qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees is confined to those who have anything to do with safety of operation. This is a question with respect to which considerable doubt seems to have arisen under the wording of the present law. Upon the strenuous objection of the truckers claiming conflict between this law and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the bill [i. e., the committee amendment] restores the law to the present provisions of the Motor Carrier Act.” S. Rep. No. 433, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 24. The bill passed the Senate. The House bill left § 204 (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the present act unchanged. 84 Cong. Rec. 9459; H. R. Rep. No. 1217, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 Cong. Rec. 10125. While the bills were in conference the Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission sent to the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees a letter on the House and Senate bills which suggested that both bills explicitly limit the Commission’s jurisdiction over qualifications and hours of service of employees to considerations of safety. The letter stated: “While the subsection [in the Senate bill] follows the existing language of section 204 . . ., a controversy has arisen in regard to the meaning of that language. . . . This controversy has now reached the Supreme Court. We think it may well be determined in this new legislation. In our judgment, if restrictions on hours of labor for social and economic reasons are to be imposed, this should be done by Congress, and no duty in that respect should be delegated to the Commission, which has no experience which particularly fits it for the performance of such a duty. Our authority over qualifications and hours of service of employees should, therefore, be confined to the needs of safety in operation. . . .” On April 26, 1940, the House conferees reported to the House a compromise bill agreed on by the conference committee which left § 204 (a) (1), (2), and (3) of the Motor Carrier Act unamended. 86 Cong. Rec. 7847; H. R. Rep. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. On May 9, 1940, the House because of disagreement with sections of this bill not here relevant voted to recommit the bill to the conference committee. 86 Cong. Rec. 8986.
43 “(b) Nothing in this part, except the provisions of section relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment shall be construed to include (1) motor vehicles employed solely in transporting *552 school children and teachers to or from school; or (2) taxicabs, or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide taxicab service, having a capacity of not more than six passengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed termini; or (3) motor vehicles owned or operated by or on behalf of hotels and used exclusively for the transportation of hotel patrons between hotels and local railroad or other common carrier stations; or (4) motor vehicles operated, under authorization, regulation, and control of the Secretary of the Interior, principally for the purpose of transporting persons in and about the national parks and national monuments; or (4a) motor vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and used in the transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof, or in the transportation of supplies to his farm; or (4b) motor vehicles controlled and operated by a cooperative association as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act, approved June 15, 1929, as amended; or (5) trolley busses operated by electric power derived from a fixed overhead wire, furnishing local passenger transportation similar to street-railway service; or (6) motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products thereof); or (7) motor vehicles used exclusively in the distribution of newspapers; nor, unless and to the extent that the Commission shall from time to time find that such application is necessary to carry out the policy of Congress enunciated in section 202, shall the provisions of this, part, except the provisions of section 804 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment apply to: (8) The transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or municipalities, except when such transportation is under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment to or from a point without such municipality, municipalities, or zone, and provided that the motor carrier engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or irregular route .or routes in interstate commerce is also lawfully engaged in the intrastate transportation of passengers over the entire length of such interstate route or routes in accordance with the laws of each *553 State having jurisdiction; or (9) the casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business.”
Our conclusion, in view of the circumstances set out in this opinion, is that the meaning of employees in § 204 (a) (1) and (2) is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation. The Commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications or hours of service of any others. The decree of the district court is accordingly reversed and it is directed to dismiss the complaint of the appellees.
Reversed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Roberts are of opinion that the decree should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion of the district court, 31 F. Supp. 35 .
44 H. R. Rep. No.. 1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.