Majority
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Taylor Law proscription against strikes by public employees neither preempts the right of persons injured by an unlawful strike to sue for damages nor provides a private right to sue for violation of its provisions. The causes of action pleaded by plaintiffs are, however, either not recognized under New York law or as pleaded do not sufficiently state a cause of action. The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
I
This appeal involves separate action by two New York City law firms to recover damages resulting from the
The second action, begun in New York County by Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman (“Jackson, Lewis”), likewise alleges an intentional strike in violation of the statute and preliminary injunction. It was, however, brought only against the TWU and its Local 100, and officers of both, sought but $25,000 in damages, and did not ask class action status. It declared on six causes of action: for violation of the Taylor Law, prima facie tort, intentional interference with plaintiff’s business, willful injury, conspiracy and breach of plaintiff’s rights as third-party beneficiary of the contract between defendant unions and the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA).
By stipulation the New York County action was removed to Queens and joined with the Queens action for trial. Thereafter defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd [a], par 7) to dismiss both actions for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motions, except as to the Jackson, Lewis contract cause of action ( 108 Misc 2d 458 ). On cross appeals to the Appellate Division, that court, in an extensive opinion, modified the order appealed from to dismiss both complaints in their entirety ( 88 AD2d
1 Class certification has never been sought or granted, however.
2 It is undisputed that the 1980 transit strike was in violation of the antistrike provisions of subdivision 1 of section 210 of the Civil Service Law. In fact, several of the defendants herein were the subject of criminal contempt findings and fines (see New York City Tr. Auth. v Lindner, 83 AD2d 573 , mots for lv to app dsmd 55 NY2d 701 ).
II
The effect of the Taylor Law, whether as preemptive of previously permissible private damage actions or as initiating a new form of private action for damages resulting from a strike in violation of its provisions, turns on what the Legislature intended. The general rule is and long has been that “when the common law gives a remedy, and another remedy is provided by statute, the latter is cumulative, unless made exclusive by the statute” (Candee v Hayward, 37 NY 653 , 656; accord Hardmann v Bowen, 39 NY 196 , 198; Jordan & Skaneateles Plankroad Co. v Morley, 23 NY 552 , 554; Wetmore v Tracy, 14 Wend 250 , 255). Likewise, as we noted in Amberg v Kinley ( 214 NY 531 , 535-536): “Whether a statute gives a cause of action to a person injured by its violation, or whether it is intended as a general police regulation, and the violation made punishable solely as a public offense ‘must to a great extent depend on the purview of the legislature in the particular statute and the language which they have there employed.’ (Atkinson v New Castle & Gateshead W.W. Co., L.R. [2 Exch. Div.] 441; Taylor v L.S. & M.S. Ry. Co., 45 Mich. 74 .)” (See, also, Abounader v Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 NY 458 ,463-464; Daggett v Keshner, 284 App Div 733 , 738, mod on other grounds 6 AD2d 503 , affd 7 NY2d 981 .)
3 Because that order brings up for review all aspects of the order appealed from, including so much as affirmed dismissal of Jackson, Lewis’ contract cause of action (Pan Amer. World Airways v Overseas Raleigh Mfg., 49 NY2d 982 ), the question certified to us by the Appellate Division was unnecessary and is not answered.
4 Not argued in Jackson, Lewis’ brief in this court and, therefore, not considered by us are the fourth and fifth causes of action for willful injury and for conspiracy.
Analysis begins, of course, with the statute itself. It contains no explicit statement as to either exclusivity or intent to create a private cause of action. Examination of the history and genesis of the Taylor Law leads us to conclude, however, that it is cumulative, not exclusive, and was not intended to establish a new cause of action.
