Fort Bend County v. Davis

FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS v. DAVIS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the fth circuit No. 18–525. Argued April 22, 2019—Decided June 3, 2019 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Act instructs a complainant, before com-mencing a Title VII action in court, to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1). On receipt of a charge, the EEOC is to notify the employer and investigate the allegations. § 2000e–5(b). The Commission may “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of . . . conciliation.” Ibid. The EEOC also has first option to “bring a civil action” against the employer in court. § 2000e–5(f)(1). But the Commission has no authority itself to adjudicate discrimination complaints. If the EEOC chooses not to sue, and whether or not the EEOC otherwise acts on the charge, a complainant is entitled to a “right-to-sue” notice 180 days after the charge is filed. Ibid.; 29 CFR § 1601.28. On receipt of the right-to-sue notice, the complainant may commence a civil action against her employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Respondent Lois M. Davis filed a charge against her employer, petitioner Fort Bend County. Davis alleged sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting the harassment. While her EEOC charge was pending, Fort Bend fred Davis because she flailed to show up for work on a Sunday and went to a church event instead. Davis attempted to supplement her EEOC charge by handwriting “religion” on a form called an “intake questionnaire,” but she did not amend the formal charge document. Upon receiving a right-to-sue letter, Davis commenced suit in Federal District Court, alleging discrimination on account of religion and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. After years of litigation, only the religion-based discrimination claim remained in the case. Fort Bend then asserted for the first time that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis' case because her EEOC charge did not state a religion-based discrimination claim. The District Court agreed and granted Fort Bend's motion to dismiss Davis' suit. On appeal from the dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Title VII's charge-fling requirement, the Court

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of Appeals held, is not jurisdictional; instead, the requirement is a prudential prerequisite to suit, forfeited in Davis' case because Fort Bend had waited too long to raise the objection. Held : Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional. Pp. 547–553.

(a) The word “jurisdictional” is generally reserved for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons over whom the court may exercise adjudi-catory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455. A claim-processing rule requiring parties to take certain procedural steps in, or prior to, litigation, may be mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19. But a mandatory rule of that sort, unlike a prescription limiting the kinds of cases a court may adjudicate, is ordinarily forfeited if not timely asserted. Id., at 15. Pp. 547–550. (b) Title VII's charge-fling requirement is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. The requirement is stated in provisions of Title VII discrete from the statutory provisions empowering federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The charge-fling instruction is kin to prescriptions the Court has ranked as nonjurisdictional—for example, directions to raise objections in an agency rulemaking before asserting them in court, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P ., 572 U. S. 489, 511–512, or to follow procedures governing copyright registration before suing for infringement, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 157. Pp. 550–553. 893 F. 3d 300, affirmed. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak argued the cause for petitioner . With her on the briefs were Neal Kumar Katyal, Mitchell P . Reich, and Randall W. Morse .

Raff Melkonian argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Wright, R. Russell Hollen-beck, Brian H. Fletcher , and Pamela S. Karlan.

Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco , Assistant Attorney General Dreiband, Deputy Solicitor General Wall, Bonnie I . Page Proof Pending Publication

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Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The Act also prohibits retaliation against persons who assert rights under the statute. § 2000e–3(a). As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action in court, a complainant must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1). The question this case presents: Is Title VII's charge-fling precondition to suit a “jurisdictional” requirement that can be raised at any stage of a proceeding; or is it a procedural prescription mandatory if timely raised, but subject to forfeiture if tardily asserted? We hold that Title VII's charge-fling instruction is not jurisdictional, a term generally reserved to describe the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction). Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455 (2004). Prerequisites to suit like Title VII's charge-fling instruction are not of that character; they are

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Center for Workplace Compliance et al. by Rae T. Vann, Karen R. Harned, Elizabeth Milito , and Daryl Joseffer; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Collin O'Connor Udell and Lisa Soronen. Briefs of amicus curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Ashwin P . Phatak; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Sherrilyn A. Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Michael L. Foreman. Scott Dodson filed a brief of amicus curiae , pro se.

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Title VII directs that a “charge . . . shall be filed” with the EEOC “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved” within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occur[s].” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b), (e)(1). For complaints concerning a practice occurring in a State or political subdivision that has a fair employment agency of its own empowered “to grant or seek relief,” Title VII instructs the complainant to file her charge first with the state or local agency. § 2000e–5(c). The complainant then has 300 days following the challenged practice, or 30 days after receiving notice that state or local proceedings have ended, “whichever is earlier,” to file a charge with the EEOC. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If the state or local agency has a “worksharing” agreement with the EEOC, a complainant ordinarily need not file separately with federal and state agencies. She may file her charge with one agency, and that agency will then relay the charge to the other. See 29 CFR § 1601.13 (2018); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 3.

When the EEOC receives a charge, in contrast to agencies like the National Labor Relations Board, 29 U. S. C. § 160, and the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U. S. C. § 1204, it does not “adjudicate [the] clai[m],” Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). Instead, Title VII calls for the following course. Upon receiving a charge, the EEOC notifies the employer and investigates the allegations. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b). If the Commission finds “reasonable cause” to believe the charge is true, the Act instructs the Commission to “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Ibid. When informal methods do not resolve the charge, the EEOC has first option to “bring a civil action” against the employer in court. Page Proof Pending Publication

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suit. Ibid.

