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Hassan v. Montuori

99 N.Y.2d 348 Court N.Y. Decision date 2003-02-18 English

Delivered by Smith, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 348
[786 NE2d 25, 756 NYS2d 126]
Marianne Hassan, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Anthony Montuori et al., Defendants, and Hendel Products, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Argued January 14, 2003;
decided February 18, 2003
p. 349
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Gair, Gair, Conason, Steigman & Mackauf, New York City (Ben B. Rubinowitz, Rhonda E. Kay and Richard M. Steigman of counsel), for appellant.
I. One whose use of a motor vehicle was not pursuant to “a lease or otherwise” and whose use or possession of that vehicle was at the will of another who could have revoked that right at any time is not an “owner” as defined by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128. (Daly v Haight, 170 App Div 469 ; Stewart v Scheinert, 47 NY2d 826 ; Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 ; McClaney v Utility Equip. Leasing Corp., 560 F Supp 1270 ; Giardina v Avis Rent A Car, 135 Misc 2d 1052 ; Dairylea Coop, v Rossal, 64 NY2d 1 ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v World Wide Rent-A-Car, 28 AD2d 286 ; Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21 ; Fried v Seippel, 80 NY2d 32 .) II. An injured passenger’s status as a statutorily defined vehicle owner cannot be used to defeat or interfere with that person’s rights to maintain an action against a vicariously liable titled or registered vehicle owner pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. (Kalechman v Drew Auto Rental, 33 NY2d 397 ; Servido v Superintendent of Ins., 11 AD2d 70 , 53 NY2d 1041 ; Schrader v Carney, 180 AD2d 200 ; Parker v Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 20 AD2d 951 ; Billy v Zajac, 7 AD2d 729 , 929; Gochee v Wagner, 257 NY 344 ; Guercio v Hertz Corp., 40 NY2d 680 ; Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Continental Natl. Am. Group Co., 35 NY2d 260 ; Allstate Ins. Co. v Travelers Ins. Co., 49 AD2d 613 , 39 NY2d 784 ; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468 .)
Lewis, Johs, Avallone, Aviles & Kaufman, Melville (Christine
p. 350
Malafi and Ann K. Kandel of counsel), for Jonathan Schreiber and another, respondents.
I. Plaintiff is not an owner as that term is defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128. (Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 ; Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 ; Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86 ; Matter of Friss v City of Hudson Police Dept., 187 AD2d 94 ; Matter of R.A. Bronson, Inc. v Franklin Correctional Facility, 255 AD2d 723 ; McClaney v Utility Equip. Leasing Corp., 560 F Supp 1270 ; Matter of Salvation Army v Town of Ellicott Bd. of Assessment Review, 100 AD2d 361 ; Matter of Rochester Christian Church v State of New York Pub. Serv. Commn., 55 NY2d 196 ; Matter of Nassau County Council Boy Scouts of Am. v Board of Assessors of Town of Rockland, 84 AD2d 862 ; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 .) II. Plaintiff’s status as an owner does not prevent her from recovering from other owners under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. (Bluebird Partners v First Fid. Bank, 97 NY2d 456 ; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Disk, 91 NY2d 577 ; Parker v Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 20 AD2d 951 ; Billy v Zajac, 7 AD2d 729 , 929; Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21 ; Kalechman v Drew Auto Rental, 33 NY2d 397 ; Gochee v Wagner, 257 NY 344 ; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468 ; Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Continental Natl. Am. Group Co., 35 NY2d 260 ; Allstate Ins. Co. v Travelers Ins. Co., 49 AD2d 613 , 39 NY2d 784 .)
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York City (Larry H. Lum and Curtis B. Gilfillan of counsel), for Cucina Bay, Inc., respondent.
I. An employee, whose use of her employer’s motor vehicle was not pursuant to a lease to which she was a party, and was revocable at any time by her employer, cannot be defined as an “owner” under section 128 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. (Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 ; Daly v Haight, 170 App Div 469 ; Barsh v Town of Union, 126 AD2d 311 ; Manufacturers Trust Co. v Stehle, 1 AD2d 471 ; People v Duff, 83 Misc 2d 655 ; Matter of Bath & Hammondsport R.R. Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 73 NY2d 434 ; Pivar v Graduate School of Figurative Art of N.Y. Academy of Art, 290 AD2d 212 ; Giardina v Avis Rent A Car, 135 Misc 2d 1052 .) II. An injured passenger’s status as a vehicle owner under section 128 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law does not preclude such an injured passenger from bringing an action pursuant to section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law as against the titled and/or registered owner of the vehicle. (Morris v Snappy Car Rental,
p. 351
84 NY2d 21 ; Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281 ; Motor Veh. Acc. Indent. Corp. v Continental Natl. Am. Group Co., 35 NY2d 260 ; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468 ; Matter of Hernandez v Barrios-Paoli, 93 NY2d 781 ; Konviser v State of New York, 180 Misc 2d 174 ; Kalechman v Drew Auto Rental, 33 NY2d 397 ; Allstate Ins. Co. v Travelers Ins. Co., 49 AD2d 613 , 39 NY2d 784 .)
McDonough, Marcus, Cohn, Tretter, Heller & Kanca, LLP, New Rochelle (Eli S. Cohn, Diane K. Kanca, Frank T. Cara and Eugene H. Goldberg of counsel), for First Union Auto Finance, Inc., respondent.
I. Plaintiff-appellant, who had exclusive possession, use and control of the vehicle for more than 30 days, is an owner under section 128 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. (Owen v Gruntz, 216 App Div 19 ; Phelps v People, 72 NY 334 ; Feitelberg v Matuson, 124 Misc 595 ; Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 ; Servido v Superintendent of Ins., 77 AD2d 70 , 53 NY2d 1041 ; Giardina v Avis Rent A Car, 135 Misc 2d 1052 .) II. Plaintiff-appellant, who had exclusive possession, use and control of the motor vehicle of the lessee corporation/ partnership, is not a protected person under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. (Sipp v McGee, 183 Misc 2d 407 ; Glennie v Falls Equip. Co., 238 App Div 7 ; Billy v Zajac, 7 AD2d 729 ; Parker v Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 20 AD2d 951 .) III. An injured active co-owner cannot bring an action against an absentee co-owner for injuries sustained in the operation of the vehicle. (Sipp v McGee, 183 Misc 2d 407 ; Billy v Zajac, 7 AD2d 729 ; Kalechman v Drew Auto Rental, 33 NY2d 397 ; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468 .) IV. Mrs. Hassan will not be deprived of a financially responsible party to respond to her injuries. (Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Continental Natl. Am. Group Co., 35 NY2d 260 .)
Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale (Cheryl F. Korman, Evan H. Krinick and Harris J. Zakarin of counsel), for Hendel Products, Inc., and another, respondents.
I. Plaintiff was an “owner” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128. (Servido v Superintendent of Ins., 77 AD2d 70 , 53 NY2d 1041 ; Foulke v New York Consol. R.R. Co., 228 NY 269 ; Phelps v People, 72 NY 334 ; Martin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192 ; Ellish v Airport Parking Co. of Am., 42 AD2d 174 , 34 NY2d 882 ; Schulman v People, 10 NY2d 249 ; Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 NY2d 506 ; People v Illardo, 48 NY2d 408 ; Giardina v Avis Rent A Car, 135 Misc 2d 1052 ; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 .) II. As an owner of the
p. 352
vehicle, plaintiff cannot utilize Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 to impose liability on other owners of the vehicle. (Kalechman v Drew Auto Rental, 33 NY2d 397 ; Servido v Superintendent of Ins., 77 AD2d 70 , 53 NY2d 1041 ; New York State Bankers Assn. v Albright, 38 NY2d 430 ; Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 ; Bragg v Genesee County Agrie. Socy., 84 NY2d 544 ; Zap-pone v Home Ins. Co., 55 NY2d 131 ; Abood v Hospital Ambulance Serv., 30 NY2d 295 ; Matter of Meyer, 209 NY 386 ; People v Walker, 81 NY2d 661 ; Argentina v Emery World Wide Delivery Corp., 93 NY2d 554 .) III. Any and all cross claims asserted against Hendel should be dismissed. (Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v Facilities Dev. Corp., 71 NY2d 599 ; Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177 .)