New York’s first statutory proscription against strikes by public employees was the Condon-Wadlin Act, passed in
On January 15, 1966, prompted by a massive strike of New York City transit workers which began January 1, 1966, Governor Rockefeller appointed a Committee on Public Employee Relations, chaired by Professor George W. Taylor. The committee was charged “to make legislative proposals for protecting the public against the disruption of vital public services by illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting the rights of public employees” and by March 31, 1966 issued its Final Report recommending that: “(1) The Condon-Wadlin Law should be repealed and
A bill introduced in the Senate based on that report, and supported by the Governor, passed that body on June 7, 1966 (Hanslowe, 1966 Survey of NY Law-Labor Relations Law, 18 Syracuse L Rev 247 , 253). The Assembly, however, on the same day passed its own bill, in which the only explicit sanction was discipline pursuant to section 75 of the Civil Service Law. The impasse between the two houses continued into the 1967 session, the Speaker of the Assembly originally opposing penalties altogether, but later modifying that position to permit penalties which would deter strikes “ ‘but not to such an extent that they would destroy unions’ ” (Wolk, p 75, citing Maiorana, Travia Proposes Strike Penalties, New York Times, March 3, 1967, p 22, col 6). The Taylor Law (officially the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act) was finally adopted in April, 1967, effective September 1,1967 (L 1967, ch 392). It declared it to be “the public policy of the state and the purpose of this act to promote harmonious and cooperative
Enactment of the 1967 law did not end the problem, however. In 1968, Governor Rockefeller re-established the Committee on Public Employee Relations and charged it to examine the experience under the Taylor Law. The committee reported its view that the law was “working well” and that the limited experience under it did not “provide an adequate basis for now recommending changes in the Act” (New York Governor’s Committee on Public Employee Relations, Interim Report, June 17,1968 [hereafter “Interim Report”], Transmittal Letter). Nevertheless, a number of changes were made in the act in 1969 (L 1969, ch 24). Striking employees became subject not only to disciplinary action but also to a one-year probationary period[5] and the deduction of two days’ pay for each day of violation was reinstated (Civil Service Law, § 210, subd 2). The imposition of penalties against employees and em
5 The probationary period provision was, however, repealed by chapter 465 of the Laws of 1978.
The same act made clear, however, the Legislature’s intent to protect employee organizations from destruction, even though they may have participated in an illegal strike. Thus, although the 18-month limitation on forfeiture of the union’s dues deduction privilege was removed, both that provision (Civil Service Law, § 210, subd 3, par [f]) and section 751 (subd 2, par [a]) of the Judiciary Law (dealing with the fines imposable for criminal contempt) were amended to make the union’s ability to pay a factor in the determination of the penalty to be assessed.
Against that background, for a number of reasons, legislative intent to provide a private remedy cannot be discerned. Although Jackson, Lewis is “one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted” and a right of action in a member of the class may be implied when clearly in furtherance of the legislative purpose (compare Abounader v Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 NY 458 , 465, supra [manufacturer held for fraud with respect to foodstuffs, without regard to privity because otherwise “the statute would be largely emasculated of possible benefits”], with Steitz v City of Beacon, 295 NY 51 , 54-55 [private right of action against city for failure to quench a fire started by another will not be implied from a statute requiring the city to maintain a fire department, in view of the crushing burden that would be imposed]), the provisions of the present statute and the history of their enactment strongly suggest that a private action based upon the statute was not intended. True such an action would be a powerful deterrent to public employee strikes, but it would also, as the claim for damages in the Burns Jackson complaint suggests, impose a crushing burden on the unions and each of the employees participating in the strike, who could be held jointly and severally liable with the union for the damages resulting from violation (see as to overdeterrence, ALI Federal Securities Code [Proposed Official Draft], § 1722, subd [a]). It would do so, moreover, notwithstanding that the penalties of the Condon-Wadlin
Implication of a private action is, moreover, inconsistent with the purposes of the Taylor Law. Its primary purposes, as both Taylor Committee reports emphasize, was to defuse the tensions in public employer-employee relations by reducing the penalties and increasing reliance on negotiation and the newly created Public Employment Relations Board as a vehicle toward labor peace (see Securities Investor Protection v Barbour, 421 US 412 , 420; National R. R. Passenger Corp. v National Assn. of R. R. Passengers, 414 US 453 , 464, reh den 415 US 952 ). A private action, which would impose per se liability without any of the limitations applicable to the common-law forms of action hereafter considered, would inevitably upset the delicate balance established after 20 years of legislative pondering. As the Washington Supreme Court has noted, “the schemes created by statute for collective bargaining and dispute resolution must be allowed to function as intended, without the added coercive power of the courts being thrown into the balance on one side or the other” (Burke & Thomas v International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wn 2d 762 , 772; accord Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich 104 , 131). Having explicitly directed that in assessing penalties PERB and the courts consider the union’s ability to pay and refused to enact a decertification provision, the Legislature must be
6 The more particularly does this follow from the failure of either the Taylor Committee’s 1966 Final Report or its 1968 Interim Report, both of which included comprehensive discussion of deterrents, to make any reference to a private cause of action.