In the event that the EEOC determines there is “n[o] reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” the Commission is to dismiss the charge and notify the complainant of his or her right to sue in court. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(b), (f)(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. Whether or not the EEOC acts on the charge, a complainant is entitled to a “right-to-sue” notice 180 days after the charge is filed. § 2000e–5(f)(1); 29 CFR § 1601.28. And within 90 days following such notice, the complainant may commence a civil action against the allegedly offending employer. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

Respondent Lois M. Davis worked in information technology for petitioner Fort Bend County. In 2010, she informed Fort Bend's human resources department that the director of information technology, Charles Cook, was sexually harassing her. Following an investigation by Fort Bend, Cook resigned. Davis' supervisor at Fort Bend, Kenneth Ford, was well acquainted with Cook. After Cook resigned, Davis alleges, Ford began retaliating against her for reporting Cook's sexual harassment. Ford did so, according to Davis, by, inter alia, curtailing her work responsibilities.

Seeking redress for the asserted harassment and retaliation, Davis submitted an “intake questionnaire” in February 2011, followed by a charge in March 2011. 2 While her

1 A different provision of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16, prohibits employment discrimination by the Federal Government and sets out procedures applicable to claims by federal employees. 2 Davis submitted these documents to the Texas Workforce Commission. Complaints lodged with that commission are relayed to the EEOC, under a “worksharing” agreement between the two agencies. See How To Submit an Employment Discrimination Complaint, Texas Workforce Commission,

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Attempting to supplement the allegations in her charge, Davis handwrote “religion” on the “Employment Harms or Actions” part of her intake questionnaire, and she checked boxes for “discharge” and “reasonable accommodation” on that form. She made no change, however, in the formal charge document. A few months later, the Department of Justice notified Davis of her right to sue.

In January 2012, Davis commenced a civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging discrimination on account of religion and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. 3 The District Court granted Fort Bend's motion for summary judgment. Davis v. Fort Bend County, 2013 WL 5157191 (SD Tex., Sept. 11, 2013). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed as to Davis' retaliation claim, but reversed as to her religion-based discrimination claim. Davis v. Fort Bend County , 765 F. 3d 480 (2014). Fort Bend filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court denied. 576 U. S. 1004 (2015).

When the case returned to the District Court on Davis' claim of discrimination on account of religion, Fort Bend moved to dismiss the complaint. Years into the litigation, Fort Bend asserted for the first time that the District Court

https:// twc.texas.gov/jobseekers/how-submit-employment-discrimination-complaint (as last visited May 30, 2019). 3 Davis also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, but she did not appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Fort Bend on that claim.

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The Fifth Circuit reversed. 893 F. 3d 300 (2018). Title VII's charge-fling requirement, the Court of Appeals held, is not jurisdictional; instead, the requirement is a prudential prerequisite to suit, forfeited in Davis' case because Fort Bend did not raise it until after “an entire round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court.” Id., at 307–308.

We granted Fort Bend's petition for certiorari, 586 U. S. 1113 (2019), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether Title VII's charge-fling requirement is jurisdictional. Compare, e. g., 893 F. 3d, at 306 (case below) (charge-fling requirement is nonjurisdictional), with, e. g., Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F. 3d 297, 300 (CA4 2009) (federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when the charge-fling requirement is not satisfied).

“Jurisdiction,” the Court has observed, “is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998)).4 In recent years, the Court has undertaken “[t]o

4 “Courts, including this Court, . . . have more than occasionally [mis]-used the term `jurisdictional' ” to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 413 (2004) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (alterations in original)). Passing references to Title VII's charge-fling requirement as “jurisdictional” in prior Court opinions, see, e. g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973), display the terminology employed when the Court's use of “jurisdictional” was “less than meticulous,” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454.

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Congress may make other prescriptions jurisdictional by incorporating them into a jurisdictional provision, as Congress has done with the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-court diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between (1) citizens of different States . . . .”). In addition, the Court has stated it would treat a requirement as “jurisdictional” when “a long line of [Supreme] Cour[t] decisions left undisturbed by Congress” attached a jurisdictional label to the prescription. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 558 U. S. 67, 82 (2009) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209–211 (2007)). See also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 132 (2008).

Characterizing a rule as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction “renders it unique in our adversarial system.” Auburn, 568 U. S., at 153. Unlike most arguments, challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by the defendant “at any point in the litigation,” and courts must consider them sua sponte . Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 141 (2012). “[H]arsh consequences” attend the jurisdictional brand. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U. S. 402, 409 (2015). “Tardy jurisdictional objections” occasion wasted court resources and “disturbingly disarm litigants.” Auburn, 568 U. S., at 153.

