Majority — Black J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the effect a federal District Court should give to state court proceedings attaching, while appeal is pending, a judgment previously rendered by the federal court.
Respondent, Lincoln Mine Operating Company, obtained judgment against petitioner, Huron Holding Corporation, in the federal District Court for Idaho. Pending appeal of this judgment to the Circuit Court of Appeals, a New York creditor of Lincoln brought suit on a promissory note against Lincoln in a state court of New York. Upon a showing that Lincoln was an Idaho corporation, the New York court caused a warrant of attachment to issue against Lincoln’s New York property.[1] In accordance with New York law,[2] summons upon Lincoln was served by a Deputy Sheriff of Ada County, Idaho. Huron, a New York corporation, answered the warrant of attachment served upon it in New York and admitted that it was the defendant against which judgment in favor of Lincoln had been en
1 Sections 902 and 903 of Art. 54 of the New York Civil Practice Act authorize courts to issue warrants of attachment against defendants shown to be foreign corporations in actions against them based on "Breach of contract, express or implied, . . .”
2 Section 233, Art. 25, New York Civil Practice Act.
Petitioner contends that the attachment was valid under the New York law, and should have been given full effect by the federal court. It is respondent’s contention that (1) the attachment proceedings were void; and (2) even if not void, the District Court should not have given effect to them, for the reason that this would be tantamount to an improper deprivation of Lincoln’s right to prosecute its suit in the District Court to full payment of the judgment.
6 Herrmann & Grace v. City of New York, 130 App. Div. 531 ; 114 N. Y. S. 1107 , 1110, affirmed, 199 N. Y. 600 ; 93 N. E. 376 . Other cases cited by respondent which get out the same general principle are: Fredrick v. Chicago Bearing Metal Co., 221 App. Div. 588 ; 224 N. Y. S. 629 , 630; Reifman v. Warfield Co., 170 Misc. 8 ; 8 N. Y. S. 2d 591 , 592; Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N. Y. 44 , 47; 193 N. E. 633 .
Second. Respondent’s next contention is that even though Huron was compelled to pay the New York judgment as a result of attachment proceedings fully authorized by the New York statutes, the Idaho federal court not only can but should require a second payment of the same amount. The Circuit Court of Appeals so held. But since Huron, owing a judgment debt to Lincoln, paid it to a creditor of Lincoln under a valid New York judgment, it certainly should not be required to pay it a second time, except for the most compelling reasons. “It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over.”[10]
It has not been urged here, nor was it urged in the courts below, that Huron was guilty of any negligence, misconduct or fraud in connection with the New York judgment. It has not been claimed that there was a failure to give Lincoln notice of the New York suit against it. No federal statute or constitutional provision is invoked as supporting the contention that the Idaho federal court was under a duty to disregard the effect of the payment made by Huron under the compulsion
7 Shipman Coal Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 219 App. Div. 312 ; 219 N. Y. S. 628 , affirmed, 245 N. Y. 567 ; 157 N. E. 859 . In determining what is the law of a state, we look to the decisions of lower state courts as well as to those of the state’s highest court, and follow the same line of inquiry recently pointed out in West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 223 . And see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 .
8 E. g., Railway Co. v. Twombly, 100 U. S. 78 ; Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499 .
Another case relied on by respondent is Wabash Railroad Co. v. Tourville, 179 U. S. 322 . But that case, involving actions in the courts of two states rather than in a state and a federal court, as here, does not support respondent’s contention. In that case this Court did not hold that state laws with reference to attachment and garnishment should not be given effect. On the contrary it based its decision upon a holding by the Missouri appellate court that the Illinois garnishment was void for failure to comply with statutory requirements, and upon a ruling by the Missouri Supreme Court “that the judgment was foreign to Illinois, and therefore not subject to garnishment there.”*[11] After basing its judgment on these grounds, the Court added a last statement to the effect that “This Court has held that to the validity of a plea of attachment the attachment must have preceded the commencement of the suit in which the plea is made. Wallace v. M’Connell, 13 Pet. 136 .” Whatever may be the present day effect of the principle announced in Wallace v. M’Connell and reasserted in the Tourville case,