That no new per se action was contemplated by the Legislature does not, however, require us to conclude that the traditional, though more limited, forms of action are no longer available to redress injury resulting from violation of the statute. The penalties imposable by PERB and the courts for such a violation provide some solace, but no recompense, for those injured by acts which not only violate the statute but also constitute a breach of duty, independent of the statute, which common-law remedies made compensable. Although it is within the competence of the Legislature to abolish common-law causes of action (Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41 ), there is no express provision to that effect in the statute, notwithstanding numerous amendments of the Taylor Law[7] after the decision by the Second Department in Caso v District Council 37, Amer. Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO ( 43 AD2d 159 , 160-162; see, also, People v Vizzini, 78 Misc 2d 1040 , 1043-1044), holding that law nonexclusive and a public nuisance action maintainable. It is one thing to conclude that limitation of penalties payable to the public treasury and denial of a decertification sanction are inconsistent with the imposition of a new strict liability cause of action, and quite another to conclude that persons damaged by action tortious before public strikes were declared illegal should be denied the recompense to which they would be otherwise entitled in the interest of labor peace. That indemnification against such liability may become a union demand in the bargaining process and prolong an illegal strike must be recognized (cf. Burke & Thomas v International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92 Wn 2d 762 , 775, supra; Note, 91 Harv L Rev, at p 1320) but is, in our view, an insufficient basis, absent clearer indication of legislative intent, to hold the statute pre-emptive of all common-law causes of action and thus, as the Supreme Court has said in another context, “permit
7 (L 1974, chs 283, 724, 725; L 1975, ch 850; L 1977, chs 216, 677, 678, 817; L 1978, ch 465; L 1981, chs 378, 814.)
Ill
The conclusion that the statute is not exclusive requires that we consider the common-law causes of action asserted in the two complaints, the allegations of which are for purposes of such consideration deemed true (219 Broadway Corp. v Alexander’s, Inc., 46 NY2d 506 ; see 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 3211.29). We conclude, for the reasons spelled out below, that neither complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
A
The cause of action common to the two complaints is that in prima facie tort. The elements of such a cause of action as stated in prior New York cases are (1) intentional infliction of harm, (2) resulting in special damages, (3) without excuse or justification, and (4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be lawful (ATI, Inc. v Ruder & Finn, 42 NY2d 454 , 458; see Wehringer v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 91 AD2d 585 , affd 59 NY2d 688 ; 2 NY PJI 624). Plaintiff suggests, however, that it is anomalous to deny a cause of action on the ground that the injury-causing act was imlawful and the balancing analysis espoused in Comment e of section 870 of the Restatement of Torts, Second, lends some credence to that argument.
It can be argued that unlawful acts are not covered by prima facie tort because they will normally be compensable in traditional tort forms of action, unless the policy underlying the traditional tort excludes such an act. But it
As it has evolved prima facie tort is neither a “ ‘catch-all’ alternative for every cause of action which cannot stand on its legs” (Belsky v Lowenthal, 62 AD2d 319 , 323, affd 47 NY2d 820 ), nor will the existence of a traditional tort foreclose alternative pleading of prima facie tort, though, of course, double recoveries will not be allowed (Board of Educ. v Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Local 1889, AFT AFL-CIO, 38 NY2d 397 , 406). The “categories” argument, therefore, need not exclude an unlawful act, as, indeed, the Restatement of Torts, Second, has recognized (§ 870, Comment h).
We need not now decide whether an unlawful act can be the predicate for prima facie tort, for there is no recovery in prima facie tort unless malevolence is the sole motive for defendant’s otherwise lawful act or, in Justice Holmes’ characteristically colorful language, unless defendant acts from “disinterested malevolence” (American Bank & Trust Co. v Federal Bank, 256 US 350 , 358; see Squire Records v Vanguard Recording Soc., 25 AD2d 190 , affd 19 NY2d 797 ; Morrison v National Broadcasting Co., supra, at p 287; 2 NY PJI 624), by which is meant “that the genesis which will make a lawful act unlawful must be a malicious one unmixed with any other and exclusively directed to injury and damage of another” (Beardsley v Kilmer, 236 NY 80 , 90).