OPINION OF THE COURT

Plaintiff, Marianne Hassan, was employed by Hendel Products, Inc. Pursuant to that employment, Hendel provided her with a company vehicle, leased from First Union Auto Finance, Inc., for business and personal use. Plaintiff used the vehicle for approximately two years prior to the accident that gives rise to this lawsuit.

On May 25, 1997, plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle which was driven by her husband. Hendel and First Auto do not dispute that plaintiff’s husband had their permission to drive the car. While he was driving, the car collided with a truck at an intersection in Merrick, New York. Plaintiff’s husband was killed and plaintiff was severely injured.

Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 against First Union and Hendel as owners of the vehicle in which she was a passenger.[1] Hendel and First Union moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff as a co-owner of the vehicle was ineligible to collect damages from them. Supreme Court denied the motion. A divided Appellate Division modified the trial court’s order and granted summary judgment in favor of both Hendel and First Union, concluding that plaintiff was a statutory owner of the vehicle due to her exclusive possession of the car for two years, and that, as such, she could not maintain an action against co-owners under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388. We granted leave and now reverse.

* Plaintiff also brought suit against the driver of the truck, alleging that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident, against the bar that served him, and against two property owners and their landscaper, claiming that their hedges obscured the view of the operators of the vehicles involved in the accident.

p. 353
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 provides:
“Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.”

Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 128, the applicable definition of “owner” includes “any lessee or bailee of a motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.”

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 was enacted to “ensure access by injured persons to ‘a financially responsible [party] against whom to recover for injuries’ ” and “to change th[e] common-law rule and to impose liability upon the owner of a vehicle ‘for the negligence of a person legally operating the car with the permission, express or implied, of the owner’ * * *” (Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21 , 27 [1994] [citation omitted]).

Assuming without deciding that plaintiff is a statutory owner, we hold that she is not precluded from bringing a section 388 claim against other statutory owners. Focusing on the language of the statute, there is no limitation of the class of possible plaintiffs to nonowners. The statute simply says “[e]very owner” shall be liable for injuries “to person or property” resulting from the negligence of any person using the vehicle with the permission of such owner. Defendants Hendel and First Union are owners who do not dispute that they permitted the person whose alleged negligence caused plaintiff’s injury to drive their vehicle. Thus, regardless of whether plaintiff is also an "owner,” the fact that her husband operated the vehicle with the consent of Hendel and First Union is sufficient to bring her within the protection of the statute.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs, the motion by the defendant First Union Auto Finance, Inc. for summary judgment denied, that branch of the motion of the defendant Hendel Products, Inc. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint denied and the certified question answered in the negative.

p. 354
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Ciparick, Wesley, Rosenblatt, Graffeo and Read concur.

Order, insofar as appealed from, reversed, etc.

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