The Court has therefore stressed the distinction between jurisdictional prescriptions and nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules, which “seek to promote the orderly prog- Page Proof Pending Publication

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The Court has characterized as nonjurisdictional an array of mandatory claim-processing rules and other preconditions to relief. These include: the Copyright Act's requirement that parties register their copyrights (or receive a denial of registration from the Copyright Register) before commenc-ing an infringement action, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 157, 163–164 (2010); the Railway Labor Act's direction that, before arbitrating, parties to certain railroad labor disputes “attempt settlement `in conference,' ” Union Pacific, 558 U. S., at 82 (quoting 45 U. S. C. § 152); the Clean Air Act's instruction that, to maintain an objection in court on certain issues, one must first raise the objection “with reasonable specificity” during agency rulemaking, EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P ., 572 U. S. 489, 511–512 (2014) (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)); the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's requirement that a cer-tifcate of appealability “indicate [the] specific issue” warranting issuance of the certificate, Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 137 (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2253(c)(3)); Title VII's limitation of covered “employer[s]” to those with 15 or more employees, Ar-baugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 503–504 (2006) (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)); Title VII's time limit for filing a charge with the EEOC, Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982); and several other time prescriptions

5 The Court has “reserved whether mandatory claim-processing rules may [ever] be subject to equitable exceptions.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago , 583 U. S. 17, 20, n. 3 (2017).

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While not demanding that Congress “incant magic words” to render a prescription jurisdictional, Auburn, 568 U. S., at 153, the Court has clarified that it would “leave the ball in Congress' court”: “If the Legislature clearly states that a [prescription] count[s] as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue[;] [b]ut when Congress does not rank a [prescription] as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515–516 (footnote and citation omitted).

Title VII's charge-fling requirement is not of jurisdictional cast. Federal courts exercise jurisdiction over Title VII actions pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331's grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, and Title VII's own jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) (giving federal courts “jurisdiction [over] actions brought under this subchapter”).7 Separate provisions of Title VII, § 2000e–5(e)(1)

6 “If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation [will rank as] jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specification fits within the claim-processing category.” 7 When Title VII was passed in 1964, 28 U. S. C. § 1331's grant of general Hamer , 583 U. S., at 25 (citation omitted). federal-question jurisdiction included an amount-in-controversy requirement. See § 1331(a) (1964 ed.). To ensure that this “limitation would not impede an employment-discrimination complainant's access to a federal forum,” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 505 (2006), Congress enacted Title VII's jurisdiction-conferring provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–

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Instead, Title VII's charge-fling provisions “speak to . . . a party's procedural obligations.” EME Homer , 572 U. S., at 512. They require complainants to submit information to the EEOC and to wait a specified period before commencing a civil action. Like kindred provisions directing parties to raise objections in agency rulemaking, id., at 511–512; follow procedures governing copyright registration, Reed Elsevier , 559 U. S., at 157; or attempt settlement, Union Pacific, 558 U. S., at 82, Title VII's charge-fling requirement is a processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, not a jurisdictional prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts. 8

5(f)(3). See Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 505–506. In 1980, Congress eliminated § 1331's amount-in-controversy requirement. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369. Since then, “Title VII's own jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), has served simply to underscore Congress' intention to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of Title VII claims.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 506. Title VII also contains a separate jurisdictional provision, § 2000e–6(b), giving federal courts jurisdiction over actions by the Federal Government to enjoin “pattern or practice” discrimination.

8 Fort Bend argues that Title VII's charge-fling requirement is jurisdictional because it is “textually linked” to Title VII's jurisdictional provision. Brief for Petitioner 50. Title VII states in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) that “a civil action may be brought” after the charge-fling procedures are followed. Section 2000e–5(f)(3) gives federal courts jurisdiction over “actions brought under this subchapter,” a subchapter that includes § 2000e–5(f)(1). Therefore, Fort Bend insists, federal jurisdiction lies under § 2000e–5(f)(3) only when a proper EEOC charge is filed. But as just observed, see supra, at 550–551, the charge-fling requirement is stated in provisions discrete from Title VII's conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts. See Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center , 568 U. S. 145, 155 (2013) (a requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions”); Gon-

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Fort Bend further maintains that “[t]he congressional purposes embodied in the Title VII scheme,” notably, encouraging conciliation and affording the EEOC first option to bring suit, support jurisdictional characterization of the charge-fling requirement. Brief for Petitioner 27. But a prescription does not become jurisdictional whenever it “promotes important congressional objectives.” Reed Elsevier , 559 U. S., at 169, n. 9. And recognizing that the charge-fling requirement is nonjurisdictional gives plaintiffs scant incentive to skirt the instruction. Defendants, after all, have good reason promptly to raise an objection that may rid them of the lawsuit filed against them. A Title VII complainant would be foolhardy consciously to take the risk that the employer would forgo a potentially dispositive defense.

In sum, a rule may be mandatory without being jurisdictional, and Title VII's charge-fling requirement fits that bill.

zalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 145 (2012) (a nonjurisdictional provision does not metamorphose into a jurisdictional limitation by cross-referencing a jurisdictional provision).

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For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is

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