Here the prima facie tort causes of action cannot stand because, although they allege intentional and malicious action, they do not allege that defendants’ sole motivation was “disinterested malevolence.”
B
The Burns Jackson complaint alleges in its second cause of action that the strike engaged in by defendants “caused
The damages here alleged are for additional out-of-pocket expenses resulting from defendants’ conduct and for loss of business profits. Such damages, though differing as to the nature of the expense or the particular contract from which greater profit was expected, were, as the Appellate Division noted (88 AD2d, at p 71), suffered by every person, firm and corporation conducting his or its business or profession in the City of New York. Indeed, the class as envisioned by plaintiff’s complaint consists of “professional and business entities conducted for profit * * * that rely on the public transportation system serving the City of New York to enable them to practice their profession and to operate their businesses and that have been damaged as a consequence of the defendants’ disruption of the service provided by that system.”
When the injury claimed to be peculiar is of the same kind suffered by all who are affected, when it “is common
C
The two remaining causes of action may be dealt with more summarily. Jackson, Lewis’ brief devotes but a two-sentence footnote to its third cause of action for intentional interference with business. The complaint alleges that defendants “intentionally and maliciously interfered with the business of the plaintiff” to plaintiff’s special damage in that the productivity of partners and employees was reduced and extra expense incurred. What is apparently sought to be pleaded, therefore, is a claim within section 766A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, for causing plaintiff’s performance of its contracts with its clients to be more expensive or burdensome.
No New York case recognizing such a cause of action has been cited or has been found by us. We need not, however, now decide whether such a cause of action should be recognized by us in other situations. The interference here alleged was but an incidental result of defendants’ conduct and, although that conduct was in violation of the Taylor Law, we conclude that as a matter of policy we should not recognize a common-law cause of action for such incidental interference when the Legislature has, in establishing an otherwise comprehensive labor plan for the governance of public employer-employee relations, failed to do so (De Angelis v Lutheran Med. Center, 58 NY2d 1053 ; Albala v City of New York, 54 NY2d 269 ; Donohue v
The Jackson, Lewis contract cause of action alleges that contracts existed between defendant unions and NYCTA and MABSTOA up to and including March 31, 1980, that they continued by operation of law until negotiation of successor agreements ended, that between April 1 and April 11,1980, defendants and their members engaged in a strike against NYCTA and MABSTOA in violation of the contracts, that plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the contracts and that plaintiff was damaged by their breach.
A third party may be the beneficiary of a public as well as a private contract (see Kornblut v Chevron Oil Co., 62 AD2d 831 , affd 48 NY2d 853 ; 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 280). He may recover, however, only by establishing (1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his benefit and (3) that the benefit to him is sufficiently immediaté, rather than incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate him if the benefit is lost (Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v Atlas, 40 NY2d 652 , 655; Associated Flour Haulers & Warehousemen v Hoffman, 282 NY 173 ; Moch Co. v Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160 ).
Existence of a valid and binding contract is, thus, a sine qua non (see Dunning v Leavitt, 85 NY 30 , 35; 2 Williston, Contracts [3d ed], §§ 347, 394; 22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 281). Here, however, the complaint itself states that the contracts expired on March 31,1980, and its suggestion that they continued by operation of law under Matter of Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth (District Council 37 & Local 1396) (5 PERB 3064) is inconsistent with the limitation on the so-called “Triborough Doctrine” stated by us in Matter of Board of Coop. Educational Servs. of Rockland County v New York State Public Employment Relations Bd. ( 41 NY2d 753 , 757-758). The contracts having expired before the strike, any rights of plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of them expired with it (Fulenwider v Firefighters Assn. Local Union 1784, 649 SW2d 268 [Tenn], supra).