10 Cf. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456 , 466; Insurance Company v. Harris, 97 U. S. 331 .
11 If by this the Court meant that under Illinois law such a judgment was not subject to garnishment, the case is nothing more than a holding that one state need not give full faith and credit to a void act of a sister state. But both the Missouri Supreme Court ( 148 Mo. 614 , 624; 50 S. W. 300 ) and this Court ( 179 U. S. 322 , 327) cited Drake on Attachments (7th ed. 1891) § 625 for the proposition that by the weight of authority a judgment of one court was not subject to attachment in another court. This citation of the “weight of authority” might indicate that this Court was deciding the issue as a question of “general law,” under Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 . If so, this aspect of the decision is no longer of any weight. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 .
It is our opinion that no such broad general rule exists. This does not, however, mean that a court which has rendered a judgment is without power to exercise jurisdiction, when properly invoked, to adjudicate newly asserted rights related to the judgment debt. It does mean that later opinions of this Court have undermined the basic reasoning upon which Justice Bradley relied in declaring that judgments in a federal court were never
12 E. g., Thomas v. Wooldridge, 23 Fed. Cas. 986, No. 13,918; United Stales Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp. v. Hirsch Lumber Co., 59 App. D. C. 116 ; 35 F. 2d 1010 ; Elson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 154 Iowa 96 ; 134 N. W. 547 . Contra: Shipman Coal Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 219 App. Div. 312 ; 219 N. Y. S. 628 ; affirmed, 245 N. Y. 567 ; 157 N. E. 859 ; Fithian v. New York & Erie R. Co., 31 Pa. 114 . And compare McNish v. Burch, 49 S. D. 215 ; 207 N. W. 85 , with Hardwick v. Harris, 22 N. M. 394 ; 163 P. 253 .
Further, we do not here, as in Wallace v. M’Connell, have a case in which two courts are proceeding in the same matter at the same time. The New York court has proceeded under New York law to final judgment. It has compelled obedience to its judgment. The New York proceedings did not arrest or take away the right of Lincoln to try out its issues with Huron in the federal court for Idaho. Those issues had already been tried and determined in that court, and its jurisdiction to adjust and adjudicate newly asserted rights relating to the judgment had not been invoked. There was therefore no possibility of collision between the two courts, for similar issues were not pending before them at the same
13 E. g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215 , 222; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176 , 178; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620 .
14 1 Stat. 122 , as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 687 . And see note 17, infra.
Both the Idaho federal court and the New York state court decided matters within the respective authority of each. To give effect to the judgment rendered in the New York attachment proceedings cannot, in any manner, interfere with the jurisdiction of the Idaho court. While the Idaho court did have authority to issue an execution for the collection of an ünpaid judgment, it would not have enforced an execution for the benefit of Lincoln if the judgment had previously been paid directly to Lincoln. Nor should it issue an execution when the money was paid to Lincoln’s creditors by reason of valid attachment proceedings. For this would be to exercise the jurisdiction of a federal court to render ineffective that protection which a garnishee should be afforded by reason of having obeyed a judgment rendered by a state in the exercise of its constitutional power over persons and property within its territory.[16] To take ^uch a step would constitute a denial of that full faith and credit which a federal court should give to the acts of a state court.[17]
The District Court properly ordered that its judgment be marked satisfied, and correctly refused to render judgment on the supersedeas bond. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgments of the District Court are affirmed.
Reversed.
15 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 , 275.
16 Cf. United States v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276 , 281-282.
17 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , 733; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 , 521; Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555 , 567-568; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 , 39-40.
Cases cited
- Wallace v. M'Connell 13 Pet. 136 p. 190, p. 191, p. 192, p. 193
- Wabash Railroad v. Tourville 179 U. S. 322 p. 191