Concurrence
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
(concurring). I agree that appellants have not stated a cause of action. Inasmuch as the court expressly does not now decide “whether an unlawful act can be the predicate for prima facie tort,” the abstract discussion of the merits of the proposition (pp 332-333) is jurisprudentially unwise and will serve only to confuse litigants and the courts. The inappropriateness of the dicta is magnified by its inconclusiveness. Consequently, I cannot join in that part of the majority opinion.
Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler and Simons concur with Judge Meyer; Chief Judge Cooke concurs in result in a concurring memorandum.
Order affirmed, with costs. Question certified not answered as unnecessary.
Cases cited
- Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co. 296 NY 79 p. 317, p. 318, p. 321
- Aikens v. Wisconsin 195 US 194 p. 317, p. 319, p. 321
- Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co. 24 AD2d 284 at 287 p. 317, p. 318, p. 319, p. 320, p. 333
- Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co. 19 NY2d 453 p. 317, p. 318, p. 319, p. 320, p. 333
- Board of Education v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n 38 NY2d 397 at 406 p. 317, p. 318, p. 319, p. 320, p. 321, p. 333
- ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc. 42 NY2d 454 at 458 p. 317, p. 318, p. 332
- Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber 285 NY 348 p. 317, p. 318, p. 319, p. 321
- Lanite Sales Co. v. Klevens Corp. 205 Misc 303 p. 317
- McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp. 70 AD2d 771 p. 317
- State v. Local 1115 Joint Board, Nursing Home & Hospital Employees Division 56 AD2d 310 p. 317, p. 321
- Caso v. District Council 37 43 AD2d 159 at 160-162 p. 317, p. 319, p. 321, p. 331, p. 334
- Wakeman v. Wilbur 147 NY 657 at 663 p. 317, p. 318, p. 334
- Lansing v. Smith 4 Wend 9 p. 317, p. 335
- Francis v. Schoellkopf 53 NY 152 at 154 p. 317, p. 320, p. 335
- Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby 241 US 33 at 39 p. 317, p. 325
- Motyka v. City of Amsterdam 15 NY2d 134 at 139 p. 317, p. 320, p. 325
- DiCaprio v. New York Central Railroad 231 NY 94 p. 317
- Squire Records, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. 25 AD2d 190 p. 317, p. 333
- Ballin v. Larkin 62 Misc 2d 949 p. 317
- Ballin v. Larkin 36 AD2d 530 p. 317
- Lincoln First Bank v. Barstro & Associates Contracting, Inc. 49 AD2d 1025 p. 317
- Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp. 7 AD2d 89 p. 317, p. 318
- Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp. 6 NY2d 900 p. 317, p. 318
- Brookins v. Pennsylvania Railroad 202 Misc 467 p. 317, p. 318
- Gibbons v. Hoffman 203 Misc 26 p. 317
- Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp. 198 Misc 291 p. 317
- Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp. 305 NY 140 p. 317
- Martin v. Curran 303 NY 276 p. 318
- In re the Arbitration between New York Times Co. & Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 3 2 AD2d 31 p. 318
- Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District 47 NY2d 440 p. 318, p. 319, p. 320, p. 336
- Drago v. Buonagurio 46 NY2d 778 p. 318, p. 322, p. 336
- Jamur Productions Corp. v. Quill 51 Misc 2d 501 p. 318, p. 320, p. 322, p. 330
- Albala v. City of New York 54 NY2d 269 p. 318, p. 335
- Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union 451 US 77 p. 319
- Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp. 15 NY2d 718 p. 319, p. 320
- David v. Fayman 298 NY 669 p. 319, p. 320
- Rosner v. Textile Binding & Trimming Co. 300 NY 319 p. 319
- Caso v. Gotbaum 67 Misc 2d 205 p. 319
- People v. Vizzini 78 Misc 2d 1040 at 1043-1044 p. 319, p. 322, p. 331
- Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. 243 NY 458 at 463-464, at 465 p. 319, p. 320, p. 324, p. 329
- Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Manufacturing Co. 248 NY 293 p. 319, p. 320
- Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co. 270 NY 287 p. 319
- Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp. 274 NY 106 p. 319
- Filardo v. Foley Bros. 297 NY 217 p. 319
- Willy v. Mulledy 78 NY 310 p. 319
- Amberg v. Kinley 214 NY 531 at 535-536 p. 319, p. 324
- Martin v. Herzog 228 NY 164 p. 319
- Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 7 AD2d 441 p. 319
- Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 290 US 398 p. 319
- Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co. 183 NY 330 p. 319
- Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co. 62 AD2d 831 p. 319, p. 321, p. 336
- Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co. 48 NY2d 853 p. 319, p. 321, p. 336
- Goodman v. State 31 NY2d 381 p. 320
- Sanford v. Rockefeller 35 NY2d 547 p. 320, p. 322
- Drinkhouse v. Parka Corp. 3 NY2d 82 p. 320
- In re the Arbitration between Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. & Holz 4 NY2d 245 p. 320
- Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County 18 NY 155 p. 320
- Callanan v. Gilman 107 NY 360 at 370 p. 320, p. 334
- Rumsey v. New York & New England Railroad 133 NY 79 p. 320
- Belsky v. Lowenthal 62 AD2d 319 at 323 p. 320, p. 333
- Belsky v. Lowenthal 47 NY2d 820 p. 320, p. 333
- Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village, Inc. 309 NY 527 p. 320
- City of New York v. De Lury 23 NY2d 175 p. 320, p. 321
- Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union Local No. 556 v. Emery 394 US 455 p. 320
- In re the Arbitration Between Susquehanna Valley Central School District & Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n 37 NY2d 614 p. 320
- Steitz v. City of Beacon 295 NY 51 at 54-55 p. 320, p. 329
- Lopes v. Rostad 45 NY2d 617 p. 320
- Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance 259 NY 250 p. 320
- American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank 256 US 350 at 358 p. 320, p. 333
- Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin 245 NY 260 p. 321
- Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney 308 NY 164 p. 321
- H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 247 NY 160 at 165 p. 321, p. 336, p. 337
- Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp. 271 NY 306 p. 321
- Schuster v. City of New York 5 NY2d 75 p. 321
- Weiss v. Fote 7 NY2d 579 p. 321
- Riss v. City of New York 22 NY2d 579 p. 321
- United Steelworkers v. United States 361 US 39 p. 321
- Ansteth v. Buffalo Railway Co. 145 NY 210 p. 321
- Phillips v. Sun Oil Co. 307 NY 328 p. 321
- Griggs v. Day 136 NY 152 p. 321
- Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 US 426 p. 322
- Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. 309 US 261 p. 322
- Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. 303 US 41 p. 322
- Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge 403 US 274 p. 322
- Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776 346 US 485 p. 322
- San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon 359 US 236 p. 322
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters 436 US 180 p. 322
- Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25 430 US 290 p. 322
- Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 444 US 11 p. 322
- Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington 442 US 560 p. 322
- Cort v. Ash 422 US 66 at 78 p. 322, p. 325
- Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission 316 US 4 p. 322
- Burns Jackson v. Lindner 108 Misc 2d 458 p. 323
- Hardmann v. Bowen 39 NY 196 at 198 p. 324
- Wetmore v. Tracy 14 Wend 250 at 255 p. 324
- Daggett v. Keshner 6 AD2d 503 p. 324
- Daggett v. Keshner 7 NY2d 981 p. 324
- Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran 456 US 353 at 374-383 p. 325
- Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n 453 US 1 at 13, at 13, 15 p. 325, p. 330
- Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 430 US 1 at 37-40 p. 325
- Di Maggio v. Brown 19 NY2d 283 p. 326
- Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour 421 US 412 at 420 p. 330
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers 414 US 453 at 464 p. 330
- Montgomery v. Daniels 38 NY2d 41 p. 331
- Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States 389 US 191 at 204 p. 332
- Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers 72 Cal App 3d 100 p. 332
- 219 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc. 46 NY2d 506 p. 332
- Wehringer v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. 91 AD2d 585 p. 332
- Wehringer v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. 59 NY2d 688 p. 332
- Squire Records, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording Society, Inc. 19 NY2d 797 p. 333
- Beardsley v. Kilmer 236 NY 80 at 90 p. 333
- De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center 58 NY2d 1053 p. 335
- Port Chester Electrical Construction Corp. v. Atlas 40 NY2d 652 at 655 p. 336
- Associated Flour Haulers & Warehousemen, Inc. v. Hoffman 282 NY 173 p. 336
- Dunning v. Leavitt 85 NY 30 at 35 p. 336